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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between the Royal Australian Navy 
(RAN) and the Royal Navy (RN) between 1945-75. My original contribution to 
knowledge is assessment of a historical topic that is greatly under-researched. In 
addition this research has revealed instances where naval policy in both the United 
Kingdom and Australia was in direct contrast to national policy, a topic that has not 
been previously addressed in an Anglo-Australian context.  
 
The aim of this study is to analyse the changing relationship between the 
Royal Navy and the RAN in the post-Second World War period, specifically 1945-
75. Particular areas of interest include the alterations in inter-service cultural ties, 
operational co-operation, collaboration in matters of personnel, and equipment 
procurement and design. As national policy and strategic concerns have an impact on 
lower-level military affairs, assessment is also made of the altering national and 
strategic relations between Australia and Great Britain in the same period. This 
includes consideration of the diminution of British military influence in the Asia-
Pacific region, as well as the strategic shift of Australia towards the United States in 
the post-war period.          
 
The methodology of the study is based on analysis of primary sources such as 
governmental archives, oral recordings and unpublished memoirs from United 
Kingdom and Australian archives. Consideration has been made of secondary 
sources concerning both the RAN and the Royal Navy to provide historiographical 
context to the research topic. Statistical assessment of the RAN Navy List’s from 
1945-75 has also been made to chart the movement of officers between the Royal 
Navy and the RAN.         
 
This thesis concludes that the relationship between the Royal Navy and the 
RAN between 1945-75 underwent a great level of change. This modification in some 
ways mirrored the gradual disassociation between Great Britain and Australia in the 
same period but the shift in naval relations did not take place at the same time, nor 
did the alteration in naval relations occur for the same reasons. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction, Methodology, Historiography, the Utilisation of 
Primary-Sources and Literature Review 
 
 This thesis will examine Anglo-Australian naval relations between 1945-75, a 
period of great change for both Australia and Great Britain in matters of strategy, 
economics, diplomacy and international affairs. The transformation of both nations 
had a marked impact on the relations between the two countries. At the end of the 
Second World War, Great Britain, though much weakened, was still a world power 
and the ties of empire and Commonwealth were strong. By 1975 Britain had turned 
to Europe in economic and strategic concerns. British military forces were much 
reduced in the Far East, Southeast Asia and Pacific regions. Faced with a declining 
military, the United Kingdom placed much more emphasis on the importance of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The degradation in the relative power 
of Great Britain made an Australian strategic shift towards the United States more 
likely. In the immediate post-war years Australian strategic concerns were 
intertwined to a great extent with those of the United Kingdom, the empire and the 
Commonwealth. By the mid-1970s the importance of the United States to Australian 
security was paramount. The post-war period was also a time of great transformation 
for both the Royal Navy (RN) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The 
chronological scope of the thesis 1945-75 should be clarified; 1945 and the 
completion of the Second World War is an obvious starting point. The end-date of 
the thesis is explained by the impact of the 1947-75 Labour Defence Review and the 
definitive abandonment of permanent deployment of British forces east of Suez. As 
Dorman wrote ‘The Mason Review marked the end of Britain’s world role with the 
virtual elimination of Britain’s out of area capability’.1   
 
 The RAN was fashioned on the Royal Navy and support given by the latter 
was absolutely crucial for the day-to-day running of the former. This was especially 
                                                          
1
 Andrew Dorman, ‘Crises and Reviews in British Defence Policy’, in Britain and Defence 
1945-2000: A Policy Re-evaluation (Harlow: Longman, 2001), pp. 9-28 (p. 18). 
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true in the immediate post-war years. By 1975 the RAN was a much more 
independent force, with less reliance on the Admiralty in matters of strategic 
direction, operations, personnel and equipment. In many ways the growth of naval 
independence mirrored the national Australian experience, but it did not occur at the 
same time, or for the same reasons.           
 
 This thesis is positioned in the traditional subset of historical studies. The 
work does not take a post-modernist approach in either the sources utilised or the 
conclusions reached. Even so the conclusions reached do, to some extent question a 
number of historically accepted ‘truisms’. These will be further examined within the 
text but they include the utility of the Royal Navy to the RAN over the 1945-75 
period, and the impact of the retreat from Suez upon the Royal Navy and hence on 
Anglo-Australian naval relations. In addition questions will be asked as to the prime 
reasons behind the great assistance given by the Admiralty to the RAN in the 
creation of the Australian Fleet Air Arm. An assessment will also be made of the 
major motivation for the purchase of US-built vessels by the RAN. These subjects 
have all involved a level of historical disagreement, and this thesis will attempt to 
illuminate these divergences.    
 
 Statistical techniques were used during the research of this thesis. An 
examination of the RAN Navy Lists was used to evaluate the changing levels of loan 
personnel between the RAN and the Royal Navy, the percentage of RN officers in 
the RAN, the number of RAN officers serving with other navies, and the number of 
RAN officers on course or training with the Royal Navy. This statistical analysis has 
built on the previous work of Alastair Cooper and this author is greatly appreciative 
of Cooper’s work in his initial evaluation of the RAN Navy Lists.2 The thesis adds to 
Cooper’s work and details a percentile breakdown of Royal Navy officers serving 
with the RAN as a percentage of the total officer strength of the RAN. In addition 
comparative data has been gathered of RAN officers serving with other navies, 
including the Royal Navy, data that was not collated by Cooper. One statistical 
                                                          
 
2
 Alastair Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 1945-1960’, 
(unpublished BA honours thesis, University of New South Wales Defence Force Academy, 
1991) and Alastair Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 1945-
1971’, The Journal of Military History, 58 (1994), 699-718. 
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difference between Cooper’s work and the data gathered for this thesis is that Cooper 
only took account of the four largest RN branches, namely Executive, Engineering, 
Supply, and Instructor, when assessing RN officers serving with the RAN. Copper 
suggested that the other branches ‘are insignificant in terms of the overall numbers of 
officers on loan or exchange’.3 This may be a fair point as the trends between 
Cooper’s analysis and those in this thesis follow similar paths. Even so, all Royal 
Navy officers in the RAN Navy Lists have been collated in the statistical analysis in 
this thesis.       
 
 There are certainly gaps in Australian naval history; as one observer of 
Australian defence studies has noted ‘There is an imbalance in the 
literature…towards the Army and, within this, a further…imbalance towards war 
rather than peace.’4 Australian military historian Professor Jeffrey Grey pointed out 
that ‘The paucity of published work on post-war naval matters demonstrates the 
underdeveloped nature of the field as a whole in Australia…’5 It appears that one of 
the reasons for this state of affairs is the poor archival records available to those 
wishing to research Australian naval history. Grey suggested that writing the history 
of the RAN’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts between 1955-72 ‘has been 
made infinitely more difficult by the wholesale destruction of records within Navy 
Office over a prolonged period’.6 As one observer stated, ‘Unfortunately, past poor 
naval archival practices destroyed much primary source material. Although overseas 
sources might replace some small portion, a large part of Australia’s naval history 
has probably been lost.’7 Robert Hyslop, a senior civil servant within Navy Office 
suggested that only about 10 percent of correspondence files have survived the 
untutored and unstructured record keeping policies of the RAN.
8
 Grey suggested that 
                                                          
3
 Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 1945-1971’, p. 718.  
4
 Joan Beaumont, ‘Introduction’, in Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, ed. by Joan 
Beaumont (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-12 (p. 10). 
5
 Jeffrey Grey, ‘Royal Australian Navy in Vietnam’, in Australian Defence: Sources and 
Statistics, ed. by Joan Beaumont (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 332-34 (p. 
332). 
6
 Jeffrey Grey, Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1955-72 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. xix. 
7
 Alastair Cooper, ‘Royal Australian Navy, 1945-72’, in Australian Defence: Sources and 
Statistics, ed. by Joan Beaumont (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 183-86 (p. 
183). 
8
 Robert Hyslop, Aye Aye, Minister: Australian Naval Administration, 1939-59 (Canberra: 
AGPS, 1990).p. 166. 
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‘One of the reasons why naval history is not a strong suit in this country [Australia] 
is that it is much harder than in other countries to write it from the sources 
available.’9 There are gaps, too, in British naval and imperial history; Kennedy wrote 
that ‘…the literature on the imperial nature of RN operations from 1949 to 1956 is 
almost non-existent…’10 One of the aims of this thesis will be to fill some of the gaps 
in the available historiography in both British and Australian naval history. 
 
 Notwithstanding these observations, primary sources from both Australian 
and British archives have been utilised extensively in the preparation of this thesis. 
This archival material included Admiralty files and other governmental documents, 
as well as more under-utilised primary sources including unpublished memoirs, and 
oral recordings.   
 
 Australian archival material was gathered from a number of institutions and 
depositories. The National Archives of Australia (NAA) is the main repository for 
Australian government archival material. The main office is in Canberra but State 
Offices also proved useful in researching Australian naval history. As such research 
visits were made to Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney. The NAA collection search 
database is available via the NAA website but not all records are listed in the 
electronic database. For specific details on NAA primary sources used for this thesis 
reference should be made to the bibliography, but certain files were of particular 
assistance in the formation of this thesis. The A816 Department of Defence 
Correspondence Files Multiple Number Series, 1935-1958 was particularly useful in 
assessing Australian strategic policy, as was the A4940 Menzies and Holt Ministries 
Cabinet Files ‘C’ Single Number Series, 1958-1967. The latter also provided 
information on co-operation between the RAN and the Royal Navy in matters of 
equipment procurement. The A5954 ‘Shedden Collection’ was particularly valuable 
in providing insight on subjects such as the ANZUS and ANZAM treaties and other 
                                                          
 
 
9
 Grey, Up Top, p. xx. 
10
 Greg Kennedy, ‘The Royal Navy and Imperial Defence, 1919-1956’, in Imperial Defence: 
The Old World Order 1856-1956, ed. by Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 133-
51 (p. 141). 
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areas of defence and security administration.
11
 The A7942 Defence Committee 
Papers, 1936-1985, did much to assist with the assessment of Australian 
considerations of post-war British plans for deployment in the Asia-Pacific regions. 
Illumination on a range of post-war Australian naval issues such as equipment 
procurement and standardisation was achieved by assessment of the MP1049/5 
Department of the Navy Correspondence Files (General), 1923-1950 and MP1049/6 
Department of the Navy Correspondence Files (General), 1951-1959. Concerns over 
personnel issues were addressed using the MP150/1 Department of the Navy 
Correspondence Files Multiple Number Series, 1911-1950 and MP151/1 Department 
of the Navy Correspondence Files Multiple Number Series, 1911-1953. Certain 
items listed in the NAA collection search database are held at the Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra, and it holds much material relevant to this thesis, primarily in 
matters of co-operation between the services in military operations and personnel.   
 
 The Sea Power Centre-Australia (SPC-A) in Canberra is an extremely useful 
depository of archival material including an extensive collection of photographs, 
some of which have been used in this piece. The SPC-A also holds archive material 
not released to the public, much of which has been used during this research. Of 
particular use was the file A1813/1632-201-30 RAN Destroyers-Deployment to 
Vietnam and Suitability of Daring Class for Duty. Also of value were various papers 
on post-war maritime exercises such as ROLL CALL, GROUNDWORK, 
KANGAROO and HIGHWOOD 77. The author kindly acknowledges and thanks the 
SPC-A for permission to use the photographic materials in this thesis, as well as 
access to unreleased archival documentation.  
  
 The National Library of Australia (NLA) holds copies of the RAN Navy List 
and also has an unedited manuscript of the memoirs of Vice Admiral Sir Henry 
Burrell.
12
 The latter contains information not included in the published version of 
Burrell’s memoirs. 
 
                                                          
 
11
 Sir Frederick Geoffrey Shedden was the Secretary to the Australian Department of 
Defence from 1937 to 1956. 
12
 Vice Admiral Sir Henry Burrell was Australian Chief of the Naval Staff from 1959 to 
1962. 
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 British archival depositories have been extensively utilised in the preparation 
of this thesis. The majority of UK-based archive material is held in the National 
Archives (TNA), Public Record Office, Kew. For a full list TNA archives consulted 
during the research for this thesis see the bibliography. Certain files were primarily 
helpful in assessing Anglo-Australian naval relations in the post-war period. ADM1 
Admiralty and Secretarial Papers did much to illuminate co-operation in areas of 
equipment and personnel. These concerns were also addressed in ADM167 Board of 
Admiralty Minutes and Memoranda, as were issues dealing with naval operations 
and the impact of declining resources on the Royal Navy. ADM205 First Sea Lord’s 
Records, 1937-1965 was perhaps the most useful archival tool in detailing Anglo-
Australian naval relations, especially on the level of Chiefs of Service.
13
 This series 
of files contains correspondence between the Australian Chiefs of Naval Staff and 
the British First Sea Lords. Other Admiralty files held in TNA assisted in 
assessments of operational matters, personnel concerns, training and co-operation in 
equipment procurement. High-level British strategic thinking was enlightened by 
assessment of the CAB128 Cabinet Minutes, 1945-1978 and the CAB129 Cabinet 
Memoranda, 1945-1978 series. Defence subjects such as the retreat from east of 
Suez, operations and the investigation into a Royal Navy base in Australia were 
addressed in a number of Ministry of Defence files including DEFE4 Chiefs of Staff 
Committee Minutes, DEFE5 Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda, DEFE6 Chiefs 
of Staff Joint Planning Committee, and DEFE7 Ministry of Defence Register Files: 
General Series. Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office files as well 
as Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office files were also used in 
research for this thesis.  
  
 Much use has been made of a variety of personal papers held in British 
institutions. The list, as detailed in the bibliography, is substantial, including material 
in Churchill College Archives Centre (CCAC) in Cambridge, the Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives (LHCMA), King’s College London, the National Maritime 
Museum (NMM), and the Imperial War Museum (IWM) in London. The IWM holds 
                                                          
13
 A Selection of correspondence between the respective heads of service in the ADM205 
series is reproduced in Alastair Cooper, ‘The Development of an Independent Navy for 
Australia: Correspondence Between the First Naval Member and the First Sea Lord, 1947-
59’, in The Naval Miscellany Volume, Vol. VII, ed. by Susan Rose (London: Ashgate for the 
Navy Records Society, 2008), pp. 511-670. 
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an impressive selection of speeches and lectures given by Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Peter Hill-Norton from 1968-73. These speeches testify to some of the strategic 
dilemmas faced by the Royal Navy and the impact of waning resources on the Royal 
Navy’s dealings with other forces such as the RAN. In addition, the IWM holds 
many sound recordings and oral archives and these provide personal insights that 
illuminates a subject that can sometimes be viewed as too equipment-centric, or puts 
too much emphasis on the higher-level strategic implications associated with the 
RAN/Royal Navy paradigm. The Hartley Library at the University of Southampton 
holds the Mountbatten Papers, a database of which can be accessed via the library’s 
website.   
 
 The utilisation of UK-based archives during the research for this thesis helped 
in filling some of the gaps in Australian naval historiography. As Cooper pointed out 
‘the correspondence between the First Sea Lords and Chiefs of Naval Staff is readily 
available at the Public Record Office [National Archives], in London, but apparently 
impossible to find in the Australian Archives’.14 Even so, the extremely useful 
ADM205 First Sea Lord’s Records series does not contain correspondence after 1959 
or so. Some further correspondence is available in ADM1/29326 but this does not 
greatly expand the timeframe of available correspondence. Additionally, the 
ADM205 series is not perfectly archived. During the research for this thesis a batch 
of archival material relevant to Anglo-Australian naval affairs was found in a section 
of ADM205/223 dealing with Anglo-Pakistan naval relations. It would not be 
surprising if prior users of this series interested in Anglo-Australian naval concerns 
did not discover or refer to this batch of documentation. Unfortunately one Admiralty 
file that may have been relevant to this thesis was not available; ADM205/87 dealing 
with correspondence on the disposition of ships, operations and exercises, and shape 
and size of the future fleet, was destroyed by the Ministry of Defence after being 
contaminated by asbestos and severely damaged by water.
15
     
 
 There are qualitative differences between the research experience in the main 
national archives in the United Kingdom and those in Australia. Although both 
                                                          
14
 Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 1945-1971’, p. 705.  
15
 Letters to the author from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence dated 16 March 2009 
and 30 March 2009. 
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institutions are extremely professionally managed, the manner in which archival 
material is released for access to the public is markedly different. In both the United 
Kingdom and Australia, archival material is generally subject to the ‘thirty-year 
rule’. There is one procedural difference, however, in the method in which material 
is released. In the United Kingdom, records have typically been released for public 
consumption after thirty years unless the release is deemed likely to cause damage to 
the country’s image, national security or foreign relations. The same rules generally 
apply in Australia, but archival material is not always automatically released 
following the thirty years duration. On these occasions, a request has to be made for 
the material to be made available. The material is then reviewed by the Australian 
authorities and a decision is made as to whether release is possible or not. If release 
is not possible the material can be withheld, sometimes due to the expectation that 
release could ‘cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the 
Commonwealth’.16 Even if, as in the vast majority of cases, the material is able to be 
released, there will be a delay between the request being made and the release of the 
material. For an Australian-based researcher this delay would in many cases not 
cause a great problem. For non-Australian based researchers, the delay between the 
request and release of material can mean an extended stay in Australia, or 
alternatively, the necessity of accessing the released material electronically at a later 
date. Both avenues can have financial implications to the researcher. To summarize, 
records in Great Britain are generally automatically released to the public after thirty 
years. In Australia, files, especially those of no perceived great public interest, are 
only released when somebody requests that they be so. The latter case can be fruitful 
for researchers of Australian naval documentation as sometimes one can be 
reasonably sure that recently released material is being viewed for the first time.  
 
 In the post-Second World War period, narratives concerning the Royal Navy 
have paid little interest to its relations with the Royal Australian Navy, while works 
on the RAN have paid scant attention to its dealings with her parent service, 
generally preferring to concentrate upon the evolution of RAN-United States Navy 
(USN) relations. Imperial, Commonwealth and de-colonisation issues are important 
                                                          
16
 An example being a letter to the author, dated 2 September 2011, regarding the release of 
Canberra, National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), A816, 11/301/776, Prime 
Minister’s Discussions in London, January 1951. 
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when attempting to understand the altering relationships between Great Britain, 
Australia and the United States in this period. Articles on imperial and colonial 
issues are many and are relevant to this area of research where those issues had an 
impact on inter-service relations and co-operation, not least those that allude to 
decolonization, the end of empire, and east of Suez issues. Studies into the 
degradation of British defence capabilities are legion. It is this diminution of 
resource, usually cited as a consequence of economic concerns, that is given as the 
prime reason behind the ‘East of Suez’ withdrawal and a resultant decrease in RAN-
RN ties. Coupled with the supposed decline of British influence, are observations by 
a number of historians, usually Australian, on a growth in resultant Australian 
independence, even though these observers grudgingly concede that a lessening of 
dependence on the United Kingdom has been accompanied by an increase in 
dependence on the USA.
17
 This strategic shift by Australia from the UK towards the 
USA has been seen as a mirror to the apparently obvious shift of the RAN towards 
the USN. An assessment of the available literature however, shows that even as this 
shift was taking place there was continuing co-operation between the RAN and the 
Royal Navy in a number of areas such as military operations, equipment procurement 
and design, personnel exchanges and strategic planning, while at the same time 
making plain that the level of co-operation was much less at the end of the period of 
interest than at the beginning. An examination of the current historiography shows 
there are areas of consensus, or near consensus, on some aspects of Anglo-Australian 
naval relations in the post war period. Evidence is also apparent of areas of 
disagreement or debate surrounding the same subject, and of gaps in certain aspects 
of the overall range of historiography dealing with post-war Royal Navy-RAN 
relations. 
 
 Alastair Cooper’s ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 
1945-1971’18 is ostensibly the most important piece of work to take into account 
when considering this area of research. Cooper concentrated on strategic planning, 
                                                          
17
 For example see Andrea Benvenuti, ‘Shifting Priorities: Australia's Defence Ties to Britain 
in the Aftermath of Empire’, History Compass, 2 (2004) <http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2004.00108.x> [accessed 19 March 2008]. 
18
 Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 1945-1971’. This is an 
expansion of an earlier unpublished BA honours thesis; Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-
Australian Naval Relations, 1945-1960’. 
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standardization and equipment policy, and personnel exchanges between the Royal 
Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. There are a number of general studies of both 
services. For the RAN, David Stevens’ The Royal Australian Navy,19 is the most up 
to date and definitive history of the RAN in the 20
th
 century. This volume explored 
the effects of changing strategic circumstances, technological innovation, and 
differing national needs and expectations; themes especially relevant to my area of 
research. Tom Frame’s No Pleasure Cruise: the Story of the Royal Australian 
Navy,
20
 is a general work, although the content has been selected and arranged to 
make certain important points. Frame addressed the ‘cyclical nature’ of Australian 
naval history in ‘A Navy Grown Up and On Its Own’.21 For the Royal Navy, Eric 
Grove’s Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II,22 is a 
scholarly account of post-war British naval policy outlining the implications and 
motivations of the various changes within the Royal Navy during the post-war 
period. Grove described his own work as ‘narrative and analytical “a la Roskill” and 
broad based with political considerations “a la Kennedy”’.23 Standard of Power: The 
Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century
 
,
24
 by Dan Van der Vat, examined the Royal 
Navy from the First World War to the Falklands conflict. This is a much less 
scholarly piece of work than Grove’s account, while addressing a greater period of 
time. Hampshire’s The Royal Navy since 1945: Its Transition to the Nuclear Age,25 
examined post-war Royal Navy to 1975. Maritime Strategy and the Balance of 
Power, 
26
 is a collection of essays dealing with British and American maritime 
relationships in the twentieth century. Relevant chapters include Sokolsky’s ‘Anglo-
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 The Royal Australian Navy, ed. by David Stevens (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
20
 Tom Frame, No Pleasure Cruise: the Story of the Royal Australian Navy (Crows Nest: 
Allen & Unwin, 2004). 
21
 T. R. Frame, ‘A Navy Grown Up and On Its Own’, Proceedings, March (1989), 116-23. 
22
 Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II (London: 
The Bodley Head, 1987). 
23
 Eugene L. Rasor, British Naval History since 1815: a Guide to the Literature (London: 
Garland Publishing, 1990), p. 462. 
24
 Dan Van der Vat, Standard of Power: The Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Hutchinson, 2000). 
25
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(London: William Kimber, 1975). 
26
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Century, ed. by John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (London: Macmillan, 1989). 
11 
 
American Maritime Strategy in the Era of Flexible Response, 1960-80’27 and Grove 
and Till’s ‘Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the Era of Massive Retaliation, 
1945-60’.28 Schofield’s British Sea Power: Naval Policy in the Twentieth Century,29 
is interesting in that its publication date is in the middle of the chosen period of 
interest, and the book appears to have been written with a very pro-Royal Navy slant. 
Admiral William James Crowe, Jr. in The Policy Roots of the Modern Royal Navy, 
1946-1963,
30
 commented on the dilemma faced by the Royal Navy in dealing with 
the reality of nuclear weapons, and the impact of such weaponry on British Naval 
policy, namely its transition to a limited-war force. Richard Hill, in his ‘British Naval 
Thinking in the Nuclear Age’,31 also focussed on the post-war choices faced by the 
Royal Navy. The quote below succinctly sums up the dilemma faced by the service; 
 
 What did seapower consist of in the nuclear age…why was seapower (and naval 
 power in particular) important and desirable or necessary…for Britain…[and] if so 
 how was it to be exercised? And, in a Britain whose relative economic position was 
 declining, was the wherewithal achievable?
32
 
 
This work placed much emphasis on naval relations within NATO but indicated 
similarities in Anglo-Australian naval thinking, especially in constabulary tasks. Hill 
also focussed on the British necessity for ‘naval reach’, arguably a requirement that 
prolonged existing Anglo-Australian naval relations.  
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In examining Anglo-Australian naval relations, the historical and cultural ties 
between the two services should not be underestimated. A number of studies have 
been carried out into this aspect on Commonwealth naval history.
33
 Following its 
inception, the RAN was an integral part of the Royal Navy and absorbed its 
equipment and vessels, customs and traditions, and operating procedures and skills. 
An assessment of these cultural and historical bonds is essential if one is to 
appreciate the impact of the altering relationship between the two services.  
 
 There were many occasions between 1945 and 1975 where the Royal Navy 
and the RAN co-operated in both high-level and low-level military operations. 
Literature relevant to these operations is legion. Some of these studies focus on 
particular theatres such as the Malayan Emergency, Korea or confrontation with 
Indonesia, and do not address the long-term characteristics of RAN-RN operations.
34
 
Others take a more generalised view on overall military operations of the period and 
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do not deal specifically with naval matters.
35
 There are a number of pieces that 
concentrate on either Australian or British naval operations, and do not deliberate on 
inter-service co-operation as such.
36
 Hill’s Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers 37 
assessed the benefits of military co-operation for medium sized naval forces, as did 
Martin’s The Sea in Modern Strategy,38 however neither work specifically referred to 
RN-RAN co-operation as such.  
 
 In addition to operational co-operation, there was much collaboration 
between the British and Australian navies in equipment design and procurement, and 
manpower resources. The acquisition of British aircraft carriers by the RAN, and the 
subsequent assistance given to the RAN in matters of training and personnel has been 
explored in a number of studies.
39
 Reynold’s Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb,40 
detailed co-operation between the services in atomic matters, including the testing 
carried out at the Monte Bello Islands. It also made much of a possible ‘Australian 
Atomic Bomber Force’, with nary a mention of the possible use of nuclear weapons 
by the RAN. Arnold made more of Anglo-Australian naval co-operation in her A 
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Goldrick and P. D. Jones (Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1991), pp. 220-44, David Joseph 
Wilson, ‘The Eagle and the Albatross: Australian Aerial Maritime Operations, 1921-1971’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of New South Wales Defence Force Academy, 
2003), James A. Boultilier, ‘Get Big or Get Out: The Canadian and Australian Decisions to 
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Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia.
41
 David 
Stevens’ A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia’s 
Maritime Defence 1915-1954,
42
 examined the perceived immediate post-war threat 
to Australia’s sea-lanes, and the great assistance given by the Admiralty in dealing 
with it. There has been no overall assessment of on-going RAN-Royal Navy co-
operation in equipment procurement or design, a matter that this thesis will address.  
 
 If it is evident that there was great co-operation between the Royal Navy and 
the RAN during this period, there was increasing co-operation between the RAN and 
the United States Navy. This presence of an Australian naval shift from the United 
Kingdom to the United States is crucial when one considers the overall level of 
relations between the RAN and the Royal Navy. The existence of an alternative area 
of support made a shift of Australian naval allegiance away from Britain more likely. 
A general overview of American-Australian naval relations is portrayed in Frame’s 
Pacific Partners: A History of Australian-American Naval Relations,
43
 however it 
was written with, what appears to be, an anti-British bias. Frame did admit that 
Pacific Partners was ‘deliberately polemical’. 44 The mechanics of the political 
ramifications of American-Australian naval co-operation were handled in ‘ANZUS 
Naval Relations, 1951-85’ by Thomas-Durell Young.45 The purchase of the 
American Charles F. Adams class destroyers by the RAN has been held up by some 
as being a tipping point in the movement of the RAN from reliance the UK to the 
USA.
46
 This thesis will examine the importance of the purchase of the American 
vessels by the RAN and question whether this was a result of the diminution of the 
UK-Australian naval relationship, or was a decision made on technical grounds. All 
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three DDGs served with USN forces in the Vietnam War and several books and 
articles deal with naval co-operation between the RAN and the United States Navy 
during the conflict.
47
 A number of studies have looked at Anglo-American naval 
relations in the post-Second World War period, and are useful as a contrast to the 
literature dealing with Australian-American naval affairs in the same period.
48
  
  
 British political and strategic considerations certainly affected naval relations 
between Australia and Britain during the post-war period. This subject has been 
assessed by a number of scholars.
49
 In British Defence since 1945, Michael Dockrill 
argued that there are two main schools of thought amongst British academics about 
how British defence policy has developed since 1945; the first is the ‘orthodox’ 
view, which attributes the reduction in the size of Britain’s defence establishment 
since 1945 entirely to financial and economic pressure which forced successive 
British governments into making hasty and piecemeal cuts. The second view is that 
Britain’s defence policy-making had been based on more rational considerations than 
those who hold the orthodox view are prepared to concede.
50
 A recurring theme in 
these studies is the inexorable decline in British military power in the post-war 
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period.
51
 Greenwood presented a critical analysis of the conventional wisdom 
regarding British defence since the Second World War.
52
 John Baylis called 
Greenwood’s approach revisionist and questioned Greenwood’s argument that a 
‘sense of history’ enabled British leaders to realise that the days of empire and great-
power status were over.
53
 The diminution in resources available to the Royal Navy 
between 1945-75 has been assessed by a number of observers.
54
 A reduction in naval 
power meant Britain was constrained by the forces available for use in the Far-East 
and the Pacific and led to a decline in opportunities for Australian and British forces 
to work alongside one another. If British defence resource considerations affected 
naval relations with Australia, so too did similar concerns about Australian defence 
resources. 
  
 Australian strategic and political concerns affected the relationship between 
the two services in the post-war period.
55
 A strengthening of the Australian-
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American relationship was viewed as inevitable due to the reduction of British power 
in the Far-East, and the rise of British economic ties with Europe. Literature dealing 
with post-war Australian strategy has often been written with an anti-British 
emphasis, a continuation of the ‘Great Betrayal’ school of thought, following the 
British failure to reinforce Singapore adequately in the Second World War.
56
 
Another historiographical group has focussed on the growth of Australian self-
confidence as an independent power.
57
 Only rarely has the antipodean dimension of 
naval grand strategy in the post-war Pacific been addressed.
58
   
 
 Decolonisation, the end of empire, and east of Suez issues were crucial to the 
state of Anglo-Australian naval relations, and the amount of literature on this subject 
is large and varied.
59
 Darby’s British Defence Policy East of Suez, was an early 
treatise on British policy east of Suez; indeed for many years it was the only 
comprehensive study on the subject. Darby argued that British policy was driven by 
a mixture of romanticism and self-interest; he also argued that in 1947 Britain missed 
an opportunity to re-examine its defence posture in the east of Suez region.
60
 Karl 
Hack called for a re-assessment of Darby’s British Defence Policy East of Suez. 
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Hack suggested that ‘the “Imperial Overstretch”, Cold War, and economic and 
colonial paradigms are, if taken singly, all inadequate tools for understanding 
Britain’s defence aims and outcomes’.61 Benvenuti’s pro-Australian views are 
evident in a number of pieces of work.
62
 A number of studies have assessed the end 
of empire with a naval emphasis.
63
 Much like the general naval histories of both 
services however, there is little ‘cross-pollination’ in these pieces. Jackson’s 
‘Imperial Defence in the Post-Imperial Era’,64 strongly suggested that the withdrawal 
from east of Suez was a fallacy, and referred to ‘the “non-withdrawal” from East of 
Suez commitments…’65 Greg Kennedy in his ‘The Royal Navy and Imperial 
Defence, 1919-1956’ wrote that ‘By 1956, with the loss of India, the British 
withdrawal from the Middle East underway, and British imperial interests in the Far 
East in dispute, the RN had come to the end of its time as the protector of formal 
empire.’66 Jackson disagreed and stated that ‘despite the fact that America had 
clearly become the defensive guarantor of British territories and dominions when 
Pax Britannica’s naval shield failed in December 1941, Britain still conceived the 
need to deploy forces in order to contribute to the security of Australia, New 
Zealand, and the many imperial territories in the Pacific’.67  
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 There are several relevant memoirs and published diaries from Australian 
naval figures.
68
 Some are more helpful than others; Sir John Collins’ As Luck Would 
Have It unfortunately offers little on post-war dealings with the Royal Navy, and 
instead focussed on Collins’ wartime experiences. This is perhaps understandable 
considering Collins’ stellar combat record, but regrettable for a student of post-war 
issues. Mermaids Do Exist by Vice Admiral Sir Henry Burrell is much more valuable 
and sheds much light on post-war relations between the UK and Australia, as well as 
the altering relationship between the RAN and the USN.  
  
 Narratives dealing with British naval authorities are useful when assessing 
the post-war period.
69
 Some of these pieces hold little of direct relevance, examples 
being Geoffrey Till’s ‘Admiral Earl Mountbatten of Burma (1955-1959)’70, and 
Mountbatten: The Official Biography
71
 by Philip Ziegler. Unfortunately, for such a 
crucial naval figure, neither piece dealt with the RAN in any great detail. This should 
not be held as a criticism, but simply reflects the fact that Anglo-Australian naval 
relations in the post-war era has been a much understudied subject. Other pieces are 
more useful, while only a few offer valuable information on Anglo-Australian naval 
relations. Tom Frames’72 chapter in The First Sea Lords: From Fisher to 
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Mountbatten sheds light on Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser’s administration, with 
an Australian slant, and is perhaps the most useful section of this piece due to this 
fact. Eric Grove’s The Battle and the Breeze: The Naval Reminiscences of Admiral of 
the Fleet Sir Edward Ashmore,
73
 whose subject was the First Sea Lord from March 
1974 to February 1977, has very good accounts of visits to Australia, personal 
reminiscences of the efficiency of the RAN, co-operative exercises between British 
and RAN units, the impact of the RAN purchase of American vessels, and the 
perceived usefulness of a British naval base in Western Australia.  
 
  To summarise, there are clear historical gaps in both the history of the Royal 
Australian Navy and the Royal Navy, and in their post-war relations with each other. 
While there have been numerous treatises on both the RAN and the Royal Navy, the 
vast majority have not ‘cross-pollinated’. This is less so the case with works on the 
RAN, considering the historical reliance of the RAN on the Royal Navy. Several 
books and journal articles have addressed the remaining historiographical spaces, but 
they have either been limited in periodic scope, or restricted in only addressing a 
certain area of co-operation, such as naval aviation or a certain theatre of conflict.
74
 
No broadly-scoped piece of research has yet been carried out on post-war Anglo-
Australian naval relations. Post-war Anglo-Australian naval relations and co-
operation were affected by the changing relationships between Australia and Great 
Britain, Australia and the United States, and Great Britain and her extended empire 
and commonwealth in the post-war period, and although the literature on these 
aspects of intra-national flux is great, there has been no direct correlation with 
Anglo-Australian naval relations. Even where the historical gaps are sufficiently 
filled, especially in regards to decolonisation and ‘East of Suez’ issues, there are still 
historical ‘debates’ ongoing. One of the aims of this thesis will be to assist in filling 
                                                          
73
 The Battle and the Breeze: The Naval Reminiscences of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward 
Ashmore, ed. by Eric Grove (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1997). 
74
 For example see Grove, ‘Advice and Assistance to a Very Independent People at a Most 
Crucial Point’, O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval 
Policy in the Korean War Era’, Prince, ‘The Contribution of the Royal Navy to the United 
Nations Forces during the Korean War’, Michael Fogarty, ‘Small Wars You Might Have 
Missed: The Minor Campaigns of the RAN 1936-56’, in Maritime Power in the Twentieth 
Century: the Australian Experience, ed. by David Stevens (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998), 
pp. 119-34. 
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the gaps and add to the relevant historical debates associated with post-war Anglo-
Australian naval relations. 
 
 The thesis is structured as follows. Following this introduction, chapter two 
will examine the cultural and historical ties between the Royal Navy and the RAN. 
Consideration will also be given to the efficacy of communications between the 
services and the importance of personal relations to the overall inter-service 
relationship. An assessment will be made of the high-level strategic choices made by 
the United Kingdom and Australia in the post-war period in chapter three. Chapter 
four will consider the dilemmas faced by Great Britain associated with that nation’s 
declining power, and the impact of the retreat from east of Suez on the strategic 
relationship between the United Kingdom and Australia. Chapter five will discuss 
operational co-operation between the Royal Navy and the RAN. This will include 
conflicts such as the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency and confrontation with 
Indonesia, as well as peacetime pursuits such as port visits and the testing of atomic 
weapons in the 1950s. Co-operation in matters of personnel and training are 
extremely important in the broader context of inter-naval relations and this subject 
will be dealt with in chapter six. Chapter seven will assess co-operation between the 
Royal Navy and the RAN in equipment procurement and design. This chapter will 
focus predominately on the creation of the Australian Fleet Air Arm and the great 
assistance given by the Admiralty in this task. In addition chapter seven will examine 
the increased ability of the RAN to look to non-British sources for equipment 
procurement. The impact of stronger Australian-American ties on the RAN will be 
considered in chapter eight. This chapter will focus on the procurement of the 
Charles F. Adams class guided-missile destroyers by the RAN, the first major RAN 
vessels to have been designed outside the United Kingdom and constructed outside 
Britain or Australia. The role played by the RAN in the conflict in Vietnam is also 
covered in this chapter. Chapter nine will contain the conclusion to this thesis, a 
conclusion that will emphasise the growth of Australian naval independence 
alongside the increased independence of Australia as a nation in the post-war period. 
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 This thesis will be positioned firmly in the naval history camp, while taking 
note of associated imperial, commonwealth and end of empire considerations. The 
wider context of British Imperial decline and strategic withdrawal from the Far East 
will be considered while the thesis will specifically deal with the altering relationship 
between the RAN and the Royal Navy in the post-Second World War period. 
Assessment will be made of primary sources from a range on institutions in the 
United Kingdom and Australia to delineate the degradation in Anglo-Australian 
naval relations within the broader perspective of post-war affairs between Great 
Britain and Australia. In doing so, consideration will be given to consistent and 
reliable aspects of the naval relationship; these facets may contrast with the wider 
national links. Relevant literature and secondary sources will be useful in providing 
context to this broader intra-national relationship, especially in the milieu of 
decolonisation and retreat from empire.  
 
Photograph 1 HMS Victorious, Sydney Harbour, 1967 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph courtesy of the Sea Power Centre of Australia.
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Chapter 2 
 
Communications, Personal Relations and Cultural and Historical 
Ties 
 
 Historical links and cultural ties between the Admiralty and the Royal 
Australian Navy were extremely strong.
1
 Senator George Pearce, the Australian 
Defence Minister from 1910-13 and 1941-21 described the RAN on its creation as a 
‘navy within a navy’, a logical outcome for a ‘nation within a nation’.2 Due to almost 
complete reliance on the Admiralty the RAN developed as a mini-version of the 
Royal Navy. As Millar pointed out ‘The Royal Australian Navy developed integrally 
with and as a direct offspring of the Royal Navy, absorbing its customs, traditions, 
procedures, skills, equipment and vessels’3 and ‘Until very recently, when national 
“flashes” were introduced, Australian naval officers, unlike those in the army or the 
airforce, have been visually indistinguishable from British naval officers. Even their 
accents are more likely to be more “British”, and their sense of loyalty to and affinity 
with the mother country to be stronger.’4  
 
 Communications between the respective heads of service were extremely 
important, especially during the early part of the post-war period. Lower-level 
communications played their part in keeping the links between the navies strong. 
Lower-deck servicemen of both services frequently interacted with each other and 
these interactions somewhat illustrated the competitiveness and rivalry common to 
any two military forces, although this was to some extent, tempered by the shared 
traditions and cultures of the respective services. The RAN had total dependency on 
the Admiralty during the early post-war period. This reliance decreased over a period 
                                                          
 
1
 Relevant literature includes Gatacre, A Naval Career, pp. 6-153, Burrell, Mermaids Do 
Exist, pp. 1-24, Southern Trident, ed. by Stevens and Reeve, pp. 160-73, 214-41, 262-75, 
Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp. 22-23, 69-73, The Royal Australian Navy, ed. by 
Stevens, pp. 5-154, Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, pp. 7-99, Hyslop, Aye Aye, Minister, pp. 
183-98. 
2
 Cooper, ‘The Development of an Independent Navy for Australia’, p. 513. 
3
 Millar, Australia’s Defence, p. 122.  
4
 Ibid. Having served in the RAN for nine years until 1993, I can attest that faux British 
accents could still be discerned from certain RAN officers during that time. 
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of time, but the drift away from the Admiralty was not an easy one due to the cultural 
and historical ties between the services. Even so the drift was assured due to the 
growing independence of the RAN, a self-assuredness that somewhat mirrored the 
experience of Australia itself.    
 
 At the highest levels, the respective heads of the Royal Navy and the RAN 
dictated the relations between the two services. As Table 1, the Professional Heads of 
the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, and Diagram 1, the Professional 
Heads of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy Timeline makes clear the 
succession of First Sea Lords and Australian Chiefs of Naval Staff did not coincide 
with each other. As such the respective heads of service occasionally had to deal with 
quite different personalities filling the same role as their predecessor. These personal 
traits were also affected by external influences such as the strategic stance taken by 
Australia and Great Britain in various stages of the post-war period. High-level 
national strategy affects lower-level concerns, and cannot be ignored when one 
considers inter-naval relations. In the same sense, national goodwill between 
countries can in some way be reflected in the inter-personal relations of the nations 
concerned.      
 
 The First Sea Lords and the Australian Chiefs of Naval Staff corresponded 
with each other on a regular basis. The correspondence took place on many levels 
from the very personal and private to the more businesslike. The correspondence 
reveals an alteration of the relationship between the two services as well as insights 
into the individual personalities of the various heads of the Royal Navy and the 
RAN. Some of the information contained in the messages was of a trivial nature, but 
this reinforces the fact that on the whole, the respective heads were comfortable in 
their dealings with each other. The correspondence also reveals a level of affection 
and friendship between some of the personnel concerned.    
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Table 1 Professional Heads of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy 
 
First Sea Lords of the Admiralty First Naval Members, Australian 
Commonwealth Naval Board and Chiefs of 
Staff  
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Andrew Cunningham, RN 
 
October 1943 to May 
1946 
Admiral Sir Louis H. K. 
Hamilton, RN 
June 1945 to 
February 1948 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
John Cunningham, RN 
 
May 1946 to January 
1948 
Vice Admiral Sir John A. 
Collins, RAN 
February 1948 to 
February 1955 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Fraser of North Cape, RN 
 
 
January 1948 to 
December 1951 
 
Vice Admiral Sir Roy R. 
Dowling, RAN 
 
February 1955 to 
February 1959 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Rhoderick McGrigor, RN 
 
 
December 1951 to 
April 1955 
 
Vice Admiral Sir Henry 
M. Burrell, RAN 
 
February 1959 to 
February 1962 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Earl 
Mountbatten, RN 
 
 
April 1955 to May 
1959 
 
Vice Admiral Sir W. 
Hastings Harrington, 
RAN 
 
February 1962 to 
February 1965 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Charles Lambe, RN 
 
 
May 1959 to May 
1960 
 
Vice Admiral Sir Alan W. 
R. McNicoll, RAN 
 
February 1965 to April 
1968 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Caspar John, RN 
 
 
May 1960 to August 
1963 
 
Vice Admiral Sir Victor 
A. T. Smith, RAN 
 
April 1968 to 
November 1970 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
David Luce, RN 
 
 
August 1963 to 
February 1965 
 
Vice Admiral Sir Richard 
I. Peek, RAN 
 
November 1970 to 
November 1973 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Varyl Begg, RN 
 
 
February 1965 to 
August 1968 
 
Vice Admiral Sir H. 
David Stevenson, RAN 
 
November 1973 to 
November 1976 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Michael Le Fanu, RN 
 
 
August 1968 to June 
1970 
 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Peter Hill-Norton, RN 
 
 
June 1970 to March 
1971 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Michael Pollock, RN 
 
 
March 1971 to March 
1974 
 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Edward Ashmore, RN 
 
 
March 1974 to 
February 1977 
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Diagram 1 Professional Heads of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy 
Timeline 
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 The direct communication between the Admiralty and the Australian Navy 
Office was sometimes viewed with a level of suspicion and misgiving by outsiders. 
Australian Ministers of State, the central office of the Department of Defence and 
Governors-General at times commented adversely on the close liaison between the 
services.
5
 This resulted occasionally in the respective heads of service reinforcing the 
need for confidentiality. When informing the British First Sea Lord, John 
Cunningham, of the findings of a recent Australian Council of Defence meeting, the 
Australian First Naval Member, Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton requested ‘that you do 
not quote me as your informant outside of the Admiralty’.6 The suspicion with which 
Hamilton’s direct communication with the Admiralty was viewed, was amplified 
because Hamilton, though a Royal Navy officer, acted as the head of the Royal 
Australian Navy and reported to the head of the Royal Navy. This was acknowledged 
by Hamilton himself.
7
   
 
 Hamilton’s successor Vice Admiral Sir John Collins, the first Australian 
Chief of Naval Staff to graduate from the Royal Australian Naval College continued 
corresponding with Cunningham’s successor as First Sea Lord, Fraser of North 
Cape.
8
 Collins found this practice useful ‘particularly when questions arose that were 
not altogether suitable for the official channels’.9 Collins also found it necessary to 
highlight the need for discretion and asked First Sea Lord Rhoderick McGrigor to 
‘treat this letter as a personal chat to you. It’s the sort of thing I could so much more 
easily say in conversation than commit to paper.’10 Sensitive information was indeed 
sent by both services to the other. In late 1954 the Admiralty passed on comments 
made by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Jack Slessor during a visit by him to 
Australia in which he questioned the role of Australian Naval aviation.
11
 This was 
information that Slessor did not discuss with the Australian Chief of Naval Staff 
although he did do so with the Chiefs of Staff of the other two services. The Chief of 
                                                          
5
 Hyslop, p. 183. 
6
 London, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), ADM205/68, Letter from Hamilton to 
Cunningham, 18 March 1947. A later request for privacy was made by Hamilton, 
ADM205/68, Letter from Hamilton to Cunningham, 17 June 1947. 
7
 ADM205/69, Letter from Hamilton to Cunningham, 27 November 1947. 
8
 ADM205/69, Letter from Collins to Fraser, 16 July 1948. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 ADM205/105, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 6 August 1954. 
11
 ADM205/105, Letter from McGrigor to Collins, 29 October 1954. 
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Naval Staff John Collins appreciated the information about Slessor’s report and ‘the 
ammunition you provided to counter the attack’.12 Collins’ successor Vice Admiral 
Roy Dowling was also aware of the sensitive nature of some of the issues discussed 
in the personal correspondence between the respective heads of service: ‘By the way 
I have no doubt that in future I shall have certain information or comment which 
must not come to the ears of my political masters. Dangerous.’13 When informing 
First Sea Lord Louis Mountbatten about issues with proposed SEATO naval 
exercises, Dowling stipulated ‘All this is for your private ear only.’14  
 
 It should not be surprising that confidential information was shared between 
the services as the links between the Admiralty and the RAN were extremely strong. 
In addition the support of the Admiralty was absolutely crucial to the efficient 
running of the RAN and many of the matters discussed were politically sensitive. On 
the 1951 Jubilee manoeuvres, involving ships of Australia, Britain, New Zealand, 
South Africa, India and Pakistan, Collins confided ‘Between ourselves the least said 
about the capabilities of the Pakistan Ships the better. They haven’t got an idea of 
fleet work of even the most elementary type…’15 Fraser noted ‘your remarks on the 
Pakistanis with interest. We have to tread very delicately on the subject of British 
officers, both in the Pakistani and Indian Navies.’16 Hamilton felt enough at ease to 
offer an opinion on the new Australian Minister of the Navy who ‘is turning out even 
better than I had hoped, he is mad keen and genuinely interested in the Navy’.17 
 
 The correspondence between the heads of service contained information that 
was crucial to the day-to-day running of the smaller RAN. Strategic guidance was 
provided by the Admiralty on all levels of naval matters, including equipment 
procurement, training and technical concerns, personnel issues and naval culture. 
This was especially true in the immediate post-war period. Even so the 
correspondence between the First Sea Lords and Australian Chiefs of Naval Staff 
                                                          
12
 ADM205/105, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 27 January 1955. 
13
 ADM205/105, Letter from Dowling to Mountbatten, 27 May 1955. 
14
 ADM205/110, Letter from Dowling to Mountbatten, 20 September 1956. 
15
 ADM205/76, Letter from Collins to Fraser, 8 March 1951. 
16
 ADM205/76, Letter from Fraser to Collins, 20 April 1951. 
17
 ADM205/68, Letter from Hamilton to Cunningham, 3 February 1947. 
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contained topics that may be viewed as trivial.
18
 Occasionally matters of great import 
as well as more humdrum concerns were reported to the Admiralty: 
 
On the whole we are in good heart. Our lower deck pay code, with its automatic 
cost-of-living adjustments, is very generous. We like to think we did [Operation] 
Hurricane well, and our boys seem to be well thought of in Korean waters. We had 
most of the Fleet into Melbourne for the Cup-a triumphant entry with the Naval 
Board afloat, guards and bands etc., and at the end of ten days’ banzai, had no police 
reports, which was satisfactory.
19
    
 
 That the respective heads of service were able to communicate with each 
other on such a familiar level is a reflection of the bonds between the officer classes 
of the RN and the RAN. Most Australian officers underwent training in the United 
Kingdom, especially in the immediate post-war era, and so felt strong ties to the 
Admiralty, British naval officers and Great Britain itself. Naval culture was 
remarkably similar in both navies and this would only have amplified these bonds 
between the officer classes. Collins felt so comfortable with the relationship to ‘take 
this opportunity of saying a word on behalf of Captain F. B. Lloyd, the RN Liaison 
Officer here, who has no superior [RN] naval officer to render half-yearly reports on 
him’. Collins suggested that had he been assessing Lloyd the assessment would have 
been ‘well above average and [I] would have recommended him for immediate 
promotion. In my opinion he would do well in Flag Rank.’20 That the Australian 
Naval Chiefs of Staff felt obliged to seek Admiralty assistance and advice on such a 
wide range of issues is also an indication of the great level of support provided by the 
Admiralty. This level of support decreased as the RAN became a more independent 
service but the co-operation between the two services continued.    
 
 The correspondence between the heads of the Royal Navy and the RAN 
reveal a genuine sense of friendliness between certain personnel. In mid-1951 
Collins wrote to Fraser ‘I do so much appreciate your personal help and guidance 
                                                          
18
 For examples see Ibid., ADM205/69, Letter from Collins to Cunningham, 23 April 1948, 
ADM205/69, Letter from Collins to Fraser, 16 July 1948, and ADM205/72, Letter from 
Collins to Fraser, 5 August 1949. 
19
 ADM205/88, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 28 January 1953. 
20
 ADM205/76, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 20 November 1951. 
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and trust I have not imposed too much on your kindness and time by the forgoing 
long letter.’21 Collins welcomed Fraser’s successor, Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor to 
the post and welcomed him ‘both personally and on behalf of the Royal Australian 
Navy’.22 Collins reiterated that he found the correspondence ‘of the greatest value 
and I think that your predecessors have also considered it a good idea.’23 There was a 
gradual relaxation in the manner in which Australian CNS Vice Admiral Roy 
Dowling addressed the First Sea Lord Louis Mountbatten in his correspondence. His 
initial letter of the 27
th
 May 1955 was addressed to ‘Dear Lord Louis’,24 while 
Dowling used the slightly less formal honorific ‘Dear 1st Sea Lord’ in his 
correspondence of eight months later.
25
 By mid-1956 Dowling was using the much 
more relaxed honorific ‘Dickie’ when corresponding with Mountbatten.26 The First 
Sea Lord Admiral Charles Lambe fell ill following a visit to Australia and from 
hospital sent a message to the Australian chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Burrell 
warning him not to ‘overdo it as I have done’.27 The approachability of some 
Australian Chiefs of Naval Staff was also noted in British political circles. Following 
conversations between Geoffrey Tory, the UK High Commissioner in Canberra and 
the Australian First Naval Member it was reported that ‘It is very satisfactory to note 
Admiral Dowling’s forthcoming attitude. Unfortunately, as we know from 
experience, the friendliness and confidence displayed by the Australian service 
Chiefs are not always to be found among some of their political chiefs who control 
them so strictly.’28 
   
 The value of the shared correspondence was appreciated by both services.
29
 
Mountbatten was keen to improve communications between the Admiralty and 
                                                          
21
 ADM205/76, Letter from Collins to Fraser, 5 July 1951. 
22
 ADM205/76, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 20 November 1951. For other examples of 
familiarity see ADM205/105, Letter from McGrigor to Collins, 3 December 1954, 
ADM205/105, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 27 January 1955, ADM205/88, Letters from 
Collins to McGrigor, 27 May 1953 and Letters from McGrigor to Collins, 3 July 1953, 31 
July 1953, 7 September 1953. 
23
 ADM205/76, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 20 November 1951. 
24
 ADM205/105, Letter from Dowling to Mountbatten, 27 May 1955. 
25
 ADM205/110, Letter from Dowling to Mountbatten, 24 January 1956. 
26
 ADM205/110, Letter from Dowling to Mountbatten, 2 May 1956. 
27
 Burrell, Mermaids Do Exist, p, 261. 
28
 London, TNA, DO35/6056, Conversation with Admiral Dowling, 5 December 1955. 
29
 For examples see ADM205/74, Letters from Fraser to Collins, 27 April 1950 and 12 
September 1950. 
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Chiefs of Naval Staff of Commonwealth countries including Australia.
30
 He intended 
to send a personal letter to the latter ‘about every quarter’.31 Australian CNS Vice 
Admiral Dowling appreciated the periodical letters from Mountbatten as ‘they are of 
great interest to me and go a long way in keeping us in the Far Flung Antipodes in 
touch with what is and what is probably going to be. I am most grateful’.32 Burrell 
also welcomed the periodic newsletters and found them great value.
33
 Collins’ last 
letter to McGrigor made plain the genuine appreciation felt by the Australians: 
 
As this will probably be the last of the series of letters that have passed between us I 
would like to thank you most sincerely for all the help you have given me in the 
past, and the trouble you have taken, amidst a deluge of important problems to write 
me at length. I very much appreciate what you have done not only for me but for the 
whole of the RAN.
34
  
 
 Visits by senior naval figures to the country of their counterparts occasionally 
occurred and were appreciated. This was especially the case for the smaller 
Australian service, as visiting British naval staff had the effect of raising the profile 
of the RAN.
35
 Collins was keen to keep the links between the Admiralty and the 
RAN strong, and trips by British naval personnel aided this. Collins saw merit for the 
RAN itself in such visits: 
 
I had a private note from Admiral Brind [C-in-C Far East Station] in which he offers 
to come down here [Australia] after relief if there is a requirement. It would be a 
very good idea as we have had heavy artillery in [Field Marshal] Slim, US Admiral 
Radford, US General Kenny in the last few months but no senior RN visitors.
36
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 ADM205/105, Letter from Mountbatten to Commonwealth Chiefs of Naval Staff, 19 
August 1955. 
31
 Ibid.; As Cooper pointed out this letter was a newsletter Mountbatten sent to all 
Commonwealth Countries; Cooper, ‘The Development of an Independent Navy for 
Australia’, p. 624. 
32
 ADM205/110, Letter from Dowling to Mountbatten, 24 January 1956. 
33
 London, TNA, ADM1/29326, Letter from Burrell to Lambe, 28 May 1959. 
34
 ADM205/105, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 27 January 1955. 
35
 Southampton, The University of Southampton, Hartley Library, Mountbatten Papers, 
MB1/C115/60, Letter from Hamilton to Mountbatten, 5 November 1945. Mountbatten was 
at the time HQ SACSEA Kandy, Ceylon.   
36
 ADM205/74, Letter from Collins to Fraser, 6 October 1950. 
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There were benefits for a small navy such as the RAN being viewed as part of a 
larger force such as the RN. Collins said of First Sea Lord McGrigor’s failure to 
come to Australia: 
 
I repeat how disappointed we all were that you [First Sea Lord] did not come out [to 
Australia] as this country is becoming less and less naval minded. When the 
Japanese Fleet was in being to the North of us it was much easier to get across the 
need for a Navy. I have got the Navy League going on a campaign which may have 
some results but I do hope we can get the First Sea Lord to represent the UK views 
at some future conference-then we won’t spend all the time fighting the land war in 
the Middle East and Malaya.
37
   
 
The visit of First Sea Lord Louis Mountbatten to Australia in 1956 was very much 
welcomed by Australian CNS Dowling: 
 
As you know we have had quite a number of Generals and Bomber Barons in the 
Antipodes from England since the war-and barely an Admiral. A visit by the 1
st
 Sea 
Lord himself is a great and extremely valuable occasion and can do much towards 
ensuring that political and public thought on Defence is kept, or put, in 
balance…The RAN is not exactly in the doldrums but it needs a helping hand and 
no-one can do that better than you.
38
  
 
There were political benefits for the RAN having an influential figure such as 
Mountbatten on its side. During the visit Mountbatten was able to speak to the 
Governor-General about the: 
 
 RAN which does not appear to enjoy as good a position in Australia as the RN does 
 in the UK. [The Governor-General] said he would be glad to help in any way he 
 could so please do not hesitate to go and see him with any suggestion for helping the 
 RAN; and you can quote me as suggesting that you should go and see him.
39
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 ADM205/74, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 27 October 1953. 
38
 ADM205/110, Letter from Dowling to Mountbatten, 24 January 1956. 
39
 ADM205/110, Letter from Mountbatten to Dowling, 14 April 1956. 
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Following the visit Dowling suggested that ‘the RAN has had a tremendous and 
much needed fillip’.40 Mountbatten appreciated the personal contact between the 
service chiefs and wrote ‘Edwina and I were very sad when we said goodbye to you 
both at dawn at Canberra yesterday for we both felt we had got to know you both so 
well during our hectic rush around Australia.’41 British naval figures were also able 
to influence Australian politicians visiting Great Britain. The Australian CNS Henry 
Burrell asked the First Sea Lord Charles Lambe ‘if you have a chance to talk to [our 
PM] during his visit perhaps you might care to fire a few rockets in our favour such 
as Australia’s need for a strong Navy, the need for another FAA…[and] the vast 
potential of submarine forces in future warfare…’42  
 
 The Admiralty had a sense that the RAN was an adjunct of the Royal Navy 
and these ties should be maintained through personal ties: 
 
 The Australian Navy is sending the aircraft carrier Sydney home [emphasis added] to 
 the [Coronation Fleet] Review and I very much hope that Collins will come in her as 
 there is a lot to discuss, both from the Navy and the Chiefs of Staffs point of view. 
 However I now  understand that Sir Frederick Sheddon is putting difficulties in the 
 way and is opposing any Chiefs of Staff coming over at all; he likes keeping them 
 under his thumb. I do think it would be a very good thing for Collins, at least, to 
 come.
43
 
 
This passage is enlightening on a number of levels. Firstly, the Admiralty considered 
the Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney in some way a ‘British’ ship. Secondly, 
there were perceived benefits in Collins visiting the United Kingdom as personal 
contact between the respective heads of service was viewed as valuable.   
  
 Collins was keen to visit London, and proposed an Admiralty invitation to 
witness part of the SACLANT-hosted Operation MARINER as this ‘would provide 
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 ADM205/110, Letter from Dowling to Mountbatten, 2 May 1956. 
41
 ADM205/110, Letter from Mountbatten to Dowling, 14 April 1956. 
42
 ADM1/29326, Letter from Burrell to Lambe, 28 May 1959. 
43
 ADM205/88, Letter from McGrigor to Field Marshal Sir William Slim, 18 February 1953;  
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[a] reason acceptable to [the Australian] government…’44 This matter was viewed as 
urgent as the Australian Chief of the General Staff ‘has received invitation in August 
C-in C’s Conference and probably only one of us can go.’45 Collins received a 
personal invitation to attend MARINER,
46
 an invitation he was happy to accept.
47
 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet was asked to look into accommodating 
Collins.
48
 Vice Admiral Hughes-Hallett, the UK National Liaison Representative to 
SACLANT took issue with the suggestion that SACLANT should not be informed of 
Collins’ presence until the eleventh hour.49 This decision was apparently made due to 
‘SACLANTs past attitude to [non-NATO] observers at NATO exercises.’50 Any last 
minute information about Collins could have been perceived as ‘trying to pull a fast 
one’ on US Admiral McCormick, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and it 
was suggested that Hughes-Hallett should be allowed to: 
 
 Say to him now, quite frankly and openly, that you had invited Collins, and that you 
 had told me to tell him for information that Collins would be embarked in one of 
 H.M. ships taking part. No question of by your leave; a definite statement that it was 
 going to occur.
51
  
 
The First Sea Lord agreed with this suggestion and asked Hughes-Hallett to inform 
SACLANT of Collins’ presence at MARINER.52 Hughes-Hallet did so and 
McCormick: 
 
Made no comment and I think accepted it as quite a natural arrangement. This 
however cannot be looked on as a test case for the NATO observer problem owing 
to Collins’ position, which entitles him to special consideration.
53
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Collins was unable to attend the exercise but the episode is illuminating in that the 
Admiralty felt able to assist Collins’ profile by inviting him personally to the 
exercise, even though the invitation may have caused offence to SACLANT. The 
fact that it did not do so is an indication that the Americans saw the Royal Navy and 
the RAN as natural associates.   
 
 Personal contact at the highest levels of naval authority cemented connections 
between the services, as did the ongoing correspondence shared by the respective 
heads of the Royal Navy and the RAN. There were also processes put in place for the 
lower-level communications between the services. These predated our period of 
interest and included the provision for an Australian naval representative at the 
Australian High Commission in London from 1911.
54
 In 1931 a defence liaison 
officer, assisted by a junior officer from each service, was put in place.
55
 In late 1932 
the post of defence liaison officer lapsed, but the individual service representatives 
remained, performing their duties under the official secretary. The form of address 
utilised was ‘Official Secretary (Navy Liaison), and from March 1933 the 
abbreviation ‘NLO’ was being used for naval wireless messages.56 Royal Navy 
Liaison Officers were also based in Australia to maintain close links with the RAN, 
even though there were sometimes issues with the efficacy of the communications.
57
      
 
 There were occasionally issues with interactions between the Royal Navy and 
the RAN on this level but these were long-standing problems.
58
 Even so they 
continued from time to time between 1945-75. Following Mountbatten’s visit to the 
Far East, a trip that included Australia, he remarked that he had been struck by the 
strength of personal bonds that existed between the Royal Navy and Navies of the 
Commonwealth.
59
 He suggested that a member of the Board should visit the 
Commonwealth naval countries at least once a year, ‘if only to explain to them, on an 
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intimate basis, how Admiralty thought was developing’.60 In early 1959 following 
conversations with the Royal Navy Liaison Officer in Australia, Mountbatten was 
concerned whether adequate measures were being taken to keep Liaison Officers in 
touch with Admiralty policy. It was suggested that a senior authority in the 
Admiralty be given responsibility for keeping Liaison Officers up-to-date, and that 
the newly appointed Australian CNS be given an invitation to visit the UK during the 
coming summer. In addition it was stressed that a naval member of the Board should 
visit Australia during the course of the year.
61
 The Board later took note of a 
Memorandum prepared by the Vice Chief of Naval Staff on arrangements for liaison 
with Commonwealth Navies.
62
  
 
 British naval officers based in Australia were useful in providing advice to 
Australian naval officers. Collins used the lower levels of Australian-based RN staff 
as a springboard. Captain F. B. Lloyd RN wrote that ‘Collins was talking to me 
privately and, in fact using me as a listener while he thought out loud. With Admiral 
Eccles in Sydney, CNS has no contemporary with whom he can really open up.’63 
Conversely, Australian-based RN officers were able to provide their superiors with 
information on Australian naval thinking, and information that needed to be treated 
with some discretion.
64
 The duties of a naval advisor could sometimes be tedious, as 
a former liaison officer noted ‘I did not particularly enjoy the appointment with not 
enough real work to do and too many social cocktail and dinner parties’.65 Yet the 
post was thought to be a valuable one. In a letter from the Admiralty informing Rear 
Admiral C H Hutchinson of his transfer to the Reserve List he was praised, with 
specific mention of his time in Australia:  
 
 From 1952 to 1954, you were the R.N. Liaison Officer in the United Kingdom 
 Services Staff, Australia, and rendered valuable service both in maintaining close 
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 relations with the Royal Australian Navy and in interpreting the views of the United 
 Kingdom Chiefs of Staff to the Australian Defence Committees and vice versa.
66
 
 
Even in times of decreasing British strategic power and influence in the Far East, 
robust military links were seen as valuable. The British High Commissioner 
suggested that maintaining strong links between the services as ‘increasingly 
necessary as CINCFE and Far East Command fade away.’67   
 
 Organised naval conferences also maintained links between the Admiralty 
and other Commonwealth navies. Exercise FAIRLEAD was a Commonwealth Naval 
Conference held at the Royal Naval College Greenwich in March 1957.
68
 The 
conference was designed to ‘get representatives of each Commonwealth Navy 
together to get to know each other and each other’s problems better’.69 
Representatives from a number of Commonwealth navies attended, including the 
RAN. Mountbatten viewed the conference as so important that during his visit to 
Australia ‘[I] talked to your Prime Minister about FAIRLEAD and he said he would 
make it possible for you [Australian CNS] and other Flag Officers or appropriate 
senior officers to attend…’70 FAIRLEAD was useful for the Admiralty as a tool ‘to 
make the case for a powerful fleet’.71 It was also beneficial for the RAN. The 
Australian CNS Vice Admiral Dowling realised the importance of the RAN being 
represented at the planning stage of FAIRLEAD, and suggested that ‘if FAIRLEAD 
could have a section dealing with employment of Navies in other than Global War, I 
am sure this will pay dividends [for the RAN] and help with our carrier policy’.72 
Mountbatten has happy to raise the issue with the conference director.
73
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 Shared correspondence and personal contact strengthened the inter-service 
bonds, even in a period where the RAN was seen as increasingly independent from 
the Admiralty. As Burrell noted, ‘knowing one’s opposite numbers saves 
misunderstandings and allows one to be blunt on paper without taking offence’.74 
Nevertheless the services sometimes did not see eye to eye, either on a personal level 
or a service level. Burrell recalled that during a Defence Committee meeting with 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Louis Mountbatten ‘we could not agree with quite a few of 
Mountbatten’s proposals, yet at dinner that night at Government House, he assured 
the Governor-General that there was unanimity on the day’s discussions. Such 
flexible interpretations were not endearing’.75 A UK brief on the ‘Future of the RAN’ 
was issued in late 1959 prior to the Australian Chief of Naval Staff’s visit to the UK. 
The opening paragraph warned: 
 
The Australians are a very independent people. They will welcome Admiralty advice 
and assistance but will not tolerate ready-made ideas being thrust upon them. In 
talking to Admiral Burrell we must therefore concentrate primarily on answering the 
questions we know he is gong to ask. Our own ideas must be worked in obliquely 
and presented as being designed for the benefit of the RAN. We must at all costs 
avoid giving the impression that we regard the RAN merely as a prop or an adjunct 
of the RN in the Far East.
76
 
 
Even where interpersonal or top-level relations were not always ideal communication 
arrangements such conferences, high-level communications and correspondence, as 
well as liaison officers did much to solidify the ties between the services. However 
members of the lower-deck, as well as junior officers had associations and dealings 
with each and these contacts shed much light on the inter-service relationship on a 
different level than those already examined.   
 
  British and Australian sailors and officers had a high level of interaction in 
the post-war period. The exchange of personnel between the two services was high, 
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especially in the period of 1945-57, and warships of both forces operated with each 
other in war and peace throughout our period of interest. Ships of both navies visited 
home-ports of their foreign brethren and were afforded opportunities to interact with 
the inhabitants. Personal relations varied from time to time but relations between 
serving members of the Royal Navy and the RAN were often valued and beneficial, 
reinforcing the close national relations between Australia and Great Britain. 
 
 James Craig, a British seaman, who was based at HMS Golden Hind in 
Sydney immediately after the Second World War, stated that his relations with 
Australians were good: ‘they treated us extremely well actually’.77 On cessation of 
Second World War hostilities, the ships Queenborough, Quadrant and Quality were 
to be handed over to the RAN. Royal Navy Lieutenant K M Macleod was part of the 
transfer team, and stayed in Australia. At the end of November 1945 he managed to 
avoid imminent repatriation by joining a repair base in Woolloomooloo. He recalled: 
 
There was also time for some shore-based social life. I acquired an Australian 
driving  license (aided by an Argyll-born police tester)…explored the Blue 
Mountains [and] improved my surfing skills at Bondi and Manly beaches. I fitted in 
some leave and  spent an exhausting week on a Queensland cattle station.
78
 
 
Another British visitor to Australia recalled that ‘the RSL, the Returned 
Servicemen’s League, in Australia, [were] very big, they would take hundreds of 
sailors and get them completely jugged up, bring them back and throw them on the 
quay at the bottom of the ladder, they were very friendly people’.79 
 
 At other times the experiences of British naval personnel to Australia were 
somewhat mixed.
80
 National competitiveness, whether it be tongue-in-cheek, or of a 
more sinister variety was in evidence. Fred Gosling a seaman on HMS Belfast during 
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visit to Australia in early 1960 remarked of the reception ‘Good, yeah they were 
good, [although] some called you Pommies and that…’81 
 
 Occasionally visiting personnel would be welcomed with open arms by 
British immigrants keen for contact with Great Britain. Richard Songer was a Royal 
Navy artificer, officer and pilot. His ship, HMS Albion undertook a world tour in 
1957-58.
82
 He commented: 
 
We met lots of British communities ashore, and [local] communities wherever, 
especially in Australia and New Zealand, they were very welcoming. Because I 
think in those days they were very connected to Britain, but a long way away, they 
didn’t feel completely independent I don’t think, and so they liked that link, and they 
were very generous to us. They took people ashore on bus trips and train trips. An 
old Spitfire pilot, I remember, picked me up in Hobart and I spent the weekend with 
him and his family sailing with a little boat, out in the harbour, it was lovely.
 83
 
 
 The Executive Officer of HMS Scarborough also recollected a strong bond 
between Australia and Great Britain: Anthony Swainson, the Executive Officer of 
the ship recalled that during a visit to Melbourne, the commander ‘had loudspeakers 
rigged all over the upper-deck, and played Land of Hope and Glory, for the 
delectation of the natives, it went down very well, and warmed the hearts of those 
who still thought of the old mother country’.84 
 
 Although there was some partition between British and Australian 
servicemen, the strong bonds between the two services made integration from one to 
the other relatively seamless.
85
 Robert Tunstall was an RN officer who served with 
the RAN on HMAS Sydney during the Korean War 1950-51.
86
 According to Tunstall 
there was much better rapport between the officers and men in the RAN during 
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Korea than during his time with the RN in the Second World War. ‘I loved the 
Australians, but not those [soldiers] alongside us in North Africa, who were gross 
and foulmouthed.’ RAN personnel during the Korean conflict were different 
however: ‘It was always no worries,’ and ‘RAN deckhands and naval airmen were 
first class and could get the f-word in between syllables let alone in between 
words’.87   
  
 Officers typically had much better relations with each other because of the 
higher number of instances of inter-naval interaction and a shared officer culture. 
This was due to RAN officers training in the United Kingdom as well as exchange 
postings from one service to another. In early 1947 RAN officer W N Swan was sent 
to the UK to undergo a Physical Training and Welfare course at Portsmouth followed 
by 2 years exchange service with the Royal Navy. Cultural ties were very strong 
between the services at this time: ‘All my thoughts were 12,000 miles away in the 
mother of all Navies.’88 Swan called Portsmouth ‘the most famous naval base in the 
British Commonwealth…and I loved every minute of it’.89 On his way to join his 
first RN sea-posting, the training carrier HMS Victorious, Swan recalled ‘Here I was, 
a stranger from the other side of the world, joining a ship of another country manned 
by officers and men I had never met. In the small family of the RAN you could be 
certain to know somebody wherever you went. I was equally certain I knew nobody 
in Victorious.’90 Integration was easy for Swan: ‘I found life aboard Victorious to be 
much the same as that aboard any other warship of the British Commonwealth…’91 
Even so cultural differences were recognised: ‘to my delight I was elected Captain of 
the first XI [cricket], a unique honour for an RAN officer in an RN capital ship’.92 
‘After 6 months in Victorious I felt I could say I had settled in and been accepted by 
both the wardroom and the lower deck. There were several exceptions, of course; but 
there are these wherever you go.’93 Clearly Swan was very impressed by his time in 
the United Kingdom however inter-service relations were not always so agreeable. 
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 Naval relations between the RAN and the Royal Navy were mixed on the 
lower-deck level.
94
 One lower-deck member of HMAS Bataan, recalled that ‘they 
were forced to accept six newcomers into their mess, four of whom they noted in 
mock alarm were “kippers”-RAN slang for British sailors, ex RN.’95 Within a month 
relations between the non-kipper and kipper messmates had progressed so that they 
looked at themselves as an exclusive group.
96
 On other occasions relations between 
the services were not always so amenable, especially where the lower-deck were 
concerned. David Butt was a signaller on HMS Cassandra on service in the Far East 
in the early 1960s.
97
 During a visit to Singapore, Butt recalled:  
 
We did have to spend two days in the Fleet Club in Hong Kong. We were anchored 
in the harbour at that time and the weather was so rough, we went ashore one 
day…they couldn’t run the boats [for our return trip] so we were stuck in [the] China 
Fleet Club, very sad that was with the bar open for two days constantly…that nearly 
caused some friction because there were a lot of Australians there as well…the 
Australian navy had a notorious reputation for a sudden change in their character 
when they’d been drinking. You could sit there for half the evening having a 
fantastic social chat with them and laugh and joke and everything else and then for 
no apparent reason one of them would suddenly get up on his high horse as 
Australians will do and start the old ‘English Pom lark’ and this sort of thing and 
start causing trouble. And they did it fairly frequently. It nearly happened in the 
China Fleet Club on that occasion but it was so  crowded there, because there was 
so many ashore and it was the only place to take refuge because the weather was so 
poor that it didn’t develop into anything… They were a funny sort of crowd, the 
Australians, and they have that reputation…
98
 
 
 As early as 1921 First Sea Lord David Beatty said it was necessary to ‘ensure 
that the various Navies of the Empire be similarly trained and that they adhere to a 
common doctrine and a common system of command and staff’.99 Beatty was aware 
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of Dominion sensitivity to centralized control from London and argued that ‘it is as 
much the Navy of Australia, of Canada, of South Africa and of India as it is of the 
British Isles’.100 That the RAN was so reliant on Admiralty support meant that in 
many ways the former could be viewed as a smaller version of the latter, especially 
in the immediate post-war period. This view was tempered somewhat by a growing 
independence of the RAN, and a lessening of Admiralty ties but culture and tradition 
is an important part of every military force, and military cultures are generally not 
altered without great consideration.    
 
 In 1954-55 the Admiralty studied the Royal Navy officer structure and 
eventually recommended the Post and General Lists for the Royal Navy. 
Mountbatten made the RAN aware of the impending changes but did not force them 
to adopt the changes automatically.
101
 When discussing the proposed changes the 
Australian CNS thanked Mountbatten for the information and said ‘Our problems are 
very much the same as yours and there is no doubt in my mind that the RAN will 
adopt at least the major changes. It is essential to maintain our very close relationship 
in everything that really matters.’102 Dowling set up a Special Committee under Rear 
Admiral Burrell to study all facets of the changes to officer structure.
103
 The system 
was examined by the RAN and was adopted by the service, although dispensed with 
after a fairly short period.
104
 One of the benefits of following Admiralty practice was 
the negation of any confusion in regard to loan and exchange personnel, and to RAN 
officers under training in the UK.
105
 The process of transformation illustrates that the 
proposed changes were not forced on the RAN by the Admiralty, an alteration of 
practice from the inter-war period. Additionally the RAN felt some necessity to 
adopt the changes, due to the close bonds between the officer classes of both 
services. Lastly the changes were later found to be less than ideal and were dispensed 
with, again a circumstance that would have been unlikely many years before.  
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 Uniforms are an obvious visual symbol of a military force. RAN personnel 
have historically been dressed in the same manner as officers and ratings of the 
Royal Navy. This is in contrast, for example, to the Australian Army which has long 
been distinguished by their distinctive ‘slouch’ hats. The ‘Australia’ national flash 
was not added to the RAN uniform until 1967. Until then the differences between the 
uniforms of the two services were minor, and in many ways only by virtue of the fact 
that RAN personnel served in non-European climates, and thus for instance did not 
have to wear blue caps. In late-1955 the Admiralty made the RAN and other 
Commonwealth Navies aware of its consideration of extending square rig to certain 
branches of the Royal Navy, and also the introduction of white caps ‘the whole year 
round’.106 The First Sea Lord ‘should value your views on this policy’.107 Dowling 
remarked that the RAN already wore white caps the whole year round and added, ‘I 
personally believe that we should be thinking of doing away with the Sailors Cap. It 
is uncomfortable and disliked by nearly all sailors. I have thought of a soft cap on the 
lines of the US gob!’108 This suggestion may have been offered in a somewhat 
flippant manner but is a reflection of the increasing independence of the service.   
 
 There were differences between the more laidback approach of the Royal 
Navy and the stance taken by the United States Navy in regards to the sartorial 
standards expected by the respective services. This was especially true when sea-
based combat operations were concerned, as in Korea. The RAN followed the 
example of the Royal Navy and generally was more relaxed in attitudes towards 
dress regulations, especially when ships were on active service. Even so there were 
occasions where the more relaxed attitudes of some Australian officers were frowned 
upon by their British counterparts.
109
 During the Korean War, the men of HMAS 
Bataan saw themselves as fighting sailors and held the view that ‘no self-respecting 
fighting captain would worry about such trivial matters as dress regulations in a war 
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zone’.110 The Australian sailors felt they could ‘thumb their noses at an RN senior 
officer’s admonishments’.111 This may have been an indication of lower-deck dislike 
of the officer class, resentment at being told what to do by a foreign officer, a dislike 
for ‘spit and polish’, recognition of a more relaxed attitude by the vessel’s Australian 
Commanding officer, or a mixture of all. In any case RAN officers and sailors were 
virtually indistinguishable from their British cousins throughout our period of 
interest.       
                 
 The manner in which officers of each service dealt with ratings of either the 
same service or its sister-service varied. Commissioned officers of the services were 
careful to preserve the distance between themselves and ratings. Commander 
Warwick Bracegirdle, the commanding officer of HMAS Bataan during the Korean 
War, was described by veterans as a ‘very fine man’ and an officer who did not talk 
down to his men.
112
 Even so, Bracegirdle was not over-familiar with his crew, a facet 
that reflected his ‘Anglophile inclinations’ and due to the Royal Naval culture from 
which the RAN had emerged.
113
 One Australian sailor recalled that it was often RAN 
officers who ‘adopted an overly officious and abrupt manner towards the men’.114 
Royal Navy exchange officers often appeared able to behave in a less strict manner 
than their Australian counterparts.
115
 Again it is not wise to make generalisations, 
suffice to say the Australian officer class was at times remarkably similar to its 
British equivalent, and so could not have been expected to behave in a completely 
dissimilar manner. It would be unwise to transport the Australian national stereotype 
of one of ‘she’ll be right’ onto RAN officers, just as it would be incorrect to persuade 
one that all British officers conformed to more British stereotypes. A overly-
authoritarian officer need not be British, nor a more laidback commander Australian. 
As so many Australian officers were trained in the United Kingdom, particularly in 
the immediate post-war era, Australian and British officer culture was extremely 
similar.   
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 The Admiralty saw clear advantages in keeping the cultural and 
organisational ties between itself and navies such as the RAN healthy. When 
considering the reorganisation of the Navy List, the Admiralty saw the inclusion of 
Commonwealth officers as a demonstration of the close relationship between the 
Commonwealth navies. On economic grounds the HMSO asked the Admiralty to 
consider excluding all information on Commonwealth Navies. The Admiralty 
refused although it did permit a reduction in details on officers, ships and 
establishments to be included.
116
 
 
 If individual sailors or officers of the respective services could not easily be 
distinguished from one another, and the officer classes of both services were very 
much alike in culture and tradition, the same can be said for the visual aspects of the 
vessels utilised by the Royal Navy and the RAN. It was not until mid-1965 and the 
commissioning of the American-built HMAS Perth that the RAN had utilised a non-
British or Australian built vessel. The addition of American designed ships to the 
Australian fleet was a clear indication of growing Australian naval independence, but 
the RAN had tried visually to forge an Australian identity prior to this class of ship 
entering the fleet.  
 
 During the Korean War RAN ships flew the British White Ensign. In addition 
RAN vessels used painted symbols of the Union Jack, typically on the top of gun 
mounts, as recognition features for Allied aircraft.
117
 Even so there was a growing 
sense of Australian naval independence, and a kangaroo cut-out was suspended on 
the signal halyards behind the bridge of some Australian ships to differentiate them 
from other ‘British’ ships.118 This kangaroo symbol has since become a permanent 
feature on RAN ships. In another deviation from Admiralty practice, from the 1
st
 
January 1969 all RAN ships wore new-style hull numbers that followed USN 
practice.
119
 This was perhaps less a sign of growing naval independence, rather a 
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recognition that Australian naval forces would increasingly be asked to operate with 
their American partners. 
 
 The most obvious visual symbol of growing naval independence was the 
adoption of the Australian White Ensign. When the RAN was founded in 1911 the 
question as to which ensign was to be flown from Australian vessels was discussed. 
The view of the Admiralty was that Dominion warships should fly the White Ensign 
as this would cultivate and sustain a sentiment of union between the Royal Navy and 
the naval forces of the Dominions. Australian Ministers considered that Australian 
ships should fly either the White Ensign defaced with either a seven-pointed blue 
star, or the Australian flag. After some months of debate it was agreed that RAN 
ships would fly the unmodified White Ensign at the stern and the Australian flag on 
the bow jackstaff when in harbour. On the 28
th
 October 1965 the Minister for the 
Navy Frederick Chaney informed the House that the Navy was investigating possible 
variants on the White Ensign which would convey a distinctly Australian 
appearance.
120
 The Australian Chief of Naval Staff canvassed the views of Australian 
officers on whether the RAN should have its own ensign and:  
 
Of those whose views I have received, approximately half were definitely in favour 
of introducing an Australian ensign; of the others several believe  that, although they 
would personally regret it, such a change was inevitable and that it would probably 
be welcomed by the majority of sailors and many officers.
121
 
 
The Chief of the Naval Staff noted that: 
 
The RAN has always been closely associated with the RN. For many years the 
senior officers were RN officers on loan. With one exception it was not until 1948 
that CNS was an RAN officer and up to 1954 FOCAF had usually been an RN loan 
officer.  Since 1957 all Board Members’ and Flag Officers’, and virtually all 
Captains’ appointments have been filled by RAN officers. Concurrent with this 
development the RAN has assumed an individual identity, and I believe there is a 
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growing feeling within the RAN that our Navy, our ships and our sailors should be 
immediately identifiable as Australian.
122
 
 
On the 21
st
 January 1966 the Naval Board decided to recommend to the Government 
that the RAN should have a distinctive Australian White Ensign.
123
 Chaney put this 
recommendation to the Prime Minister noting that:  
 
The Naval Board considers that the wearing of the RN Ensign, for all its great 
traditions, is not in keeping with the RAN’s individual identity nor with the national 
wish that Australia should project an independent image to the world. Our ships 
frequently visit Asian ports, and there is no doubt the wearing of the White Ensign 
causes confusion. Furthermore in Vietnamese waters our ships fly an ensign 
identical with that of a country which is not engaged in the conflict.
124
 
 
The Naval Board recommended a design that ‘while retaining the essential features 
of the White Ensign, should be recognisable as Australian in view of its similarity to 
the National Flag’,125 and a sketch of the proposed design was sent to the Prime 
Minister. In December 1966 a signal was sent to the Fleet informing it that ‘the 
Government with the concurrence of Her Majesty has approved the adoption of an 
exclusive Australian White Ensign…’126 It was stressed that: 
 
We are all proud and honoured to have served under the White Ensign, but it is now 
appropriate that an unmistakeable indication of the RAN’s position as an 
independent service of an independent nation of the British Commonwealth should 
be displayed in Her Majesty’s Australian ships and establishments.
127
 
 
Nevertheless it was stressed that ‘In deciding on the design of the new ensign the 
Naval Board was influenced by its desire to preserve traditional links with the Royal 
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Navy which helped to found, foster and develop our service.’128 The new ensign 
retained the two main features of the Royal Navy White Ensign, namely the Union 
Flag in the canton and the white background, but removed the red cross of St. George 
in favour of the stars of the Southern Cross and the Federation Star in blue. On the 1
st
 
March 1967 all RAN establishments and ships hoisted the Australian White Ensign. 
It was a clear sign that the RAN was modifying the existing naval culture, shared by 
itself and the Royal Navy, to reflect a more ‘Australian’ service. The Australian 
Chief of Naval Staff Vice Admiral Alan McNicoll noted that ‘It is interesting that 
from the beginning Australia wished to adopt a distinctive ensign, but was overborne 
by Imperial and international difficulties’.129 This fact was an indication that the 
RAN, perhaps under Admiralty pressure, took longer to find a more unique 
Australian identity than the nation itself. The high levels of communication and co-
operation between the Admiralty and the RAN in the post-war period should not 
mask the fact that the services were not one, and the RAN grew increasingly 
independent in the post-war era.   
 
 Between 1945-75 the indications of the RAN becoming a more sovereign 
service are legion. The modifications to uniform, the adoption of the Australian 
White Ensign, changes to the hull-marking of vessels, and the acquisition of non-
British built or designed ships are some of the more obvious examples of this trend. 
Some of the less obvious examples of this are in the RAN’s dealings with the 
Admiralty itself. One sign of growing RAN self-determination was the decision by 
Collins to ‘kill that misnomer HMA Squadron and substitute the old term HMA 
Fleet’. Collins did not ask for Admiralty permission to do so, but informed the First 
Sea Lord saying ‘I am sure you’ll agree that such a collection is not a squadron, even 
if it’s small for a fleet.’130 The First Sea Lord was ‘interested to hear of your decision 
to revert to the original title of HMA Fleet, and I agree that this title is more suitable 
to describe the Forces you now have’.131  
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 There is evidence that the RAN was increasingly being seen as a more self-
sufficient force by those in British naval circles. On the 15
th
 September 1959 First 
Sea Lord Charles Lambe sent Australian CNS Henry Burrell a letter apologising for 
an Admiralty study into the future requirements of the RAN. The Australian Chief of 
Naval Staff assured him that ‘it has not embarrassed me in the slightest. I heard a 
buzz about it but did not give it any weight…’132 In years gone by, such a study 
would not have been questioned by either the Admiralty or the RAN. On the 
impending loss of the Australian FAA in 1959 Lambe apologised to Burrell and said: 
‘I feel sure you must have been having an extremely difficult time and I only wish 
that I could have been of more help to you in fighting your battles than I was…The 
RAN is so important to us that I am sure you will forgive me for poking my nose 
in.’133 This is an admission that the Admiralty was perhaps less useful to the RAN 
than in previous times, as well as an acknowledgement of the ongoing ties between 
the services. The comments of the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Station in 
regards to the impending loss of the Australian Fleet Air Arm in 1959 illustrated the 
changing relationship between the RAN and the British naval hierarchy: ‘it ill 
becomes a Pommy to offer advice or even consolation except with the utmost 
circumspection’.134 
 
 In many ways the growing self-sufficiency of the RAN and drift from the 
Admiralty mirrored the national experiences of Great Britain and Australia. Although 
Anglo-Australian strategic issues are covered at a later point in this thesis, some 
themes should be covered here to provide a national-naval contrast. Australia was a 
progressively more self-sufficient nation in the post-war period on a number of 
levels, be they economic, strategic, military, diplomatic or cultural. Even so, the ties 
that held Australia to the United Kingdom were not so easily loosened. Writing in 
1955, the British High Commissioner in Australia, Sir Stephen Holmes, pointed to 
what he termed a ‘curious paradox’ in the Australian outlook on the world. 
‘Australians’, he noted, ‘combine a determined claim to “independence”, an 
insistence on being allowed to think and act for themselves, with a sense of need to 
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be assured of the continuance of an almost paternal relationship between the United 
Kingdom and Australia, which may seem much more appropriate to the days before 
Dominion status’.135 As Ward wrote, ‘Holmes’ comment points to a major dilemma 
that has confronted historians studying the question of Australia’s fraying ties to 
Britain in the decades after World War II.’136 This dilemma is also evident in the 
dealings between the RAN and the Royal Navy in the post-war period. On one hand, 
the RAN craved an independence from the Admiralty and recognition that the Royal 
Australian Navy was an ‘Australian’ service. On the other hand, the RAN was reliant 
on the Admiralty in ways that the other Australian services were not reliant on their 
British counterparts. This made the RAN a more Anglophile and conservative force 
than either the RAAF or the Australian Army. It is interesting that even at the end of 
the chosen period of interest Royal Australian Navy promotions were still being 
reported in the Times alongside those of the Royal Navy. The Australian Army and 
RAAF were not accorded the same luxury.
137
 It was only when the RAN gained the 
self-confidence and skills, primarily via the senior officer corps, to replace the 
assistance previously given by the Admiralty, that Australian naval independence 
could be nurtured. This independence was assisted by stronger ties with the United 
States Navy, again mirroring national experience, but there was no replacement of 
the Admiralty by the USN. Throughout this process, the Admiralty retained personal 
and professional contact with those in the RAN, offering advice as appropriate, 
mindful of the changing circumstances of the relationship.        
 
 The British also found themselves confronted with a changing politico-
military environment with a strategic shift towards NATO and an economic drift 
towards Europe. Even so national ties were difficult to ignore. As Admiral of the 
Fleet Lord Peter Hill-Norton stated:    
 
 Our first defence priority is support for the North Atlantic Alliance. The security of 
 these islands must obviously be our first concern, and this is bound inextricably with 
 the security of Western Europe. However, unlike other members of the Alliance, we 
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 have traditional and blood ties with other countries and specifically those of the old 
 Commonwealth and the British Dependencies overseas. We cannot therefore look to 
 our own interests in isolation from these factors, or from the call they make on our 
 capabilities.
138
 
 
Efforts were made to assuage any Antipodean feelings of alarm of a drift in Anglo-
Australian relations: 
 
I think this is an earnest of the fact that, contrary to what a number of people 
suppose (I think-not unreasonably-as the results of the negotiations for our entry into 
the European Economic Community, which is none of my business) we are not 
becoming little Englanders. There is no intention of withdrawing into our tight little 
island…
139
 
 
Nevertheless, a level of pragmatism was in evidence that even the national ties of 
kith and kin, and culture and tradition could not greatly affect: ‘Something we must 
recognise is that all too often the policies and interests of our old Commonwealth 
friends are quite different to our own aspirations and that realities and self-interest 
more and more tend to over-shadow sentiment.’140 This is a sentiment that is very 
relevant to the impact of culture and tradition on the Anglo-Australian naval 
relationship. 
 
   High-level communications between the RAN and the Admiralty 
strengthened the bonds between the services. As Collins wrote, ‘Liaison with the 
First Sea Lord at the Admiralty…was maintained by correspondence and visits. 
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Often much more could be achieved, and more quickly, by personal contacts than 
through the official channels.’141 These communications were augmented by lower-
level interactions, some not always as efficient as expected. The officer culture of the 
Anglo-Australian naval paradigm was strong. The officer corps of the RAN has been 
described as ‘conservative and Anglophile’142, and this was especially true during the 
immediate post-war period. HMAS Bataan’s commanding officer during the ships 
first deployment to Korea referred to his ship as a ‘British ship’.143 The RAN 
introduced representational signs that the service was a more ‘Australian’ one. 
Collins was the first Australian Chief of Naval Staff to have graduated from the 
Royal Australian Naval College. As Cooper correctly pointed out, ‘The sight of 
Collins…taking over from Hamilton, an RN Admiral, was a very strong symbolic 
statement’.144 In addition changes to naval culture were implemented that made the 
RAN a more ‘Australian’ branch, such as the addition of ‘Australia’ flashes to the 
RAN uniform and the adoption of the Australian White Ensign. There were some 
that cherished the links between the Admiralty and the RAN. Former Chief of the 
Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Sir Roy Dowling wrote to the First Sea Lord: 
 
 As you are aware, the RAN is very close indeed to the RN. Long may it remain so. 
 There have been pressures in the past for us to be more independent, or more 
 dependent on the USN. All such pressures have been from outside the Service and 
 all have been strongly and successfully resisted from within the Service.
145
 
 
For all of this, the national drift of Australia from the United Kingdom could not be 
ignored, and an alteration in Anglo-Australian naval relations was certain, no matter 
the cultural and historical ties between the services. Vice Admiral Sir Henry Burrell 
wrote ‘Throughout my career I, and the RAN, had received the greatest help and 
consideration from the Royal Navy.’146 Burrell called an invitation to lunch with the 
First Lord, Lord Carrington, and my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty: 
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One of the great moments in my life…I had no idea if any Australian naval officer 
had ever expressed the gratitude of our navy to the Royal Navy, but at that lunch I 
did just that. This story of my life should reek with the opportunity, experience and 
friendship given to me by the Royal Navy. If it does not the fault is mine.
147
  
 
 The two navies shared a common culture and the bonds between the two were 
recognised and appreciated. McGrigor’s successor as First Sea Lord, Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, wrote to the new Australian Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral 
Roy Dowling to ‘tell you right away how much I hope we shall be able to maintain a 
close personal contact by correspondence and I hope from time to time by visits. I 
am sure I do not need to tell you that I will ensure the continued friendly co-
operation between our Navies.
148
 Dowling responded, ‘As you know our two Navies 
are very closely knit. We are very grateful for all the assistance and guidance we’ve 
had in the past.’149 In addition: 
 
We hang tight to the guidance of QR and AI and the rules of the Naval Discipline 
Act (slightly modified to suit local conditions) and so far there has been no 
concerted pressure from outside sources to break the grip. Now and then some 
‘wise-guy’ suggests that we follow the RN too blindly and closely or that it’s high 
time we wrote our own instructions (shades of Canada) but we smile and ignore such 
thoughts.
150
 
 
 Even so Burrell recognised that an increasingly independent RAN had to act 
with a certain level of pragmatism in its dealings with the Admiralty. This matter-of-
factness manifested itself in the purchase of the US-built Charles F. Adams class 
destroyers. Culture and tradition were all well and good, but if the Admiralty could 
not meet the RAN’s requirements, the RAN had to look elsewhere. 
 
In late 1959 the UK High Commissioner in Australia noted, ‘I leave here with 
one dominant impression. It is that the Australians have in recent years made great 
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progress leading to a much greater sense of maturity and self-confidence.’151 He 
continued: ‘They are independent, sometimes aggressively independent, dislike 
intensely any suggestion of patronising from English visitors or paternalism from the 
British Government, and are immensely proud of their own achievements and what 
they have in this vast country in little more than a hundred years.’152 These 
comments could very much be used as a parallel for the altering Anglo-Australia 
naval relations in the post-war period. 
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Chapter 3 
 
High-Level Strategy 
 
The relationship between the Royal Navy and the RAN was greatly 
influenced by the high-level strategic choices undertaken by the United Kingdom and 
Australia.
1
 The post-Second World War period saw massive alterations in the 
strategic outlook of both the United Kingdom and Australia. Both nations gravitated 
to the United States of America for purposes of national security but strategic ties 
were still maintained between Britain and Australia throughout the post-war period. 
Agreements such as ANZAM and the creation of the Far East Strategic Reserve, 
ANZUK, FPDA and SEATO, strengthened or maintained, in varying levels, the 
bonds between the two Anglo-Australian navies. In contrast, treaties such as ANZUS 
and the Radford-Collins agreement made plain the strategic shift of Australia from 
the British sphere of influence to that of the United States. Likewise, the British 
focus on NATO underlined the importance of that treaty’s importance to the United 
Kingdom and presaged the strategic shift of Britain from its global defence 
commitments to European/North Atlantic defence.  
 
 The ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaya) agreement emerged from 
early post-war discussions on the future responsibilities of the Dominions within the 
system of Commonwealth defence co-operation.
2
 In 1947 it was suggested that 
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improved co-operation between Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand was 
necessary for defence of the British Commonwealth.
3
 The area that the resultant 
reorganisation of defence machinery covered would become known as the ANZAM 
region.
4
 ANZAM was based on the common interests of Australia, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom in the defence of Australia, New Zealand and the Malayan area, 
and of the sea and air communications in the region. In late 1948 the British Chiefs 
of Staff were anxious to encourage Australia to assume responsibility for as large an 
area as possible, and that Australian acceptance of responsibility for planning was ‘a 
step forward which might in time lead to greater things’.5 This aim matched the 
Australian commitment to take on greater responsibilities in the Pacific area.
6
 In mid-
1949 the Admiralty proposed that the main Australian naval commitment at the start 
of any future war should be in the ANZAM area.
7
 It was later stated that the 
Admiralty’s concept of Australia’s share in Commonwealth defence was of reliance 
upon the RAN to provide the forces required for the defence of sea communications 
in the ANZAM area. Even so the actual threat was deemed to be low and as such it 
was hoped RAN forces would be available to co-operate with the remaining 
Commonwealth and allied navies in other parts of the world.
8
 
 
 In 1950 the Australian Defence Committee recommended to the government 
that peacetime planning for the ANZAM region would be based on the supposition 
that Australia would accept the strategic responsibility for the defence of Australia 
and the overall direction and control of operations within the ANZAM area in the 
event of war.
9
 The RAN had an obvious role to play in the defence of shipping 
within the ANZAM area. Following the realisation that there was no immediate 
threat of an invasion of the Australian mainland, the Australian Chief of Naval Staff 
John Collins was intent on emphasising the control of sea communications in the 
ANZAM region, and not only the defence of Australian waters, as the primary task 
                                                          
3
 Canberra, NAA, A5954, 1850/1, Co-operation in British Commonwealth Defence, August-
October 1947.   
4
 Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations, 1945-1971’, p. 700.   
5
 London, TNA, CAB131/5, Defence Committee Minutes, 24 November 1948. 
6
 London, TNA, CO537/6331, Telegram from UK Information Office Canberra to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, 31 May 1950. 
7
 ADM205/72, Minutes of meeting with the First Naval Member RAN, 26 April 1949.  
8
 ADM205/74, Letter from First Sea Lord to Collins, 27 April 1950.  
9
 Grey, Up Top, p. 5. 
58 
 
of the RAN.
10
 Indeed the RAN’s assumption of responsibility for the defence of sea 
communications within the ANZAM region was an important departure from 
previous strategic practices, as the RAN had not had any significant role in strategic 
planning independent of the Royal Navy. As Cooper so succinctly summed up: 
 
The development of an indigenous naval strategic planning capability reduced the 
RAN’s reliance upon the Royal Navy. Although the RAN did not particularly wish 
to operate independently of the Royal Navy, its increasing ability to do so meant that 
its ties to the Royal Navy became more ties of convenience than of necessity.
11
 
  
The Admiralty provided assistance to the RAN and helped the latter carry out its new 
responsibilities. Collins thanked the Admiralty for providing logistics experts for 
ANZAM planning purposes; ‘it seems we are now making some progress in this 
somewhat tiresome task. If we have seemed un-co-operative in regard to providing 
planning teams…it is only our lack of officers.’12 The fact that Australia were to be 
responsible for defence of sea communications in the ANZAM area was an 
acknowledgement that the United Kingdom would be unable to maintain strong 
naval forces in the Far East if they were required elsewhere.   
 
 All was not plain sailing as far as resources allocated to the Far East Station 
by the RAN were concerned. In mid-1954 the UK Commander in Chief Far-East said 
of the co-operation given by the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) that ‘we shall be 
making really big strides if and when we can get the Australians to do the same’.13 
This should be viewed as a more relaxed stance taken by the New Zealand 
government on the circumstances in which RNZN vessels could be used as opposed 
to any recalcitrance on the part of the RAN. Indeed there is evidence that the RAN 
were more forthcoming than the Australian government. This stance was appreciated 
as ‘After all it is working towards the ANZAM concept.’14 Certainly the British were 
keen to have Australian vessels attached to the Far East Station in both peace and 
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war.
15
 Collins too, was keen on ‘keeping the closest contact between the Far East 
Station and the Australian Navy, both from the point of view that they are adjacent 
Naval Stations, and also because in these days of ANZAM, the Melbourne Pact, and 
now SEATO, they have so many Naval problems in common’.16 The addition of a 
naval air capability to the RAN was a crucial resource for the ANZAM area. The 
British saw the Australian naval aviation capability as vital in protecting sea 
communications in the ANZAM area.
17
 The Commander-in-Chief of the Far East 
Station made plain that the strength of British naval forces in the Malayan area at the 
start of any conflict would depend on whether the conflict was global or local and on 
how the war broke out. The fact that British naval forces could not be promised in 
any great numbers in the Far East in a global conflict was implicit in this statement.
18
    
 
ANZAM had a great impact on the relationship between the RAN and the 
Royal Navy. ANZAM deployed forces in the field for active service in the ‘Malayan 
Emergency’ and in confrontation with Indonesia. During these operations ships of 
both navies operated side by side. At the same time strategic planning was carried 
out by both services under the ANZAM remit. The creation of an Australian 
capability for maritime strategic planning reduced the RAN’s reliance on the 
Admiralty, but also meant continued co-operation between the RAN and the Royal 
Navy in the ANZAM region. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom was not the only 
naval power courted by the RAN in the post-war era. 
 
 In late 1948 the Australian Chief of Naval Staff John Collins, reported to the 
British First Sea Lord that following a visit to Pearl Harbor, the US ‘were thinking 
on much the same lines as ourselves’ and that ‘the limits to our proposed area of 
responsibility on the north and the east were decided in consultation with 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, so as to have some workable arrangement ready in the 
event of the only possible trouble’.19 The First Sea Lord hoped that the question of 
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‘areas’ would soon be worked out, noting that the exact limits were under discussion 
at prime ministers’ level. He also made plain that ‘it is very satisfactory that you 
have such good contacts’ with the American navy.20 In early 1951 meetings were 
held between Collins, and the United States Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
(CICPAC), Admiral Arthur Radford.
21
 The evolution of the search for an accord 
between the RAN and the USN concluded in the Radford-Collins agreement of early 
1951. This agreement divided the Pacific into zones for the naval control of shipping 
and recognized the existence of the Anglo-New Zealand-Australian area of interest in 
Malaya (ANZAM). Radford-Collins codified the co-ordination of naval forces of the 
ANZAM and CINPAC regions in areas such as search and rescue, anti-submarine 
warfare, reconnaissance, the control of shipping and escort and convoy routing.  
 
 Collins reported on the meetings to the Admiralty and pleaded ‘for the 
acceptance of the Radford-Collins line as delineating the agreed ANZAM region. If 
we cannot do so I feel we shall have to have two areas, one the British 
Commonwealth ANZAM region and the other for use with the United States…’22 It 
was later recommended that this be accepted by the British Chiefs of Staff.
23
 
Radford-Collins was periodically revised and amended but in essence it remained the 
same throughout our period of interest.
24
 One change to the agreement did directly 
impact SEATO naval planning however; in May 1966 an offer to extend to SEATO 
the naval control of shipping arrangement implicit in the Radford-Collins agreement 
was made, an offer that was later accepted by certain members of SEATO.
25
 One 
salient point in regards to the agreement was that Collins represented all of the 
ANZAM nations, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, during the talks. 
Even so, there were also representatives of the Royal Navy and the Royal New 
Zealand Navy present. Radford-Collins arguably raised the profile of the RAN. One 
observer noted that the Australian Chief of Naval Staff’s ‘position under 
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Radford/Collins gives him considerable voice and status when dealing with the US 
PACFLT authorities. When speaking for the RAN alone, it is possible that in the 
American mind, CNS could be regarded as just another of the many foreign flag 
officers who direct minor forces in the Pacific.’26 The Radford-Collins agreement 
symbolised one facet of growing Australian naval independence, as well as a shift 
away from the Admiralty.     
 
 Even so, there is evidence that the RAN occasionally saw much more 
promise in naval relations with Britain than with the US; Collins wrote to the First 
Sea Lord ‘I am sure we must go ahead on the ANZAM level before we can make any 
progress with the Americans’ 27 and ‘You will have gathered from past comments 
that I have always been “an ANZAM man” and I am glad that things have turned out 
this way, for ANZAM is realistic whereas Five Power, ANZUS, SEATO etc. are all 
so indefinite.’28 This highlights the occasional differences between national strategy 
and naval strategy. To Australia, on a national level, SEATO had more attraction 
than ANZAM as the former held the possibility of American assistance. The British 
viewed its links with Australia and New Zealand ‘particularly in ANZAM’ as 
fundamental to achieving its strategic aims in the Far East.
29
 Thus ANZAM had clear 
benefits for both nations, and helped to keep relations between the Royal Navy and 
the RAN strong.  
 
 Australia forged closer ties with the United States, on both naval and political 
levels in the post-war period. The ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States) treaty which entered into force in April 1952 symbolised a level of political 
separation between the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as the Australian 
requirement for a ‘great and powerful friend’. Following the crisis of Japan’s entry 
into the Second World War, Australians realised for the first time that the Royal 
Navy was no longer an impenetrable shield guarding Australia and the far-east 
region. In the post-war period the only nation to which Australia could turn for 
                                                          
26
 Canberra, SPC-A, RG50/C2/239, Correspondence by the Staff Officer (Trades), 
AUSTUS-PACOP-DRAFT, 25 February 1964.  
27
 ADM205/105, Letter from Collins to McGrigor, 29 October 1954. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 ADM205/189, Annex to COS73/63, The Far East-Strategic Aims: Means of Achievement, 
13 February 1963.  
62 
 
assistance was the United States. Nonetheless, the fundamental tenet of Australia’s 
foreign policy became maintenance of the closet possible ties with both Great Britain 
and the United States. There was no military planning machinery under ANZUS, and 
although meetings were supposed to be held every 6 months, in practice they were 
very irregular and were primarily political in nature, with military advisors attending 
as observers.
30
 As such, ANZUS had much less impact on naval relations between 
the United States and Australia than the Radford-Collins agreement. Nor did the 
ANZUS agreement appear to do much to sour Anglo-Australian naval relations; as 
far as the British Far East naval forces were concerned, from a military point of view 
we ‘felt that we were getting all we needed from the Five Power Agency’ and did not 
feel unduly excluded from ANZUS.
31
 Thus ANZUS appeared to have negligible 
effect on naval relations between either Australia and the USA or Australia and the 
United Kingdom.  
 
 Nor were the British unduly bothered about the impact of ANZUS on its 
relations with Australia. During British Cabinet discussions it was stated that the 
‘conclusion of ANZUS would be fully in accord with modern conceptions of the 
nature of the Commonwealth and that Australia and New Zealand would be 
undertaking responsibilities for the protection of Commonwealth interests in the 
Pacific.’32 The Cabinet later agreed that if the proposed treaty was to be concluded, 
statements should be made in the parliaments of the United Kingdom, Australia and 
New Zealand making it clear that the treaty would not affect the existing relations 
between the independent nations of the Commonwealth.
33
 Indeed the ANZUS treaty 
was said by Prime Minister Atlee to ‘meet the desire of Australia and New Zealand 
for guarantees in the Pacific, and would be to our [the UK] advantage as making 
them more willing to meet their commitments for the defence of the Middle East.’34 
This did not transpire as Australia concentrated its defence resources in south-east 
Asia and the Pacific region, a result of strategic necessity and limited resources.  
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 The South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty, better known as the South 
East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), was signed in Manila in 1954: both 
Australia and the United Kingdom were members. Australia had an obvious interest 
in collective security in Asia. This area provided the most obvious route for potential 
aggression against Australia. Communist China was viewed as the main threat, and 
‘the two countries outside the area to which we have to look are the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Fortunately we are in intimate relationships with each of 
them.’35 For Australia SEATO was a useful tool in bringing the USA and Britain 
together into an Asian alliance. The United Kingdom saw obvious differences 
between ANZAM and the proposed South-East Asian collective defence organisation 
that later became SEATO. The former ‘is a regional arrangement and provides a 
means of co-ordinating Commonwealth strategy for the defence of the ANZAM area 
in war’.36 The latter ‘is an organisation designed to block the overt or covert spread 
of Communism in South-East Asia.’ Even so it was concluded that SEATO, being 
wider in scope, could fulfil the purpose of ANZAM but that ANZAM as planned 
could not be embodied in SEATO.
37
 The RAN saw obvious advantages in playing an 
important role in SEATO. A role in containing regional communism was a boon to a 
service under the threat of diminishing resources. Australia also saw SEATO as a 
means of keeping the British east of Suez.
38
 In contrast the British viewed SEATO as 
‘an impossible instrument to use for hot war planning’ due to security reasons, 
however it may ‘be an extremely useful organisation to enable us all to get together 
on cold war problems.’39 In late 1963 the British strategic aims in the far east were 
viewed as the containment of communism and the maintenance of Commonwealth 
links, with particular stress on the forward defence of Australia and New Zealand. 
This could be achieved through active membership of SEATO.
40
 The later 
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withdrawal from east of Suez meant this was unachievable, as UK naval 
commitments to the far east dwindled due to the redeployment of naval forces to the 
European theatre and NATO.   
 
 The SEATO agreement did not hinder ANZAM as the latter was viewed as 
cementing the military bonds between the three nations involved: ‘it may be said that 
the existence of the [ANZAM] arrangement greatly facilitates the study of defence 
problems in this area and will help ensure that the contribution of the three countries 
to the SEATO alliance are made as effective as possible’.41 One of the later functions 
of ANZAM was the preparation of contingency plans for the defence of 
Commonwealth interests in South East Asia in case SEATO failed to provide such 
defence.
42
 Unlike ANZUS, SEATO or NATO, ANZAM was not a treaty 
organisation but rather a piece of planning machinery. The 1955 creation of the 
British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR), the principal role of 
which was to provide a force-in-being to respond to external threats to the ANZAM 
region, gave ANZAM the wherewithal to act as a ‘deterrent to further Communist 
aggression in South East Asia’ as well as assist in the maintenance of the security of 
the Federation of Malaysia. Australia’s naval commitment was 2 destroyers and/or 
frigates on continuous service in the Far East, with a carrier when available, under 
British operational control. The vessels remained under Australian government 
command however, a departure from previous command and control arrangements 
where RAN ships fell under RN command. 
 
The UK was convinced that ‘in the beginning any organisation [for collective 
security in Asia] should consist of the countries concerned being linked in a loose 
periphery and not in a tight organisation controlled by NATO’.43 This may have been 
a reflection that the UK were already aware that they could not guarantee military 
forces in the far east on the level that they had committed to the Atlantic/European 
theatres. In late 1954 the First Sea Lord suggested that although some or all of the 
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Far East Fleet may remain in the ANZAM region following a major and direct threat 
to British territory, it will be decided at the time ‘whether any aircraft carrier sent 
from Home or Mediterranean Stations to reinforce the Far East Fleet should remain 
to assist you…or whether it should return to NATO.’44 One month later the UK 
Chiefs of Staff discussed SEATO versus NATO.
45
 While there was agreement on the 
importance of South East Asia in the cold war, it was deemed undesirable to rob 
NATO to support SEATO; ‘the forces required must be supplied separately by the 
Commonwealth as much as the United Kingdom’. In the face of diminishing military 
resources the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would take precedence over all 
other military obligations.  
 
In mid-1949 Britain joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
This did not mean an immediate end to worldwide military obligations. As late as 
1955, British strategy still saw Commonwealth co-operation as vital.
46
 10 years later 
however, it was stated that the ‘threat to Britain’s survival can only be met by the 
strength and unity of the NATO alliance through which the United States, Canada 
and the countries of Western Europe affirm their independence’.47 The Defence 
Estimates of 1968 made plain the British strategic shift from Commonwealth 
defence; ‘The major decisions which the Government has taken may be broadly 
summarised as follows: Britain’s defence effort will in future be concentrated mainly 
in Europe and the North Atlantic area, [and] we shall accelerate the withdrawal of 
our forces from Malaysia and Singapore and complete it by the end of 1971.’48 A 
reduction in military force available to the British, allied to the steady Soviet military 
build-up in the post-war period, meant that NATO would have the majority of 
available naval forces allocated to it by the end of our period of interest.
49
 In this, the 
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British military were in the main un-apologetic, while at the same time pragmatic in 
regards to its strategic realities.       
 
 With the vast majority of British naval forces declared to NATO, the 
provision of forces for south-east Asia would be to the detriment of the Atlantic 
alliance. As Hill-Norton made plain: 
 
In considering the type and size of the forces we have decided to retain in South East 
Asia we had to have regard to two overriding military factors. First that, except 
perhaps in the longer term, manpower and costs will for all practicable purposes rule 
out the possibility of providing naval and air forces over  and above our present 
overall force levels. The second factor, which stems partly from the first, arises from 
the fact that the previous Government had planned and announced that after 1971, 
virtually all our UK and European based forces would be declared to NATO, thus 
the provision of forces for SE Asia had to be at the direct expense of our planned 
priority contribution to NATO.
50
 
 
Nonetheless there was a realisation that Britain had historical ties to other countries 
such as Australia.
51
 As such, much was made of the intentions of Britain not to 
sacrifice all on the altar of European defence. As Hill-Norton asserted in mid-1971 ‘I 
am trying to get across the notion that we are not abandoning our friends, nor are we 
piking on defence…’52 
 
 On the other hand the British military were aware of the resource issues 
facing them. Following the election of the Conservative Government, and while Lord 
Carrington, the Secretary of State, was in the Far East in discussions with the 
regional powers, Hill-Norton stated ‘Any adjustments made in our Far East presence 
can be no more than relatively marginal, unless we are prepared to make major 
inroads into NATO posture; and I earnestly hope that no-one contemplates that’.53 
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Four months later he added, ‘A continued presence of some 5 or 6 DD/FF and a 
submarine East of Suez post 1971 is merely an extension of the periodic deployments 
that we had in any case planned to make, but inevitably it will be at the expense of 
the immediate availability of the ships to SACLANT and SACEUR…’54 Following 
the apparent change of policy regarding the level of military force to be kept in the 
far east it was still necessary to assuage any European fears over Britain’s 
commitment to NATO:  
 
 We shall continue to keep a military presence East of Suez and the British 
 Government is discussing the form and nature of our military contribution there with 
 the Government’s of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. I hope that 
 this particular change of policy will cause no apprehension here because I can 
 promise you that it is in no way indicative of a lessening of our interest in NATO.
55
 
 
 The British military were pragmatic about the strategic realities they faced. 
On the British inability to reinforce the Far East region due to NATO commitments, 
Hill-Norton said ‘All this may not be easy for all of us to swallow, or perhaps for our 
good friends overseas to accept, but it is the reality of today.’56 This is impossible to 
argue with. The British had no choice but to face up to strategic truth by recognising 
the importance of the trans-Atlantic alliance. The significance of NATO continued to 
the end of, and beyond our period of interest.
57
 Indeed the perceived maritime danger 
posed by the USSR increased following the decision to retreat from east of Suez: 
‘The Soviet Union has become a major maritime power with a large modern well-
equipped fleet of cruisers, destroyers and escorts, [with] some 300 operational 
submarines of which 100 are nuclear powered, and a force of up to 1,000 naval 
aircraft.’58 A British failure to contribute effectively to NATO’s maritime defence 
may have been perceived as a demonstration of ‘a lack of sympathy with the 
determination of the US to defer the use of nuclear weapons for as long as possible 
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by extending the conventional phase of any war in Europe. It could well precipitate 
the process of NATO’s dissolution.’59 As such, NATO had to take precedence over 
Britain’s global responsibilities, especially if the strategic links and the ‘special 
relationship’ with the USA were to be maintained. Australia, too, rationalised its 
national strategic needs in the post-war era and moved ever closer to the USA. This 
had the inevitable result of a shift from the ties of empire and strategic disassociation 
from Great Britain. 
 
 After the British government’s decision to retain some forces based in the 
Malaysian/Singapore area after 1971 it was viewed as ‘highly desirable to have a tri-
national organisation under which intelligence can be exchanged, combined 
exercises planned and contingency planning undertaken when directed by the three 
Governments…Thus there is a clear need for an organisation broadly similar to 
ANZAM to continue after 1971.’60 The transition from ANZAM and the FESR 
produced two structures. ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) 
was the direct successor to ANZAM and the FESR and both Australia and the United 
Kingdom contributed naval forces to it.
61
 The second structure was the Five Power 
Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a military consultation agreement between the 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia. The FPDA came 
into effect on the 1
st
 November 1971, when the Commander-in-Chief Far East was 
withdrawn and the Commander of the ANZUK force in Malaysia and Singapore 
assumed command of Australian, British and New Zealand forces assigned to him.
62
 
 
 The Admiral of the Fleet Hill-Norton defended the level of British military 
forces allocated to the new structures during a visit to Australia in 1971: 
 
 Following the election of the present Government in the United Kingdom a year ago, 
 instead of keeping no resident forces in the Far East we are now going to keep forces 
 of all three Services at about the same level of Australia. In a general way...the  
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 ANZUK force…of the Five Power defence system breaks down about 40-40-20 with 
 Australia and the UK taking the 40s…63  
 
In reality the FPDA was not a defence pact, with no immediate commitment for 
either Australia or Great Britain to deploy forces in the defence of Malaysia or 
Singapore. In any case the United Kingdom did not have the in-theatre forces to back 
political will, if indeed there was any, with military force. There were differences of 
opinion between Australia and the United Kingdom on strategic matters, one case 
being the correct method of co-ordinating maritime surveillance in the ANZUK area 
of interest.
64
 The fact that such discussions were taking place in the early 1970s is 
testimony to the continued relationship between the two services.  
  
 The high-level strategy and international alliances and agreements entered 
into by the United Kingdom and Australia affected not only relations between the 
two nations but between the RAN and the Royal Navy also. In the immediate post-
war period both nations were committed, to a greater or lesser degree, to imperial 
defence and working together as nations of the Commonwealth. This co-operation 
was typified by agreements such as ANZAM, and the creation of the FESR. By the 
1970s the United Kingdom, in recognition of its reduced global influence, had 
recalled the vast majority of its military forces to the European and Atlantic theatres 
in a bid to strengthen NATO. Anglo-Australian military co-operation was evident in 
latter agreements such as SEATO and the FPDA but these were diluted by the 
weakening of British military force in the far east, as well as a shift of Australian 
strategic focus towards the USA. This movement was best illustrated politically, by 
ANZUS, and in a maritime sense, the Radford-Collins agreement. 
 
 The alterations in national strategy affected relations between the RAN and 
the Royal Navy. An Australian national drift towards America made it easier for the 
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RAN to contemplate a similar path. Likewise, a British focus on European defence 
rather than historical responsibilities concerning the far east and Australasia 
weakened the bonds between the Admiralty and the RAN. As one observer noted ‘At 
the strategic level, a British withdrawal raised questions about…the future of 
ANZAM, the commitment of the British to SEATO and the composition of the 
FESR.’65 The following quotation from a former British First Sea Lord could be 
relevant to both the national and naval Anglo-Australian ties:  
 
 Something we must recognise is that all too often the policies and interests of our old 
 Commonwealth friends are quite different to our own aspirations and that realities 
 and self-interest more and more tend to over-shadow sentiment.
66
 
 
 The question of high level or naval strategy, for either Australia or the United 
Kingdom, was not an exchange of either, for the United States. The naval staffs of 
the UK, the USA and Australia routinely met to discuss naval matters and strategy.
 
During a visit of US Admiral Radford to the Far East in late 1951, the three services 
were able to take ‘a look at all the many holes in the boat if we get into a war…in the 
near future’.67 Sir William Oliver, the UK High Commissioner in Canberra stated ‘In 
Australian eyes, her surest guarantee of security in matters of defence lay with 
ANZUS rather than ANZAM.’68 This was true on a national level, but on a naval 
level there were instances where ANZAM was thought to be a very valuable 
instrument.
69
 Australia had gravitated towards the United States on a national level, 
due in the main to strategic lessons learned in the Second World War. As Britain had 
not been able to guarantee Australia’s security in the last conflict, there was every 
reason to believe that she could no do so in any future conflict. This did not, 
however, result in a cessation in Anglo-Australian co-operation at either a national or 
naval level throughout the post-war period. Even so, the British retreat from east of 
Suez made agreements such as ANZAM and SEATO in effect obsolete, as least as 
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far as Anglo-Australian co-operation was concerned. At the end of 1971 the British 
Chief of the Defence Staff stated that:          
 
So far as the United Kingdom is concerned this [question of priorities] centres 
somewhat naturally in the first place on the security of Great Britain and thus on the 
prevention of a major conflict between the East and West. Our next priority is the 
support of our other allies and in particular those within the British Commonwealth 
of Nations.
70
 
 
The sentiment may have been true but the strategic realities meant that ‘the next 
priority’ was ‘next’ by a fair margin. This was reinforced by the dilemmas faced by 
the United Kingdom in utilising military force in the Far East and east of Suez in the 
face of economic burden and military reduction.  
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Chapter 4 
 
East of Suez Dilemmas 
 
 It is not the aim of this chapter to recount the diminution of global British 
military and political influence in the post-Second World War period. This subject 
has already been addressed by a vast range of observers.
1
 The relationship between 
the Royal Navy and the RAN however, was directly influenced by the decline of the 
Royal Navy from the position it once held.
2
 Decolonisation, the withdrawal from east 
of Suez, the loss of Singapore as a main operating base, and the attenuation of British 
naval power reduced the influence able to be asserted by the Admiralty on the Far 
East region, and on the Royal Australian Navy. Even so, a level of British military, 
and especially naval willingness, to continue to be an influence in the Indian Ocean 
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and Pacific regions even after the withdrawal from empire, was in evidence. This 
enthusiasm manifested itself in the readiness to consider alternatives to the main 
naval base at Singapore, most notably Cockburn Sound on the west coast of 
Australia. It was also evident in ongoing concerns over the defence of Australasia, 
and security in the Indian Ocean region, following the disbanding of the Far East 
Fleet and well into the 1970s. The Royal Navy was a severely stretched military 
force in the post-war era, faced with limits on manpower, vessels, expenditure and 
bases of operation. Even so it was an abiding influence, albeit at a much reduced 
level, on the RAN and in the Indian/Pacific ocean regions.             
 
 Immediate post-war Admiralty plans were based around the notion of an 
‘Imperial Fleet’. This force would consist of ships of the British Commonwealth as 
opposed to a purely British force and be used for the defence of the empire as a 
whole: ‘The success of the World Security Organisation must not be 
assumed…strong forces of all arms are to be maintained if the British Empire is to 
retain the status of a first class power.’3 There were doubts by some about the 
fortitude of the United States in any future conflict: ‘From past experience it is 
unlikely that America will take part in the early stages of a war, and the Empire may 
be faced once more with “holding the ring” alone.’4 Leaving the perceived 
unreliability of America aside, it made much sense for the British to utilize 
Commonwealth naval unity as much as possible. British resources were not infinite, 
and were much weakened by the war. There was still an innate sense of 
Commonwealth unity, especially within naval circles and the Imperial Fleet would 
be to the benefit of the Commonwealth, not just to Great Britain. The relative decline 
of the Royal Navy in the post-war period however, meant that the idea of an 
‘Imperial Fleet’ was soon unrealistic. 
 
 Self-evidently, the Royal Navy in 1975 was not the same force as it was at 
the end of the Second World War. In 1948-49 the Royal Navy possessed 107 major 
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combat units; in 1973-74 the number was 86.
5
 In 1949 active Royal Navy personnel 
numbered 144,500 and had fallen to 76,200 by 1975.
6
 This was in spite of 
expenditure remaining remarkably constant over the same period.
7
 Observers are at 
odds over the level of decline suffered by the Royal Navy in the post-war period. 
Van der Vat wrote ‘To regard the history of the Royal Navy for the fifty-five years 
from its greatest triumph to the end of the century as a story of unremitting decline is 
not just an oversimplification but a distortion…it would also be tedious and 
depressing.’8 Grove correctly pointed out that ‘In 1984 the United Kingdom was 
spending more on her peacetime navy than ever before. Moreover, that money was 
buying an active fleet that in tonnage terms was little short of the operational fleet of 
thirty years before’9 while conceding ‘…there could be no doubt that Britain 
relatively was not the naval power she once had been’.10 Although there are 
disagreements about whether the service suffered the extreme levels of decline as 
suggested by some, the Royal Navy was not same force in relative terms.
11
 
 
 Even if observers were in disagreement over the level of degradation suffered 
by the Royal Navy, the service itself was not. Following the settlement of the 
1955/56 Defence Estimates the Chiefs of Staff concluded that: 
 
Cuts of the nature suggested and on the time scale proposed would reduce the 
seagoing fleet of the Navy by over one-third, and would cut our dwindling Reserve 
Fleet by about a half. The new construction programme would be so small that no 
ship larger than a Destroyer could be laid down in the foreseeable future and our 
fighting power would diminish as the large vessels remaining from the last war pass 
out of service in the next few years. This would in turn reduce us from being a 
worldwide Navy, which has for many centuries served to link together the countries 
of the Commonwealth, to what could only be called a continental Navy with a 
correspondingly limited role…Reductions of the nature proposed could lead to only 
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one conclusion, namely that we no longer have confidence in the ability of naval 
power to play its part in the defence of this country and the Commonwealth.
12
 
 
The proposed cuts did not immediately bring about the expected diminution of the 
Royal Navy’s global role. Indeed as Grove pointed out ‘The navy had cause to be 
grateful for the political pressure to get rid of a reserve that was becoming a useless 
encumbrance.’13   
 
The Defence White Paper of 1955 stressed the Royal Navy’s peacetime 
role.
14
 The Statement on Defence of 1956 stated ‘The cold war is the most immediate 
threat. The Navy is able to play an important part in upholding our interests and 
influence in peacetime in distant parts of the world.’15 The task before the Admiralty 
was to reduce those forces primarily intended for global war and to re-allocate the 
resources to mobile cold war and limited war forces.
16
 As such a new construction 
programme was approved with the aim of providing forces for cold and limited war, 
with global war relegated to third priority. Nevertheless, Vote A plans for the Royal 
Navy manpower were to be 116,500 by the 1
st
 April 1957, a reduction from 122,500 
in 1956 and 128,400 in 1955.
17
 More disquiet on the part of the Admiralty was 
evident at the beginning of 1957: 
 
The Board of the Admiralty have, for some time, viewed with disquiet the dwindling 
size of the fleet and have taken vigorous steps…to reduce the shore backing, in order 
to maintain the sea-going fleet at its best possible strength. A recent reappraisal of 
the Russian submarine threat has thrown into relief the inadequacy of our existing 
Fleet, which under the proposals now being examined must be reduced still further, 
and reduced well below any level which previously the Board of the Admiralty have 
considered anything like adequate to meet the responsibilities which they conceive 
to be theirs.
18
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The Minister of Defence proposed to cut RN manpower to 80,000.
19
 The Admiralty 
Board were extremely concerned with the planned reductions stating that: 
 
For the past decade the Navy had been steadily whittled away and earlier exercises 
in current defence review had envisaged further cuts involving serious risks. 
Nevertheless, even the most drastic (the 90,000 manpower ceiling plan Board 
Memorandum B.1126) had preserved some possibility that, with  good fortune and a 
sizeable new construction programme, the Navy of the future would be capable of 
playing a sufficient part to ward off a catastrophic decline in the influence of the 
United Kingdom in naval affairs. A further cut in manpower of the order suggested 
by the Minister of Defence would, however, certainly go beyond the critical point.
20 
 
It was stated that under the proposed diminution, the service would be incapable of a 
limited operation such as MUSKETEER, and the effect on the NATO alliance might 
be fatal since the UK was the lynchpin of the European naval effort in the alliance.
21
 
The Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys’ White Paper of April 1957 fully embraced 
the strategy of nuclear deterrent, imposing cuts on the Royal Navy for economic 
reasons, however the importance of limited war did prove a justification for the 
retention of British aircraft carriers, thought to be useful in any future conflict in the 
Far East.  
 
 The size of Far East naval resources fluctuated in the post-war period. In mid-
1956 naval forces in the Far East consisted of 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers and 5 frigates. 
It was necessary to augment this force with the addition of a task group based at 
Singapore. While the ideal composition of this force was far beyond the Admiralty’s 
means, both in money and manpower, it was estimated that the necessary tasks of 
cold war policing, and holding the line in any limited war, could be carried out by the 
addition of 1 light fleet carrier, 4 destroyers, 1 landing ship and 1 cruiser.
22
 In early 
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1957 it was proposed that the Far East Fleet should be reduced to a squadron of 1 
cruiser, 4 destroyers, and 4 frigates. The naval base at Singapore was crucial to this 
force. The Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff doubted that the carrier task force east of 
Suez could spend any appreciable time in the Far East unless the base facilities at 
Singapore were maintained.
23
 Military forces in the Far East were particularly 
vulnerable to reduction. In assessing the commitments to be cut if the total 
manpower of the armed services was to be reduced to 370,000, it was suggested that 
‘from the military point of view the simplest commitment to shed would be the Far 
East. However in view of the great importance of Malaya to the sterling area, it is not 
practicable to remove all our forces from the Far East.’24 Lord Mountbatten stated 
that from the naval point of view, the difference between armed forces of 450,000 
and those of 370,000 were that in the former the Royal Navy would retain an 
effective squadron in the Far East.
25
 The Admiralty had long held the view that the 
Far East was an extremely important theatre.  
 
The Admiralty was convinced about the importance of the Far East as a 
theatre of likely conflict and stressed that ‘Even if there are no “local hot wars” in the 
Far East this Station is likely to be troubled and unsettled for many years whilst 
Communist China seeks to emulate Soviet Russia by building a belt of satellites 
around its border. The purely British interests in Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong 
therefore make it necessary for a naval squadron in the Far East.’26 In addition the 
British had ongoing commitments through her strategic alliances such as AMZAM 
and SEATO to maintain maritime forces in the region. Nonetheless they recognised 
that ‘the Commonwealth countries which are most affected are Australia, New 
Zealand, India and to a lesser extent Pakistan and Ceylon.’27 As such ‘Our policy 
should therefore be firmly directed at persuading these Commonwealth countries, 
together with the independent powers in South-East Asia, to provide, with the United 
States, the main deterrent to further communist aggression in this area, and major 
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forces in any local hot war which may develop, whilst our own naval squadron is 
kept as small as possible.’28 
 
 Even before the reductions of later years, the Far East Fleet was stretched 
with one former Commander stating ‘I was next made a Commodore 1st Class…and 
appointed Chief of Staff Far East Station, based on Singapore. The work was 
intensely interesting, our parish extending from Japan to Australasia, the Pacific to 
the Indian Ocean, the Gulf, Suez Canal and East Africa. To cover this enormous area 
we had an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, a flotilla of destroyers and one of frigates, 
and a few submarines.’29 The Admiralty was clear on the benefits of an effective 
fighting force to Commonwealth relations, ‘If we are to continue to contribute to the 
deterrent and have an effective say in naval policy in peace, both within the 
Commonwealth and NATO, we should aim at deploying a navy which is as modern 
and effective as we can make it.’30 The Admiralty was equally aware of the dangers 
of a decline in influence on its naval partners such as the RAN. Following the 
planned defence cuts in 1955 the Admiralty stated that ‘The effect of the reductions 
in the fleet necessary under the Minister’s long term proposals should be brought out, 
not only in relation to the continued vitality of NATO, but also in relation to the 
ANZAM area and the Commonwealth generally.’31 Of the proposed reductions of 
early 1957 the Admiralty stated that there were ‘other implications no less serious 
consequent upon the reduction of the Fleet and the closing and reduction of overseas 
bases, which must affect our relations with the Commonwealth and foreign powers, 
particularly those with whom we are in alliance’.32 In the ‘Role of the Navy’ of mid-
1957 it was asserted that the defence of the UK rested on a dual deterrent of the 
nuclear power of the Western Allies, and the political and military cohesion of 
NATO.
33
 Defence of UK interests world-wide depended on NATO above all, but 
SEATO and the Baghdad Pact as well. One aspect of the Navy’s role in the defence 
of these interests, as well as the support of NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, 
                                                          
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Hutchinson, Private Papers, 1916-1962, 1461 91/38/1, Handwritten Diary 1952. 
30
 ADM167/144, Admiralty Board Minutes, 23 June 1954, Review of Naval Policy, 
R51/1126, p. 15. 
31
 ADM167/141, Admiralty Board Minutes, 27 September 1955, Long Term Defence 
Programme, 4919.  
32
 ADM167/150, Admiralty Board Minutes, 8 January 1957, Vote ‘A’ Exercise, B1126. 
33
 ADM167/150, Admiralty Board Minutes, 30 August 1957, The Role of the Navy, B1163. 
79 
 
was to provide and reinforce the naval resources required for colonial policing: ‘If 
Her Majesty’s Government is prepared to see our Colonies and our dependencies 
disappear, these [forces] do not matter.’34 An idea that later received some British 
support was that of an integrated Commonwealth Eastern Fleet.  
 
 In 1959 the Admiralty Plans Division considered the formation of a 
‘Commonwealth Eastern Fleet’ composed of units of the Royal Navy, the RAN and 
the Royal New Zealand Navy. Benefits of such a fleet were thought to be ‘making 
the best possible use of our available resources’.35 The question of an integrated fleet 
was tied into the recognition that the RAN could not practically continue to operate 
as a single carrier force. The investigation into the ‘Commonwealth Eastern Fleet’ 
remarked that ‘on its present Vote the RAN is crippling itself for the sake of one 
Aircraft Carrier, together with all the consequent overheads.’36 The future of the 
RAN, and in particular the Australian Fleet Air Arm, was thought by the Admiralty 
to be ‘an immense question’.37 The Admiralty, however, were in an unenviable 
position when proffering advice on the Australian FAA: 
 
We encouraged and helped finance the development of the RAN’s FAA after World 
War II. It is therefore not easy for us to advise that in a matter of ten years Naval air 
has become too expensive a luxury for the RAN and they should abandon it with the 
concomitant sacrifice of all the ground support and trained personnel that go with 
it.
38
 
 
 Although the detailed working of such a plan required further study it was 
proposed that a practical answer might be based around the abolition of the 
Australian Fleet Air Arm, with the RAN concentrating on escorts such as the 
Darings, Battles and Type 12 frigates. The additional Australian escorts would 
enable the Royal Navy to pay off eight British escorts allowing the Royal Navy to 
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man an extra aircraft carrier and carrier air-group, and rotate two carriers east of Suez 
instead of one.
39
 
 
 It was admitted that ‘to achieve any successful solution on these lines we 
would have to overcome a number of political and national difficulties.’40 It was also 
thought that the: 
 
Commonwealth Eastern Fleet would have to work as one Fleet and not as a Fleet 
made up of three separate Navies. It would need ONE C. in C., separate to the 
Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, 2 Flag Officers at sea and probably one 
Flag Officer ashore in Singapore.
41
  
 
Even though there were formidable difficulties to be met in dealing with the political 
objections of a ‘Commonwealth Naval Force’ it was thought that it would be prudent 
to have ‘a military proposition in mind’ prior to airing ‘this subject in a positive 
manner to a wider circle.’42 Prior to RAN Vice Admiral Burrell’s 1960 fact-finding 
visit to the UK it was suggested that: 
 
It is inferred from correspondence that has already passed that Admiral Burrell, 
while keen to retain his FAA is already doubtful whether it is going to be practical to 
do so. He also seems to think that if the FAA has to be abandoned, the right 
replacement for it is a combination of escorts and submarines. The correct approach 
therefore seems to be to show every sympathy with his FAA ambitions but to let it 
become obvious during  the course of discussions that really they are 
impractical…On that basis the encouragement of the RAN towards a Navy 
comprising mainly escorts and submarines should be an easy step which would fit in 
admirably with D. of P’s long term proposals.43     
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 It was also suggested that ‘the concept of an integrated Commonwealth Fleet 
ought to be put tentatively and informally to Admiral Burrell…as the ideal long term 
objective’.44 Even so the difficulties surrounding a ‘Commonwealth Fleet’ were 
plain. Military forces are the instruments of political policy, and an integrated navy 
could not exist in a vacuum. The political interests of Australia and the United 
Kingdom were divergent. As the ‘Brief for discussion with Admiral Burrell’ 
questioned ‘could the RAN be expected to integrate with a RN force most of which 
remained declared to NATO in global war’.45 Nonetheless it was viewed that: 
 
When the naval problem in the Far East is viewed in the broadest terms the need for 
some measure of integration with our Commonwealth allies is so apparent that it is 
not unreasonable to take the line that these problems, formidable though they may 
be, simply must be solved if the Commonwealth is to remain a global political and 
military force.
46  
 
 Plans for an integrated naval force were resisted in British political circles. In 
early September 1959 the Commonwealth Relations Office made plain its 
displeasure on the proposals to advocate an integrated ‘Commonwealth Navy’ to the 
Australian CNS: ‘My understanding is that the recommendations of the Australian 
Chiefs of Staff on defence policy…are for self sufficiency.’47 The Admiralty 
confirmed that the draft brief represented purely naval staff thinking and it had not 
been endorsed by the Board of the Admiralty let alone received outside political 
approval.
48
 The Commonwealth Relations Office accepted that there was no 
intention of formally advocating the formation of an integrated Eastern 
Commonwealth Fleet.
49
   
 
 In an updated version of the ‘Future of the Royal Australian Navy’ brief for 
Burrell’s visit it was suggested that: 
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It has been known for some time that the Australian Government would be strongly 
opposed to any such integration because of its effect on ANZUS and because they 
want to be independent. In these circumstances, no formal proposal can be made to 
Admiral Burrell for consideration of an integrated Commonwealth Fleet.
50
 
 
This was an admission that Australian strategic interests would not accommodate an 
integrated fleet, something that was not overtly stated in the draft version of the 
document. The final version of the document was even more succinct about the 
possibility of an integrated fleet: 
 
It is concluded that, even though a fully integrated RN/RAN/RNZN fleet may at best 
be a distant aim, or at worst unattainable in full measure, nevertheless the pursuit of 
progressively closer co-operation between these Navies is a realistic-perhaps the 
only realistic-policy; and that it should provide the background to the discussions 
with Admiral Burrell.
51
 
 
 During the meeting of 13
th
 January 1960 between Burrell and the First Sea 
Lord, the latter stated that he was not surprised to hear that the RAN were having 
difficulties in planning balanced forces, as the United Kingdom was faced with 
precisely the same difficulties.
52
 The First Sea Lord suggested that from a military 
standpoint the only feasible answer was ‘the kind of integration which NATO aimed 
at on the organisation of its air forces. Unfortunately the political difficulties in the 
way of complete integration, even within the Commonwealth, were formidable’ and 
in his view ‘probably made this concept impractical.’53 The First Sea Lord did think 
that there were certain fields where some measure of integration between the RAN, 
the Royal Navy and possibly the Royal New Zealand Navy was feasible, namely 
minesweeping.
54
 Burrell made no comment on the likelihood of an integrated fleet, 
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or on the practicality of a joint RN-RAN minesweeping force. The First Sea Lord 
later repeated his suggestion that: 
 
Mine clearance was one field in which a worthwhile measure of co-
operation…might very well be possible. Minesweeping was a non-aggressive-almost 
humanitarian- operation and therefore the political difficulties which attached to 
other aspects of co-operation did not exist here…it would be well worthwhile to 
examine the possibility of a combined RN/RAN/RNZN mine clearance effort for the 
whole of the area East of Suez.
55
  
 
Burrell repeated that his immediate objective was to test his plan for buying six 
coastal minesweepers in the United Kingdom and building six inshore minesweepers 
in Australia.
56
 Neither the subject of an integrated fleet or a joint minesweeping force 
was discussed during the subsequent meeting between Burrell and the Admiralty.
57
 
 
 The subject of an integrated Commonwealth Fleet is instructive in a number 
of ways. Firstly the Admiralty was aware of the diminishing resources of both the 
Royal Navy and the RAN. There was a measure of pragmatism on the part of the 
Admiralty in recognising that the RAN could not afford a Fleet Air Arm, but to 
suggest so would have been problematic due to the great assistance provided by the 
Admiralty in the creation of the Australian FAA. A shift in RAN naval emphasis 
from a balanced fleet including naval aviation, to a force mainly composed of escorts 
and submarines, would have enabled the Royal Navy to reduce its escort force and 
increase its carrier force, if the concept of a ‘Commonwealth Eastern Fleet’ was 
accepted. This would only have been possible if the political will for such a force 
was present. This was not the case however, either from an Australian strategic point 
of view, or from an Australian naval position. One proposal that did yield a greater 
level of inter-service co-operation was the idea of basing British naval forces in 
Australia.  
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The suggestion that the Royal Navy may have utilised Australian bases 
following the loss of the use of Singapore is a relevant one when considering the 
impact of dwindling British naval resources on Anglo-Australian naval relations. The 
notion of using Australia as the ‘solid background’ for fleet operations and resources 
was not a new one, being proposed by Sir Andrew Cunningham soon after the 
Second World War.
58
 Indeed, crucial to the mobility of the Imperial Fleet was the 
existence of a global system of bases from which the fleet could operate. Such bases 
should be situated in a rear area reasonably free from enemy attack, backed by a 
developed industry and if possible [possess] a white population. Australia was 
thought of as a prime candidate such a base.
59
 In late 1954 the British VCNS 
suggested that the north-west of Australia be utilised as an alternative to Singapore; 
‘There was little support in the Admiralty or elsewhere…’ 60 His proposed motive 
was to join the three navies of the UK, Australia and New Zealand into a single force 
keeping the peace in the far east, an idea that was probably far too visionary ‘but I 
felt these countries might be ill-advised to rely so wholly on American power to 
defend them from invasions from the heavily populated areas of Asia’.61 
 
 In 1956 the Admiralty was asked to provide advice on a number of issues by 
the Australian First Naval Member, including Admiralty plans for a naval base in 
South East Asia if Singapore was to become ‘insecure or untenable for political 
reasons’.62 The Admiralty response was that ‘there is too much alarmist talk of the 
ultimate inevitability of our being forced to seek an alternative base to Singapore. 
The truth of the matter is that there is no alternative to Singapore of anything like 
comparable worth and consequently we must not waver in our determination to 
remain there.’63 During the First Sea Lord’s tour of Australia, in reply to attempts to 
interest him in Cockburn Sound near Fremantle, on the west coast of Australia as a 
base for the Royal Navy, he suggested that it should be developed by the RAN.
64
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Nevertheless, there were some who suggested that the most obvious solution to the 
problem of the paradox of Britain wishing to disengage militarily in South-East Asia, 
while still intending to contribute to Australia’s defence, would be a shift in 
emphasis from Singapore to Cockburn Sound.
65
  
 
 In early 1961 the Admiralty were invited by the Minister of Defence to put 
forward plans for the long-term naval programme showing the shape of the Fleet, for 
the next decade, under three scenarios, one of which was continuing to play a major 
role east of Suez, with no base except in Australia.
66
 The presentation took place on 
the 17
th
 May 1961 and the Minister of Defence directed that a preliminary study be 
carried out to examine how best a worthwhile military force could be deployed under 
such a scenario. Lord Mountbatten stated that according to Athol Townley, the 
Australian Minister of Defence, the present Australian government would gladly 
allow the British to set up fresh installations, however a different (Labour) 
government would not be so accommodating. As such, great importance was placed 
on an early official approach to the present government before the next general 
election to be held in 1961.
67
 Mountbatten later urged caution however: 
 
 We see danger in pressing on too fast, for although our future security of tenure in 
 Singapore may be in doubt, we have no intention of leaving the base until we are 
 forced to do so. If we discuss alternatives to Singapore, we might not only create a 
 false impression as to our real desires, but might also prematurely set in motion the 
 very thing which we wish to avoid. Accordingly, the timing of any submission to the 
 Australian Government will need careful consideration.
68
 
 
The Defence Minister Harold Watkinson agreed: ‘We shall have to play this slowly 
until we are through our other difficulties.’69 Speculation on the possibility of 
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alternative bases in Australia was again revived when Watkinson visited Australia in 
March 1962. Cockburn Sound was thought of as the best location for a naval base, 
and the British Chiefs of Staff drew up a list of requirements including a suitable 
fleet anchorage and the use of emergency naval repair facilities.
70
 It was decided not 
to press forward with the issue due to a review of defence strategy, the risk of 
prejudicing the continued use of Singapore and the possibility of discouraging the 
Australians from spending money in Malaya. The First Sea Lord tentatively raised 
the issue during a later visit to Canberra, but was told the Australians expected the 
initiative to come from the British.
71
 The British were indeed soon assessing how 
best to provide protection to her strategic interests in the Far East if Singapore was 
no longer available to them: ‘If we should lose our facilities in Malaysia, Australasia 
would be compelled to rely on close defence, to which we should contribute, using 
facilities in Australia.’72 
 
 In mid 1964 the British feared that ‘Malaysia must have reservations about 
the existence of foreign bases on their soil….We would therefore be wise to start to 
plan now for the ultimate handing over to Malaysian control of the base facilities we 
now enjoy.’73 It was concluded that however long the British wanted to stay in 
Singapore, the Malaysians were bound, sooner or later, to ask them to go. This 
should be accepted ‘as an inevitable historical development’ and once the Malaysians 
had accepted the principle of self-defence, the UK should take the initiative about an 
alternative base.
74
 The necessity of an alternative base was still viewed as crucial: ‘It 
was most important that the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand should 
appreciate that even if we eventually had to leave Singapore we had no intention of 
abandoning Australasian interests.’ 75 It was argued that once out of Singapore, the 
UK could react in SE Asia at Brigade group strength ‘more cheaply and more 
quickly than from Australia.’76 Even so, ‘in the circumstances postulated, the close 
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defence of Australasia would become our immediate preoccupation and this would 
demand base facilities…’77 The British appeared extremely keen on alternative 
facilities. In mid-1964 the British Naval Chief of Staff bemoaned ‘the unsuccessful 
efforts that have been made in the last three years to get down to brass tacks on 
discussions with the Australians about a base in their country’.78 The issue of a base 
in Australia had, since 1962, been left to the Australians to raise and Mountbatten 
intended to discuss it when he visited Australia in February 1965.
79
  
 
 The proposed naval facilities in Australia were generally tied to a 
continuation of the defence of Australasia after the withdrawal, on political grounds, 
from Singapore. A part of this overall strategy was the ‘defence obligations we still 
owe to the Commonwealth and particularly to the defence of Australia and New 
Zealand’.80 In mid-1964 the British Naval Chief of Staff asked ‘What sort of forces 
are we likely to have to provide for the defence of Australasia and for the 
commitments in South Asia we may have to meet in the period after our withdrawal 
from Malaysian soil?’81 It was suggested that ‘it would hardly be sensible to envisage 
a [new] UK base in Western Australia as an alternative [to Singapore]…a base in 
Western Australia should be an Australian base’ and incorporate facilities that the 
United Kingdom could share for mutual advantage.
82
 The British feared that once 
forced withdrawal from Singapore commenced it would snowball into a rush; at all 
costs they wanted to avoid ‘being ejected like scalded cats’ out of Singapore into 
‘corrugated iron shacks in the bush’.83 In October/November 1964 a small team of 
naval experts visited Australia to explore the prospects of the possible use by the 
Royal Navy of facilities in Australia.  
 
 Australian bases for British forces were also discussed during the ANZAM 
Defence Committee meeting of early March 1965. The subject was not mentioned in 
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the Minutes of the meeting but a record of the discussions was kept.
84
 According to 
the British Chief of the Defence Staff, the main reason that previous discussions [in 
1962] of British bases on Australian soil was never resolved ‘was because it had 
been agreed that if the news ever leaked that consideration was being given to the 
establishment of an alternative base [to Singapore] in this part of the world 
[Australia] the alternative would develop into policy.’85 On the conclusion of these 
talks, it was agreed that both the Australian and British Chiefs of Staff would 
consider the issue, so that further possibilities may be examined such as the UK 
supplying an outline of the size and types of forces they might desire to base in 
Australia; Australia could then examine the possibility of fulfilling these 
requirements.
86
 Soon after, the Australian military confirmed that it would be of 
great assistance to them when considering their long term plans to have some idea of 
possible UK requirements in Australia. These requirements included the possibility 
of naval facilities. Such indications however could not be given until the Defence 
Review was completed and the Government’s long-term policy was clearer.87 
 
British defence cuts were making any long-term commitment to the region 
increasingly less likely. In mid-1965 it was reported that at £301,000,000, British 
military expenditure abroad accounted for three eighths of the previous year’s 
balance of payments deficit. Nearly all of the money was spent in three main 
theatres; the maintenance of a British presence east of Suez took 38 per cent, British 
forces in Europe took 33.3 per cent, and British bases in the Mediterranean, (whose 
chief purpose at the time was to maintain communications with the forces east of 
Suez) took 14 per cent.
88
 The Government at the time was determined to reduce the 
amount by £50,000,000 or £100,000,000, a cut of between 16 and 33 per cent. Even 
so tentative plans for utilisation of a base in Australia continued. 
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 In late 1965 the British Chiefs of Staff considered a report on the 
implications, the means and the costs of a phased re-deployment to Australia.
89
 The 
study was not a complete analysis of the problem owing to the inability of opening 
serious discussions with the Australians. Even so, the study was remarkable 
considering the assumed amount of naval power ultimately to be based in Australia.
90
 
In terms of major operational units this would be: 
 
1 Strike Carrier 
2 Commando Ships/Landing Ships Assault (LSA) 
1 Cruiser 
2 Guided Missile Destroyers (GMD) 
10 Escorts 
6 Submarines 
12 Mine Counter Measure Ships (MCM) 
 
This was a sizeable portion of the British Fleet, at a time where the service was under 
intense pressure to make reductions in running costs wherever possible. Opinions 
differed about whether further preparations should be put on hold until the ministers 
have cleared their minds on the politico-military situation in the Far East.
91
  
 
A level of pragmatism on the part of Australia was in evidence in the 
discussions over the possibility of British forces in Australia. The United States 
opposed contingency planning against the forced withdrawal of British forces from 
Singapore on the grounds that if it became known that the UK was seriously 
considering alternatives the western position there would be gravely weakened.
92
 
Australia understood this view but agreed to, and carried out such planning because 
of their doubts about the long-term British presence in Malaysia/Singapore:  
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 In our view the preparation of contingency plans would help to convince the United 
 Kingdom that we understand their problems and are willing to assist them and would 
 be part of the price of persuading the United Kingdom to hold on in 
 Malaysia/Singapore as long as possible.
93
  
 
 Planning for an extension of bases was necessary in any case. If British forces 
were forced to leave Singapore, and adhered to their stated intentions of leaving 
forces in the region, facilities in Australia would be required. If the British withdrew 
all forces from South East Asia and the Australasian region, then additional facilities 
would be needed in Australia to support any expansion of Australian forces.
94
  
 
Any extension of base facilities in Australia should be carried out as part of 
Australia’s planned defence development of its forces and done in such a way that it 
cannot be related publicly to alternative deployment from bases in 
Singapore/Malaysia. It is emphasised that the development of additional facilities in 
Australia which could be used by United Kingdom forces is not considered to 
provide a satisfactory alternative to the maintenance by the United Kingdom…of a 
physical presence in Singapore/Malaysia for as long as possible.
95
  
  
This was at a time when Australia was very much aware of the necessity ‘to look 
ultimately to the United States for backing and support in situations which might 
develop’.96 Nevertheless, the Australian Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger 
maintained that ‘the Indian Ocean area should continue to be under British influence 
and not become another American lake’.97  
 
In 1966 the First Sea Lord was extremely concerned about the Navy’s ability 
to play its part east of Suez. The 1966 Defence Review’s biggest cuts had fallen on 
the Navy and apart from the carrier force, the loss of 16 frigates and nearly half the 
minesweeper force would come as a profound shock to the Fleet. ‘In the Indo-Pacific 
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area where our forces would be operating on the periphery of land masses and would 
have to be supported over vast areas of sea there was a clear case for maintaining our 
maritime forces…’98 The First Sea Lord pointed out to the Secretary of State that the 
planned phase-out of carriers in the mid-1970s not only meant that HMG openly 
accepted the political and military restrictions resulting from their loss but was also 
dependant on giving up a number of commitments.
99
 There was, however, no 
certainty that it would in fact be possible to disengage. He pointed out that ‘During 
his recent tour the Secretary of State had been reported as stating that we intended to 
remain a world power with substantial forces in the Far East and to stay in Singapore 
as long as possible.’100  
 
The Secretary of State responded that due to the impossibility of basing 
sizeable land forces in Australia, British policy would be to stay in Singapore and 
Malaysia as long as we could. If this proved impossible because of political pressures 
in those countries, the only alternative would be to send the bulk of our forces home 
and our responsibilities would have to shrink accordingly.
101
 In a letter to the First 
Sea Lord, it was said that: 
 
It would be wrong to pretend that the outcome of the Defence Review was not a 
severe blow to the Navy presaging as it did the end of its aircraft carriers...There is 
no requirement within our present defence policy to support the Army from carriers 
in the European theatre, except conceivably on the flanks; the need for carriers has 
therefore rested in recent years almost entirely on the maintenance of a strong British 
military presence ‘East of Suez’; and thus ultimately the case for a new generation of 
carriers has depended on the length of time we would wish to continue to play a 
world wide role. The Government has now decided to leave Aden [in] 1966/68 and 
to reduce our commitments in the Far East when confrontation ends and when it can 
be done with honour.
102
  
 
Even so, discussions were still taking place on basing UK forces in Australia. 
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 In early 1966 an initial meeting took place between the British Chief of the 
Defence Staff, Sir Richard Hull, and the Australian Chiefs of Staff on the problems 
associated with deploying UK forces in Australia.
103
 In announcing the talks, the 
Australian Prime Minister said the study ‘was exploratory and without commitment 
by Britain or Australia.’104 The Australian Chief of Naval Staff said that facilities 
expected to be available at Cockburn Sound in the early 1970s, even though 
Ministerial approval had yet to be given for any such project. The possibility of 
British facilities to replace those in Malaysia and Singapore was stated in the 
Defence Estimates of 1966.
105
 Following the initial meeting Hull feared excessive 
pressure could prove counter-productive and make the Australians reluctant to take 
part due to the impression of having British plans forced upon them.
106
 Others 
stressed that further discussions should take place as soon as possible ‘to maintain 
momentum and to impress upon the Australians that we mean business’.107 Extensive 
planning on the possibility for a ‘Tri-Service’ UK base on Australian soil followed 
the Minister of Defence’s visit of early 1966 to Australia.108 At this time it was noted 
that Australian planning for a naval base in Western Australia had already reached a 
stage where a Naval Staff Requirement had been produced, however it was found to 
be possible to incorporate the Royal Navy requirements into a revised document.
109
 
For planning purposes it was assumed that the timescale for the deployment for 
British forces would be 1975, and that the maximum Royal Navy force would be: 
 
1 Commando Ship 
1 Landing Ship Assault 
1 or 2 Cruisers 
4 GMD Type 82 Destroyers 
8 other Destroyers/Frigates 
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4 Nuclear Submarines (SSN) 
2 Conventional Submarines 
2 Escort Maintenance Ships 
1 Submarine Depot Ship 
1 Minesweeper Support Ship 
11 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries 
 
It was stressed that not more than 50% of this force would be in any one Australian 
base at any one time.
110
 Even so, this was a sizeable naval force, especially when 
compared with the overall size of the RAN. In addition it was only envisaged that the 
base would accommodate a modest RAN force: 4 escorts, either DDGs, Type 12 DEs 
or modernised Darings and 3 Oberon class submarines.
111
 A maritime airfield and 
facilities for a British amphibious Brigade were also envisaged. Thus, on these plans, 
the forces of the Royal Navy would have dwarfed those of the indigenous service. 
 
 Initially, the Australian political will for British forces based in Australia was 
lacking: ‘Australia’s defence policy has for a number of years been based on a 
forward defence strategy to hold South East Asia thus providing depth for the 
defence of the Australian mainland and its island territories.’112 Although the 
viability of this policy depended primarily on American support in South East Asia, 
‘the continued presence of British forces and particularly the availability of bases in 
Singapore/Malaysia for the use by forces of the ANZAM countries are most 
important elements of the policy.’113 The Australian cabinet endorsed the view of the 
Defence Committee in late 1965 that the centre of possible general war had moved 
from Europe to Asia due to the emergence of China, a nation that ‘will probably 
present the main political and military problems for the world in the next few 
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decades.’114 As such Australia believed that ‘the maintenance by Britain of an 
adequate presence in Asia, if necessary at the cost of reducing her commitments in 
Europe, would constitute the most effective use of their forces in allied global 
strategy’.115  
 
In addition ‘Any tendency by the United Kingdom to accept the view that 
1970 is a date beyond which the United Kingdom forces are not likely to be in 
Singapore/Malaysia would be contrary to Australian interests and should be 
countered.’116 ‘In our view the development of a new system of bases in Australia 
would be no adequate substitute for the present British Defence structure in the 
region’117 as these would not be in accordance with the forward defence policy of 
Australia. Even so ‘the implications of proposals for basing major British units in 
Australia…and the nature of the facilities they would need require close 
examination.’118 The Chairman of the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee doubted 
the purpose of any British land forces stationed in Australia and had ‘no doubt we 
would not accept Ghurka troops in Australia’.119 As for the Royal Air Force ‘there 
appears nothing to be gained by having units stationed here’, however ‘a British 
naval force based in Australia and operating in the Indian Ocean would be a most 
valuable contribution to the security of our sea communications in that area…’ 120 An 
Australian Navy Department single-service paper made plain that a UK sovereign 
rights type of base in Australia would be ‘nationally unpalatable’.121 Australian 
misgivings included suggestions that Australia bear all capital costs and doubts on 
how long any British forces stationed in Australia would remain.
122
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 In mid-1966 a joint Royal Australian Navy/Royal Navy working party 
examined the physical possibility and limitations involved in providing the required 
amenities and agreed that the facilities of the proposed base must be integrated for 
use by both the Royal Navy and RAN on a common user basis, and concluded that 
‘providing the necessary finance is available, there should be no difficulty in 
providing the necessary facilities for the Royal Navy force by 1975’.123 A proposed 
amended Reference for the civil engineers tasked with the feasibility study of the 
base was drafted, incorporating RN requirements. The logical sequence of events 
was seen as construction of the base to accommodate RAN requirements, with an 
option to expand the base if and when the RN could no longer be accommodated at 
Singapore. In 1967 discussions were still taking place between the UK and Australia 
as Britain planned ‘to withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia 
in the middle 1970s’.124 It was felt by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee that it 
was important to have a clear definition of the role to be played by any forces based 
in Australia. There appeared to be political benefits for the proposed forces as they 
were ‘not required exclusively to support the UK national interest, but as clear 
evidence that we were not intending to abandon our interest in the theatre after we 
left the mainland of Asia.’125 In addition the British were wary that once a firm 
approach had been made to Australia ‘we would have difficulty if, at a later date, we 
wished to withdraw the offer.’ Even though the Australians would look more to the 
USA than to the UK for assistance in defence in an emergency, the Australians 
‘would…regard our presence in that theatre, however small it might be, as a means 
of ensuring that the US government continued to maintain a presence in the Far 
East’.126  
 
 In 1969 the Australian Government approved a ‘modest’ naval facility in 
Cockburn Sound.
127
 There was disagreement on the British side about whether any 
financial assistance could or should be given towards the construction of the naval 
base. The Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, made clear during a visit to Australia 
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in July 1970 that there could be no question of UK financial involvement. Ministry 
of Defence advice was given as ‘to approach with care any suggestion to the 
Australians that we might want them to design their own facilities along lines 
particularly geared to suit our own requirements, if the implication was that we might 
be expected to make any financial contribution to the new base’.128  There was 
however a suggestion that a material contribution, such as surplus facilities, perhaps 
‘a small floating dock, going spare as a result of our partial run down in Singapore’ 
could be offered as a means of ensuring minimal charges for the use of the 
facilities.
129
 The reluctance of the British to make any great contribution to the base 
was reiterated by the British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
in January 1971, although he did suggest that if the British were to make some use of 
the base after 1975, a small contribution might be considered.
130
 The Ministry of 
Defence was ‘not very sanguine about being able to offer anything about which the 
Australians would be enthusiastic’.131 The British High Commissioner in contrast 
hoped that ‘it will be possible for us to consider some contribution in kind at least to 
this work’.132 This attitude was in stark contrast with the co-operation surrounding 
the naval joint working party of 1966. Apparently during the earlier discussions the 
question of costs was left to one side.
133
 The Australians did see benefits in inviting 
the British to utilise the naval base.  
 
In mid-1970 the Australian Minister for Defence, Malcolm Fraser, stated that 
the British would be welcome to use the facilities without contributing to the capital 
cost of the base.
134
 At this time questions from Australian media continued to be 
directed at finding out the degree of Admiralty interest in the project, ‘the feeling 
being that without interest outside Australia, the necessary Federal backing would 
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not be forthcoming’.135 It was later suggested that Royal Naval advice would be 
welcomed, especially in regards to certain areas in which Royal Naval requirements 
might differ from those of the RAN.
136
 The UK Chief of the Defence Staff suggested 
that the presence of a well designed base would ease future Royal Naval operations 
in the area, therefore British advice should be willingly given, although this would 
not imply any commitment to particular use of the base in future or any future 
financial support.
137
 He also welcomed the ‘opportunity this would afford for further 
co- operation between our two Navies’.138 The British Defence Secretary welcomed 
the intention to establish the base and stated that the Royal Navy looked forward to 
making occasional use of it. The British later noted that the new naval facilities being 
developed on the west coast of Australia may prove useful in deterring an increase of 
Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.
139
 
 
British strategic decisions were extremely unpopular in Australian political 
circles. On receiving the news of the acceleration of the British withdrawal from the 
Far East, the Australian Prime Minister was ‘dismayed that such large decisions 
should be…made for comparatively small savings’.140 The Minister of External 
Affairs observed that the ‘new policy would reduce Britain to a status a little less 
than Italy and a little more than Sweden’, while the Trade Minister bitterly observed 
that in the past Australian troops had arrived ‘in Belgium, Gallipoli and Greece 
without question…’141 Even so, there appeared to be political advantages for the 
Australian government in being able to tie British approval, and the Royal Navy’s 
use of the base, when announcing the decision to proceed with the project. The 
timing of the announcement was ‘clearly geared to the internal politics of the 
forthcoming senate election’.142 Indeed John Gorton, the Australian Prime Minister 
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had promised in the previous national election that the planned development of a 
naval base at Cockburn Sound would commence.
143
 This should not detract from the 
main aim of the base especially as far as Australia was concerned; the Australian 
government attached great importance to the base due to the Royal Navy’s 
withdrawal from the Indian Ocean and because of the RAN’s reliance upon ports in 
eastern Australia.
144
 Australian strategic interests will be discussed in more detail in a 
later chapter, but there were clear advantages for Australia to have the British 
involved in the base at Cockburn Sound: 
  
 The point so far as Australia is concerned is that we need major docking facilities on 
 the west coast regardless of what happens in Singapore. If we can engage British 
 interest in helping us construct them, so much the better…The ties of kin and 
 Commonwealth, so easily scoffed at these days, still suggest a vital concern by 
 Australia and Britain in each others security…145  
 
An editorial of the Sydney Morning Herald succinctly summed up Australia’s 
interest in the British withdrawal from east of Suez, and the potential impact of the 
new naval facilities:  
 
The type of British regional commitment in which Australia has a particular interest, 
is not ground or air, but naval. This is the area in which Australia is weakest and in 
which she is least able to meet satisfactorily the broader demands of regional 
security. In the context of the mounting Russian interest in the Indian Ocean it was 
the prospect of the withdrawal of British naval power which was the most dismaying 
feature of the Wilson government’s East-of-Suez policy. It is up to Australia now to 
press for the maximum British naval presence…Canberra could encourage such a 
response by a sharp acceleration of construction programmes at Cockburn Sound, an 
acceleration which Britain is known to consider both necessary and possible. The 
present approach to the projected new base is ridiculously dilatory.
146
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An Australian Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs Report concluded: 
 
That the naval facilities at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia should be 
established and become operational as soon as possible for the protection of 
Australia’s west…that the facilities at Cockburn Sound should be made available to 
friendly powers under mutually agreed arrangements. ..that the practicability of the 
permanent stationing of units of the Australian navy at Cockburn Sound should be 
considered as of the utmost importance…[and] that Australia should seek to achieve 
reciprocal naval and air access to Indian Ocean island staging areas now in control 
of Britain.
147
 
 
On the 28
th
 July 1978 HMAS Stirling was commissioned as a forward support 
base.
148
 Just after the end of our period of interest, on the 19
th
 April 1976, the USS 
Oklahoma City became the first foreign warship to visit the Western Australian 
Naval Support Facility.
149
 This was perhaps a stark illustration of the impact of 
dwindling British naval influence in the Asia/Pacific region.  
 
 The discussions over a possible Royal Navy base in Australia are instructive 
when considering the strategic challenges faced by the United Kingdom in the post-
war era. The British wished to retain the use of Singapore for as long as possible. If 
this was no longer feasible due to political pressure then alternative naval facilities 
would have to be found. This would have been even more likely if hostilities with 
Indonesia ceased: ‘it is not the present Indonesian policy of confrontation that would 
render the render the tenure of our main and forward bases uncertain but the situation 
that could arise in the period following an acceptable solution to confrontation’.150 
Australia questioned whether an end to confrontation would bring a ‘halcyon age’ as 
regards to Indonesia.
151
 An important aspect of the need for alternative arrangements 
was the perception that Britain had ongoing commitments to the region: ‘However 
strong the arguments may be…that our duty to the weaker members of the 
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Commonwealth must diminish as members achieve full independence and become 
strong, and that in the post-colonial phase we may well invest less in the East than 
we do now, the need to stand by Australasia and our friends in South Asia will 
remain…’152 The naval force to be based in Australia was sizeable, however the 
rundown of the Far-East Fleet due to economic constraints meant no redeployment 
was possible. The British, nonetheless, saw potential benefits to the base due to their 
ongoing interests in the Indian Ocean region. 
 
 The British took a keen interest in the increase of Soviet influence in the Far 
East. The Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Fleet Peter Hill-Norton commented 
on the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean becoming a permanent one in 1969: ‘My 
command’s watch on small Soviet fleet movements past Singapore is now a routine 
activity…I leave Singapore with the distinct impression of having watched a 
potential storm cloud grow on the horizon.’153 In 1971 the Defence Estimates 
included a section on the Indian Ocean in which the government made clear its view 
that: 
 
 The growing Russian naval presence in this area of strategic importance should be 
 regarded as a matter of concern for all neighbouring countries, as well as those 
 countries, like Britain, who depend for their livelihood upon the trade routes which 
 pass through the Indian Ocean…the decision to continue to deploy British naval 
 forces and long range maritime reconnaissance aircraft in the area is an important 
 contribution to Britain’s ability to maintain vigilance in the area…154  
 
The reduction of British forces in the Far East meant that the RAN would 
have to play an enhanced role in the region. Operations between the two services will 
be covered in a later chapter however the reduction of British naval power east of 
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Suez meant there were substantially less opportunities for co-operation between the 
Royal Navy and the RAN.
155
 The reduced availability of British units east of Suez 
had a number of ramifications for the RAN: ‘It is realised that the withdrawal of 
British forces from SE Asia will demand a major increase in the maritime forces 
required to protect our vital shipping trade.’156 In addition it was thought that threat 
to Australia from Indonesia would increase, as would the threat to Indian Ocean 
trade routes. These increased threats would require an increase in overall naval 
strength. The unavailability of Singapore would mean the RAN would have to 
become a two-coast navy with some forces stationed on the west coast. Alternative 
communications facilities would need to be constructed to compensate for the loss of 
Singapore, and there would need to be an increase in afloat support to allow two 
separate forces to operate simultaneously.
157
  
 
The proposed British withdrawal had great implications for the deployment 
of the Australian Fleet. Remarking on the Australian strategy of contributing to a 
deterrent to aggression in SE Asia, and to form a part of forces available for the 
defence of Malaysia and Singapore, the FOCAF suggested that ‘after British 
withdrawal from the Far East in 1970, the deployment of two escorts for this purpose 
is unrealistic.’158 It was suggested that ‘a viable deterrent can only be provided by a 
show of force, preferably continuously, but if this is impractical, then by visits of 
significant numbers of ships which are in current tactical practice.’ FOCAF 
considered ‘the physical presence of two ships alone to be of only marginal deterrent 
value, and recommended that ‘consideration should be given to the withdrawal of 
RAN units from the Strategic Reserve after 1970, and that the deterrent value of their 
presence be replaced by annual visits of an Australian Squadron’.159 The composition 
of the Squadron would depend whether the commitment to Vietnam remained in 
force, but in any case the Squadron would provide far greater deterrent than two 
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ships and would be a valuable contribution to the improvement of the Australian 
image in the Far East.  
 
 The Director of Plans suggested that: 
 
From a military point of view-for the purpose of providing a deterrent and 
maintaining a military presence in South East Asia-the points made by FOCAF…are 
considered completely valid. Moreover the proposed deployments and employment 
of an RAN Squadron represent proper use of sea power by exploiting its inherent 
mobility and flexibility. However, FOCAF’s proposals do not take account of the 
political considerations (which are unknown to FOCAF) which inhibited our 
reaction to the British withdrawal of Naval forces. The RAN proposals, as expressed 
in the current considerations on British withdrawal, have been governed by 
Government policy in respect of: 
 
a. the need for a continued Australian military presence in Malaysia/Singapore; 
b. the roles allocated to any forces contributing to that presence; 
c. the composition of an Australian force contribution; 
d. the nature of any future agreement under which the Australian presence is 
maintained.  
 
Until Government has taken its decisions in respect of these matters it is considered 
that the detailed nature and scope of current considerations should not be made 
known officially outside Navy Office. Meanwhile, as convenient, FOCAF could be 
briefed unofficially on the detailed considerations.
160
 
 
The Director of Plans proposed a reply to FOCAF stating that ‘Government had not 
yet taken a decision in respect of the matters a. to d. above but decision will be 
governed by a number of political factors which indicate a need to maintain 
Australian forces continuously in the area’.161 It was suggested that the Director of 
Plans last comments be deleted as they ‘touch on policy matters at present 
undecided. I recommend a reply to the effect that FOCAF’s views have been studied 
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with interest and will be borne in mind during the discussions which are taking place 
the present time.’162 Again these discussions are illustrative as they make plain the 
fact that national policy and naval policy do not always go hand in hand and are 
often at odds with one another. RAN internal discussions on the implications of the 
British withdrawal are a case in point.  
 
The British too, were well aware of the political and military implications of 
their military diminution on their relations with Australia. In late 1971 Admiral of 
the Fleet Peter Hill-Norton stated that ‘Our basic political aim of a continuing 
military presence in South East Asia is to encourage the other countries to pay a 
larger part in deterring aggression and subversion, consistent with their national 
interests and their own resources.’163 Hill-Norton had previously claimed that ‘he 
hoped to see Australia playing a larger part consistent with her national interest in the 
area.’164 As will be emphasised in a later chapter Australia did take a more 
independent stance in the region. This may well have been partly due to a perceived 
degradation of operational efficacy of ANZUK forces in the early 1970s.  In 1972 the 
Commander of the ANZUK Force stated that ‘the frequency of changes in the United 
Kingdom assignment of [naval] units is such that continuity of training is 
difficult’.165 The RAN Director General of Operations and Plans remarked that: 
 
 The statement in the report on effectiveness is not surprising, nor is the comment of 
 UK national use of the facility. Operational efficiency must suffer under lack of 
 adequate training facilities and exercises, however bearing in mind the emphasis on 
 the political as opposed to operational role of the force, it would be unwise to spend 
 money in providing extra facilities for an indeterminate period. Clearly the UK 
 national cell is making the most of the facilities available at the least possible cost. 
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 On the other hand, so far, no RAN ship has reported adversely on the maintenance 
 being provided.
166
  
 
After the disbandment of the Far East Fleet the Admiralty continued to take 
an interest in maritime issues pertinent to the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean 
regions. A British Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda of 1973 casts doubt on the 
theory of complete British withdrawal from the east of Suez area.
167
 The aim of the 
study was to examine how existing British military activity in the Indian Ocean 
might be better co-ordinated with that of other nations in order to more effectively 
counterbalance the increased Soviet presence and influence in the area. The Russians 
were not to be allowed to think that the Nixon Doctrine, and the Western 
preoccupation with Europe meant that the West would stand by and permit Russia to 
extend their influence elsewhere. Possible areas of co-ordination included maritime 
surveillance, ship scheduling and sharing of airfields, bases and logistical facilities. 
The British regretted the declining level of co-operation between the RAN and the 
Royal Navy: ‘UK Service links with Australia…are normally very good, although it 
is disappointing that the recent RAN deployment into the Indian Ocean was planned 
without any discussion of the possibilities of co-operation with the RN.’168 Even so, 
the RAN and the Royal Navy held inter-service discussions at high levels to the end 
of our period of interest and beyond.  
 
In late 1973 it was pointed out that the Royal Navy maintained destroyers and 
frigates east of the Cape on a rotational basis, to meet UK contributions to the Five 
Power Defence Arrangements and the ANZUK Force, to participate in SEATO and 
CENTO exercises, and when on passage between tasks to provide a presence in the 
Indian Ocean and South East Asia. It was also planned to provide additional ships to 
augment this force. The first such deployment sailed in 1973 and included a nuclear 
submarine, a command cruiser and frigates, accompanied by RFAs. Joint exercises 
were carried out with a number of navies including the RAN. Two Fleet Tankers and 
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one Solid Support Ship were allocated to support the force with one tanker allocated 
to ANZUK forces on an 80% availability basis.
169
 Even so, the withdrawal of 
facilities and the introduction of Group Deployment by the Royal Navy resulted in a 
loss of operational effectiveness; as the Commander of the ANZUK Force noted in 
late 1974, ‘The Group Deployment method of operating adopted by the Royal Navy 
has resulted in a very uneven workload, with barely manageable peaks during the 
periods when a group was in the area.’170  
 
 The decisions taken to withdraw from the Far East were taken due to 
economic pressures, as well as strategic necessity. As a former Commander-in-Chief 
of the Far East stated, ‘The decisions of January this year-to accelerate our 
withdrawal from East of Suez, to leave no fixed bases other than Hong Kong behind 
us, and to concentrate on a European strategy, were political decisions taken against 
a backdrop of economic necessity.’171 The cuts proposed by the Healey reviews of 
1965-68 were only slightly reduced by the Conservative government between 1970-
74. A change of government in 1974 led to another defence review, the Mason 
Review of 1974-75. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact nations were identified as the 
main threats to British national security. As such the review concluded that ‘NATO 
should remain the first and overriding charge on the resources available for defence; 
that our commitments outside the Alliance should be reduced as far as possible to 
avoid overstretching our forces.’172 The following were viewed as essential to the 
security of Great Britain; the United Kingdom’s contribution to NATO front-line 
forces in Germany, anti-submarine forces in the eastern Atlantic, the UK’s nuclear 
deterrent and home defence. The Mason defence review aimed to reduce the drain of 
Britain’s defence from 5-6 per cent of GNP to 4.5 per cent over ten years. As 
Dorman wrote ‘This allowed the government to remove the last vestiges of Britain’s 
worldwide role by withdrawing its forces completely from the Five Power 
Agreement and CENTO, and dispensing with those forces earmarked for these 
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worldwide roles.’173 The Mason review of 1975 meant a decisive abandonment of 
enduring deployment of British forces East of Suez. Even so, relations between the 
Royal Navy and the RAN continued. Examples include the late 1976 Navy to Navy 
talks between senior representatives of the RN, USN, RAN and RNZN.
174
 In 
addition, mid 1980 talks took place between Admiral Sir James Eberle, the 
Commander in Chief of the UK Fleet, and high-ranking RAN officers over subjects 
as diverse as Australian defence policy post-Afghanistan, UK and NATO defence 
policies, and strategic questions of mutual interest including new Soviet naval 
construction.
175
     
 
 Great Britain’s post-war economy could not support the military forces 
necessary to police and maintain her colonies or possessions. As such the political 
necessity for a retreat from east of Suez would appear to be obvious.
176
 The scale of 
the withdrawal however was not agreed upon, then or since by historians. Jackson’s 
‘Imperial Defence in the Post-Imperial Era’ strongly suggested that the withdrawal 
from ‘East of Suez’ was a fallacy, and referred to ‘the “non-withdrawal” from East of 
Suez commitments…’177 Conversely the late Saki Dockrill asserted that ‘Britain 
wanted after the Confrontation, to abandon the Far East altogether, without even 
having to play a reduced role there (except possibly from a base in Australia)’.178 
This view both incorrectly assessed the military preparations involved in remaining 
in the Far East after the Indonesian confrontation, and severely minimised the 
planning carried out for doing so from an Australian base, most likely Cockburn 
Sound, if Singapore was no longer tenable.  
 
 Greg Kennedy in his ‘The Royal Navy and Imperial Defence, 1919-1956’ 
wrote that, ‘By 1956, with the loss of India, the British withdrawal from the Middle 
East underway, and British imperial interests in the Far East in dispute, the RN had 
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come to the end of its time as the protector of formal empire’.179 Jackson disagreed 
and stated that ‘despite the fact that America had clearly become the defensive 
guarantor of British territories and dominions when Pax Britannica’s naval shield 
failed in December 1941, Britain still conceived the need to deploy forces in order to 
contribute to the security of Australia, New Zealand, and the many imperial 
territories in the Pacific’.180 The latter view appears to have more validity, especially 
when one considers the resistance of the Admiralty to a complete withdrawal from 
the region. Tom Frame said that the May 1949 ‘Revised Restricted Fleet Plan’, 
restricting the Royal Navy to £200 million per year in a ‘normal’ year, ‘conceded 
formally that Britain needed to rely substantially on the U.S. Navy in the South 
Atlantic and the Pacific and on the navies of Australia and New Zealand in the Indian 
Ocean’.181 The Admiralty however continued to maintain a presence in the region 
throughout our period of interest, even though Great Britain did not possess the 
economic resources to maintain her imperial possessions.  
 
A reduction in naval power meant that Britain was constrained by the forces 
available for use in the Far-East and the Pacific. The high level strategic choices 
made by the UK placed a premium on the importance of NATO and 
European/Atlantic defence. Under post-war economic pressure Britain’s NATO 
commitments were incompatible with her prior worldwide commitments: ‘In general 
the provision of forces for South East Asia can be made only at the expense of our 
planned contribution to the [NATO] Alliance’ and ‘we shall need to settle the 
composition of our military presence in South East Asia in a way which will 
minimise the of the adverse repercussions which are certain to follow from any 
suspicion that our commitment to NATO and European defence was being 
reduced’.182 This arguably made the eventual withdrawal from east of Suez all but 
inevitable. Table 2 shows the geographic distribution of Royal Navy and Royal 
Marines personnel in early 1971. Naval forces allocated to the Far East were just 
13% of those allocated to European and Atlantic defence. Even so, the Admiralty co-
operated with the RAN in plans for a naval base in Western Australia to replace the 
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potential loss of Singapore as an operational base, and remained wary of the increase 
in Soviet maritime power in the Indian Ocean during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
 
Table 2 Geographic Spread of Royal Navy/Royal Marines Personnel, 1971 
 
Geographical Area Number of RN/RM Personnel 
United Kingdom 71,200 
Far East 9,300 
Mediterranean, Near East and Persian 
Gulf 
3,300 
Continental Europe 200 
Elsewhere 1,300 
 
Note: Figures are from Henry Stanhope, ‘Highest Priority for Improving Forces Manpower 
Situation’, The Times, 18 February 1971, p. 10. 
  
Although it may be assumed that the United Kingdom and Australia always 
shared common threats throughout the post-war period this assumption is not so clear 
cut. In 1949 the RAN viewed their only potential enemy as the USSR.
 
The Korean 
war of 1950-53 made plain the non-Soviet communist threat to Western interests. 
Following this conflict, the Admiralty were concerned about the possibility that 
China would seek to match the USSR by building a ring of satellites around its 
border. This possibility made the employment of a British naval squadron in the far 
east essential. By 1954, Australia too, viewed China as the main threat to Australian 
interests. The strong relations between Australia and both the United Kingdom and 
the United States were viewed as crucial in ensuring Australian security. Even so the 
policy of the United Kingdom at the time was to persuade Commonwealth countries 
such as Australia, together with the independent powers in South East Asia and the 
United States, to provide the main deterrent to further communist aggression in the 
region. SEATO and the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve were 
additional tools to act as warning to further communist aggression in South East 
Asia.  
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Confrontation with Indonesia in 1962-66 was presaged by Australian disquiet 
about the growth of Indonesian seapower, a threat that was seen as crucial to the 
requirement for an independent Australian submarine capability. Indonesia was only 
seen as a limited threat however and in late 1965 Australia took the view that the 
focus of general war had moved from Europe to Asia due to the emergence of China. 
This was in contrast to the British strategic outlook that stressed the importance of 
NATO to the security of Britain. This divergence of strategic interests did not result 
in a complete reliance of Australia on the United States, although Great Britain and 
Australia clearly disagreed about the strategic importance of Vietnam. By 1969 the 
British were aware of the increase of Soviet influence in the far east. Even so, a 
reduction in military force available to the British meant that NATO would have the 
majority of available naval forces allocated to it in the post-war period. 
 
The east of Suez policy resulted in a diminution of British naval power in the 
far east however the United Kingdom was conscious of the increasing Russian naval 
presence in the strategically important Indian Ocean. These concerns somewhat 
mirrored Australian concerns about the same issue. The construction of naval 
facilities on the west coast of Australia was intended to act as deterrence to Soviet 
influence in the Indian Ocean. The Mason Review of 1974-75 resulted in the 
decisive abandonment of permanent deployment of British forces east of Suez. Even 
so relations between the Royal Navy and the RAN continued, typified by joint-
exercises, and inter-service discussions on matters of strategic significance.   
 
The Admiralty was mindful of the consequences of the withdrawal from the 
Far East on its relations with its Commonwealth partners such as the RAN. The 
disbanding of the Far East Fleet meant a decline in opportunities for Australian and 
British forces to work alongside one another. Even so the Admiralty retained an 
interest in the east of Suez region throughout the 1945-75 period, albeit at a much 
reduced level. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Operations 
    
 Operational co-operation between the Royal Navy and the RAN was in great 
evidence in the post-war period. This collaboration was manifest in conflicts such as 
the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency and confrontation with Indonesia. Naval 
forces of both nations trained and exercised together throughout our period of 
interest, and beyond. These exercises often took place under the aegis of strategic 
alliances such as SEATO and ANZUK and frequently involved fleet visits to 
Australia and Great Britain by ships of the other navy. Instances of these naval 
exercises and port visits continued to take place after the withdrawal of British forces 
from east of Suez. In addition assistance was given to Britain by the RAN during 
British testing of atomic devices in operations off the west-coast of Australia in the 
1950s. Australia was fostering closer operational links with the United States during 
this period, most notably during the Vietnam conflict, and the Royal Navy found 
itself operating more often with its NATO allies. Even so, operational co-operation 
between the Admiralty and the RAN can be found in varying degrees between 1945-
75 and beyond. 
 
The conflict in Korea provided a great opportunity for the RAN and the 
Royal Navy to co-operate in operational matters.
183
 Forces of both navies worked 
with each other throughout the conflict under the banner of the United Nations (UN), 
in a manner that was more or less Commonwealth in nature. Even so, the UN aspect 
of the conflict meant that the navies of both forces operated with non-
Commonwealth naval forces, and were predominantly commanded by those of the 
USA. For example, all Commonwealth vessels operating off the west coast of Korea 
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in the initial stages of the war joined Task Group 95.1, a formation of the US Navy’s 
7
th
 Fleet.
184
 Grouping of Commonwealth ships together made sense as this 
maximised the Commonwealth naval effort as vessels of Commonwealth navies had 
common operating procedures and, to a lesser extent, equipment. There were issues 
in regards to operating procedures, especially where the Commonwealth navies 
differed to the USN, but overall the navies of the United Nations worked well 
together. Light fleet carriers of both the Royal Navy and the RAN played an 
important role in the war, and their commonality meant that they could be swapped 
for each other with no great degradation of operational effectiveness. The British and 
Australian naval contribution to the conflict was substantial, especially when one 
considers the relative size of the Royal Navy and the RAN and the operational 
involvement of both forces was appreciated by each other and their American ally.  
 
The shared doctrine, operating procedures, training and equipment between 
British Commonwealth vessels meant that grouping them together was desirable, and 
ships of the Commonwealth could usually operate seamlessly with each other.
185
 
Australian and British ships regularly shared operational information with one 
another. The officers of HMAS Bataan for example, were briefed on ‘current 
operational policies and situations’ before their first patrol on the west coast of Korea 
in 1952 by the officers of HMS Belfast. Bataan’s commanding officer also received 
a final briefing from HMS Mounts Bay’s commanding officer, Captain John 
Frewen.
186
 Shared operating procedures were an advantage when one considers 
vessels of Commonwealth naval forces functioning together, but the lack of the 
former did not always mean that the latter could not adequately work with non-
Commonwealth forces, most notably the United States Navy. The British Naval Staff 
history of the war recorded that ‘it was encouraging how smoothly units of the 
various United Nations navies worked with each other from the start’.187 One 
observer noted during the war that:    
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It is a most heartening picture to see the troops and Navies of many different 
countries working and fighting together under one unified command, and this 
despite the diversity of languages, customs, and ways of life. As far as naval 
operations are concerned, very valuable experience has been gained by ships of the 
British Commonwealth working in the same task groups and elements as ships of the 
US Navy under both British and American tactical command.
188
 
 
The commanding officer of HMAS Bataan reported that by the end of Bataan’s first 
tour in Korea, ‘the navies…were working together with common procedures and 
doctrines in mutual confidence as parts of an efficient team’.189 Even so there were 
problems with differences between methods of operation between the USN and 
Commonwealth navies such as the Royal Navy and the RAN.   
 
The Admiralty considered that the system of command during the Korean 
War was perhaps the most important aspect of the campaign.
190
 Partly because a 
United States high command already existed in Japan, and to some extent because it 
was clear that America would take the heaviest load in the war, the remainder of the 
United Nations, including Britain and Australia, came under the existing command 
system as they arrived in theatre. Under US naval practices each ship came under 
three separate command organisations; Operational, Logistical and Type 
(Administration).
191
 The Admiralty viewed this command structure as workable in a 
self-contained and mobile fleet:  
 
But with the scattered nature of the operations and multiplicity of separate 
commands of the Korean War, it introduced various complications, and senior US 
commanders who had suffered inconvenience by it did not hide their envy of the 
close relations that existed between the Operational, Maintenance and Technical 
braches of the staff of the British flag-officer.
192
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Operationally, the chief difference between the American and British systems lay in 
the rigidity of the former. Orders were extremely detailed and direct communication 
on a junior level with another service or task group was frowned upon. All 
intercommunication was supposed to go back up the chain of command, through the 
top, and back down again…practically no discretion was left to the man on the 
spot.
193
 This was in contrast with the practices of the British Commonwealth 
commanders whereby ‘the normal British anticipation was exercised and action was 
initiated at once’.194  
 
These doctrinal differences caused problems in operational matters, one 
example being HMAS Bataan in August 1952. After diverting United States Marine 
Corps aircraft to assist in silencing a group of North Korean artillery, Bataan’s 
commanding officer Warwick Bracegirdle was criticised for not going through the 
correct channels. Bracegirdle argued that improvised control at the local level was 
quicker than relaying requests to higher authority and that there was no time to refer 
matters back further than the west-coast patrol force commander aboard the cruiser 
HMS Newcastle.
195
 Fortunately British Admiral Sir Alan Scott-Moncrieff, the 
commander of the west-coast blockade force, welcomed the use of initiative by 
Commonwealth commanders.
196
 An additional difference between Commonwealth 
ships and those of the USN was that United States Navy ships were equipped with 
more communications circuits and operators than their Commonwealth 
counterparts.
197
 This led to overwork of both equipment and complements in 
Commonwealth ships, and in the course of the war crews were augmented. The 
Americans also produced and required a much greater volume of paperwork than the 
Commonwealth commanding officers were used to.
198
 Fortunately Scott-Moncrieff 
did much to protect his commanders from unfamiliar or uncongenial American 
methods.
199
 One area of operations in which the Royal Navy and the RAN had 
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complete familiarity with each other was in naval aviation, and the aircraft carriers of 
both services greatly contributed to the conflict.  
 
The contribution that the Dominions could make to Commonwealth defence 
was optimised during the Korean War. The fact that the RAN possessed a naval 
aviation capability materially assisted the Admiralty in meeting its operational 
commitments. The First Sea Lord requested that HMAS Sydney be sent to Korea to 
relieve the operational pressure on the Royal Navy; ‘it would be invaluable to the 
cause and might be useful experience for her’.200 The Australian Chief of Naval Staff 
John Collins passed on his thanks for the kind words about the RAN ships in Korea 
and acquiesced to the Admiralty’s request for Sydney’s presence in Korea.201 The 
relief of HMS Glory by HMAS Sydney was a historic landmark for it was the first 
time a Dominion carrier had gone into action. As the Vice Admiral William 
Andrewes, commander of British and Commonwealth naval forces noted:  
 
Her squadrons…were determined to show that they could beat any records existing, 
and they were not slow to start. One of the most satisfactory aspects…was the very 
high standard of bombardment spotting by HMAS Sydney, which was commented 
on particularly by the US battleship USS New Jersey.
202
 
 
The most conspicuous role played by British Commonwealth naval forces was by the 
light fleet carriers and ‘Their performances were admitted on all sides to be 
outstanding...’203 
 
Although the United States provided the largest contribution to the war, the 
Commonwealth effort was by no means insignificant. A total of 76 ships of the 
Commonwealth and Royal Fleet Auxiliary Services served in the conflict including 
32 warships of the Royal Navy, comprising five carriers, six cruisers, seven 
destroyers and fourteen frigates, and nine vessels of the RAN consisting of one 
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carrier, four destroyers and four frigates.
204
 17,000 officers and men of the Royal 
Navy, Royal Marines and the RFA Service served afloat in Korean waters, with 165 
decorations for distinguished service against the enemy being awarded.
205
 The RAN 
provided 311 officers and 4,196 ratings to the war with fifty-seven officers and men 
being awarded decorations for war service.
206
 As evidence of the shared 
Commonwealth naval assistance to the war, the British Naval Staff History of the 
conflict listed Commonwealth naval forces alongside those of the Royal Navy.
207
 
From the British point of view, the Korean conflict had proved a war of blockade, a 
seaman’s war of traditional pattern. The importance of the daily routine patrols of the 
Commonwealth naval forces was stressed and: 
 
The degree of success achieved can be judged from Communist reactions. At no 
time have they been able, or recently even attempted, to supply their forces by sea, 
and this single factor, in a country with such sparse land communications, has tipped 
the balance between defeat and victory for the great outnumbered land forces.
208
  
 
The Korean conflict was a drain on the both the Admiralty and the RAN. Collins 
remarked that ‘I am hoping that the Korea business may have subsided by next year 
and that we have some ships from the Far East Station down to join in the [jubilee 
celebrations] fun and exercises.’209 The Admiralty appreciated the assistance given 
by the RAN; ‘The strength of these [British naval] forces has been maintained 
throughout the operations. Moreover, the strength of the United Nations naval forces 
has been increased by ships of the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy, 
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and the Royal New Zealand Navy. The contributions of these Commonwealth navies 
are substantial in relation to the size of their peace-time fleets’.210 
 
Ships of the Royal Navy and the RAN operated efficiently with each other 
during the Korean War. ‘I have just been talking to one of [Vice Admiral] Andrewes’ 
staff back home and they all speak with such high praise of your Australian ships. 
Co-operation between us is complete and efficiency at the highest level.’211 The First 
Sea Lord regularly passed his appreciation of the operational capabilities of the 
Royal Australian Navy in the Korean theatre.
212
 Operating with both British and 
American vessels in Korea, Australian sailors were able to make comparisons 
between the two forces. HMAS Bataan worked with the American escort carrier 
USS Bairoko and the British light fleet carrier HMS Ocean. The Australians were 
greatly impressed with the British ship: ‘If Bairoko was slick, Ocean was slicker.’213 
Ocean also paid tribute to the capabilities of Bataan; ‘When you were inshore your 
handling of Ocean’s aircraft was invariably first class and every target you gave 
them was a winner.’214 The First Sea Lord and the Commander in Chief of the Far 
East Station exchanged views on the gradual drift of the Royal Canadian Navy away 
from the Admiralty, with the former remarking that ‘unlike the other Commonwealth 
countries, the Canadian ships were always difficult in Korea…’215 That is to say that 
RAN ships posed no such difficulties. If the RAN and the Royal Navy worked in an 
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extremely efficient manner during the Korean conflict, they did also albeit at a much 
reduced operational level, during the Malayan Emergency.  
 
The Far East Strategic Reserve has already been discussed in regards to its 
high-level strategic role. The secondary role of the Far East Strategic Reserve was 
the maintenance of the security of the Federation of Malaysia. The Malayan 
Emergency of June 1948-July 1960 gave ships of the Reserve opportunity for 
operational co-operation.
216
 Australia placed great importance on the defence of 
Malaya; 
 
 Apart from the role which Australia may take as a member of the British 
 Commonwealth in co-operation in mutual defence, it is fundamental to our security 
 that the situation in Malaya…should be cleared up as soon as possible.
217
 
 
Reduced operational commitments in Korea following the armistice of 1953 meant 
that both Britain and Australia could redeploy naval forces to the Malayan theatre of 
operations.
218
 Thirteen Australian ships served with the Strategic Reserve between 
1955-60 during the period of the Emergency.
219
 This did not mean that all of these 
resources were used in the Emergency itself, and the part played by the RAN in the 
Emergency in particular was minor.
220
 There was no great effort expended in 
blockade tasks as would be in evidence in the later conflict in Vietnam. Both British 
and Australian ships provided naval gunfire support to ground forces on a number of 
occasions, although the efficacy of such actions was sometimes in doubt. The 
operations of British and Australian warships in the next regional conflict, 
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confrontation with Indonesia between 1962 and 1966, would be much more 
important to the outcome of the conflict. 
 
Confrontation with Indonesia in the mid-1960s again provided opportunity 
for British and Australian naval assets to work alongside each other in an operational 
role.
221
 When the Indonesian government started its policy of confrontation against 
Malaysia, active operations were confined to the Borneo States. Although naval 
patrols were maintained in the Kuching and Tawau areas, they were mainly of a 
deterrent nature and there was little evidence that any seaborne incursions had been 
planned.
222
 In August 1964 Indonesia expanded the area of active confrontation to 
West Malaysia. As there is no direct land bridge between Indonesia and the Malay 
Peninsula all incursions had to be made by sea or air. Only one attempt at an airborne 
operation was ever mounted, and this was a political and military failure. However a 
large number of various types of seaborne incursions took place and the Royal Navy 
and its allies, including the RAN, became the most active tools used to deter and 
destroy such incursions. The Indonesians believed that by applying military, 
economic and political pressure to Malaysia it would fall, without the necessity for a 
full scale war. The campaign of incursions into west Malaysia was part of that 
pressure.
223
 During the early months of 1965 a large number of sabotage attempts 
were made, particularly against Singapore. It was necessary to station a large number 
of patrol ships in the Singapore Strait; this had an immediate effect and the number 
of incidents dropped off sharply. 
 
Military forces utilised in confrontation were Commonwealth in nature. The 
security forces involved were those of Britain, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. 
Although the British were the predominant partners in this alliance it was of over-
riding political importance that the anti-confrontation operations would not be able to 
be depicted as a British imperialist-colonialist war against Indonesia.
224
 Naval 
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operations against Indonesia were of a Commonwealth character also. Although the 
majority of assets were British, the RAN, as well as the RNZN and the Royal 
Malaysian Navy did provide vessels. As well as destroyers and frigates from the Far 
East Fleet, for the RAN this specifically meant ships of the 16
th
 Minesweeping 
Squadron, HMA Ships Hawk, Gull, Teal, Snipe, Curlew and Ibis.
225
  
 
The nature of naval operations during confrontation varied. The naval theatre 
was in effect split into two: west Malaysian waters and Borneo waters. In the west 
Malaysian region the Indonesians mounted two types of operations, infiltration and 
sabotage. British and Australian vessels were placed in patrol groups in areas 
opposite known Indonesian base areas. In a three-week period in March 1965, 
approximately 100 attempts to cross the Singapore Strait were attempted. These 
attempts were made by sampans with two boatmen and about 12 troops. It was 
during these operations that some of the fiercest sea fighting of the whole campaign 
took place.
226
 The importance of the patrols should not be minimised; one instance of 
a small fleeting radar contact not being adequately investigated resulted in a sampan 
containing 15 Indonesian infiltrators successfully landing on the coast of South-East 
Jahore. It took two battalions of ground-troops, and six weeks before they were 
eliminated.
227
 The nature of these operations was one of Australian and British 
vessels working side by side. As one observer noted following the successful capture 
of an Indonesian prahu by the British minesweeper HMS Maryton: 
 
 It is one of many beats, links in the chain of nightstick patrols, through the long, dark 
 alley of water from Singapore to North Malaya, one ship taking over where the other 
 wheels and turns back upon her wake. To Maryton’s east is an Australian frigate and 
 another Royal Navy minesweeper…
228
 
 
In the waters around Borneo naval forces were used to deter incursions by 
Indonesian warships, to prevent movement around the coast by parties of armed 
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Indonesians, and to provide naval gunfire support to ground troops ashore.
229
 Larger 
Australian vessels had the added responsibility of occasionally escorting the British 
vessels Bulwark and Albion, both of which transported troops to and from Borneo.  
 
British and Australian vessels operated under a number of limitations placed 
upon them either by political directive or force of circumstance.
230
 These limitations 
included a defensive policy, whereby resistance to all incursions was permitted but 
no form of counter-attack on Indonesian bases was allowed. In the event of being 
challenged by Indonesian vessels, allied warships on patrol were not to provoke 
action and if attacked, were to use the minimum force necessary to persuade the 
attacking vessel to desist.
231
 A considerable problem was one of naval patrols 
operating effectively in areas that were liable to be saturated with fishing fleets. This 
constraint was exacerbated by the fact that very few of the ships employed were 
designed for anti-incursion patrolling tasks, in the main being Coastal Minesweepers 
or other wooden-hulled vessels. Command and control was also affected due to the 
overall naval force consisting of a number of nations, although orders issued to 
Royal Navy vessels equally applied to RAN, RNZN and RMN ships.
232
 
 
Confrontation with Indonesia placed a heavy burden on the Royal Navy. By 
mid-1966 confrontation had absorbed 16,000 men and over 70 vessels.
233
 The Royal 
Australian Navy’s commitment of twelve ships was much more modest, but 
confrontation was unfolding at a time of escalation in the war in Vietnam and as one 
observer noted; 
 
Australian warships remained committed to the FESR and undertook tasks outside 
the Malaysian area throughout confrontation. A significant and concurrent 
commitment was to Vietnam, and FESR destroyers and frigates, as well as the 
carrier Melbourne, performed escort duty for the troop transport HMAS Sydney on 
all of her voyages to and from Vung Tau.
234
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Although the strategic shift of Australia from Great Britain to the United States was 
very much in progress during this period, ships of the RAN and the Royal Navy 
continued to operate very effectively with each other. This was in the main due to 
shared naval doctrine, culture and equipment, but also due to ongoing co-operation in 
matters of operational training. 
 
Training in an operational environment was and is an important part of inter-
service co-operation. Being part of a larger naval organisation such as ANZAM, the 
Far East Strategic Reserve or SEATO was extremely valuable for the ships of the 
RAN, as this allowed for increased opportunities to train with larger, better resourced 
navies such as the Royal Navy. Vessels of both services continued to train with each 
other throughout the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency and confrontation with 
Indonesia and beyond. Australian and British naval units operated together within the 
confines of numerous SEATO maritime exercises such as PX-41 SEA ROVER, in 
1970.
235
 Co-operative naval exercises were carried out prior to the ceremonial entry 
of the combined fleet to Singapore on the 5
th
 June 1970. CRACKSHOT was the 
work-up phase prior to the entry to Singapore and during this exercise HMAS 
Melbourne utilised her Skyhawk and Tracker aircraft and Wessex helicopters in 
various weapons drills including anti-submarine exercises.
236
 
 
Co-operation in operational training did not end with the British withdrawal 
from east of Suez. Indeed the British strongly held the view at military level that ‘to 
meet the requirement of having the capability for operations in South East Asia 
should the UK government so decide, provision should be made for periodic 
exercises of forces of all three services in the area post-1971’.237 During the meeting 
of 6/7
th
 April 1970, SEATO military advisors were informed that after the UK 
withdrawal from the Far East in 1971, the UK would continue to take part in SEATO 
                                                          
235
 Canberra, AWM, AWM122, 69/3006/PART 1 and AWM122, 69/3006/PART 2, Annex A 
to SCR/70/D-9. 
236
 FCO46/618, Minutes of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East’s 4th Meeting/70 with High 
Commissioners, held at Phoenix Park on Thursday 14 May 1970.  
237
 Canberra, SPC-A, RG53/C2/188, RAN Fact Finding Mission Report, 6 March 1968, p. 3.  
122 
 
exercises, albeit on a reduced scale.
238
 It was also recommended that fleet Royal 
Navy visits to the Far East and South East Asia be timed to coincide with dates set 
for SEATO exercises.
239
 In response to the question of whether British forces would 
travel to Australia for joint exercises, the Chief of Defence Staff answered ‘I would 
think it very likely’, and continued ‘I think [such] ships would tend to be those ships 
that we have East of Suez anyway-ships we very much hope will keep on doing what 
they have done for many years, taking part in exercises with the RAN and quite often 
with the RNZN and sometimes with the USN too.’240  
 
In 1971 the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff stipulated that, as part of the 
maintenance of links between British military forces and those of Australia and New 
Zealand, the Navy Department was to include the requirement for ships of the frigate 
force east of the Cape, and major units planned to be deployed east of the Cape, to 
visit both countries periodically whenever possible.
241
 It was also ordered that British 
Defence Liaison Staffs should consider the question of reciprocal visits to the UK. In 
view of the already substantial amount of RAN personnel training with the Royal 
Navy, it may be safe to assume that this request was targeted at the Army and the 
RAF. Although the quantity of British forces in the Far East was greatly reduced in 
number after 1971, the British were relieved that military co-operation, including 
exercises and training would continue due to the formation of the Australia-New 
Zealand-United Kingdom (ANZUK) Force.
242
 It was planned that one submarine 
(SSK) would be attached to the RAN from late 1972, and that another submarine 
(SSN) and a cruiser (CCH) would deploy east of the Cape for six months every other 
year, with the first deployment in mid-1973. It was envisaged that visits to New 
Zealand would be less frequent than visits to Australia, and exercises with the RAN 
would be combined with visits whenever possible.
243
 At a time where British military 
resources were increasingly stretched, it was viewed as beneficial that the Royal 
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Navy have opportunities to exercise and train in an operational environment, with 
navies such as the RAN, as much as possible. As Admiral of the Fleet Sir Michael 
Pollock wrote: 
 
ANZUK provides an integrated command structure based in Singapore to command 
the Australian, New Zealand and British contributions to the Five Power 
arrangements and is at present commanded by an Australian Admiral. Besides 
demonstrating our continued interest in the area, our contribution to this Force 
allows us to exercise and train regularly with our Commonwealth partners and to 
maintain our close links with them. There is regular co-operation with other forces in 
the area, for example the US 7
th
 Fleet, and we also play our part on SEATO.
244
 
 
Such joint exercises were viewed as being valuable in giving the Royal Navy the 
capability to deploy groups to areas they would otherwise be unable to reach, the 
Pacific Ocean being one example.
245
 Other benefits to the Admiralty of joint 
operations were evidence of limitations to British communications equipment in the 
Australian theatre.
246
 Examples of joint-exercises continued to the end of our period 
of interest and beyond. British naval vessels continued to take part in joint exercises 
in the Australia-New Zealand-Indian Ocean area, examples being exercises 
GROUNDWORK in early 1973
247
, KANGAROO in 1974
248
 and ROLL CALL in 
1978
249
. British task forces were made available for joint-exercises in 1974-5 with 
the RAN in Australian waters on the east coast (KANGAROO 1, JUC 92) and thus 
should be viewed as additional to the activities designed to deter a Soviet presence in 
the Indian Ocean.
250
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Joint exercises continued between the RAN and the Royal Navy after 1975. 
In the British, Australian and New Zealand military discussions of mid-1975 it was 
agreed that the United Kingdom would examine the possibility of producing an 
integrated exercise schedule of all services of the three countries where they had 
common interests.
251
 In 1977 HMA Ships Melbourne and Brisbane took part in 
Exercise HIGHWOOD 77, a joint RN/RAF exercise conducted in the South West 
Approaches to the west of Ireland, north and east of Scotland and in the North Sea. 
The Australian vessels were part of the ORANGE forces which simulated Soviet 
units, Melbourne acting as a KIEV class carrier and Brisbane as a KRESTA 2 class 
vessel.
252
 An Ikara firing by Brisbane was cancelled during the work-up phase of the 
exercise due to poor visibility, however a ‘most successful’ surface-to-air Tartar 
warshot firing was later carried out.
253
 The exercise was viewed as particularly useful 
as HMAS Melbourne, by judicious use of natural obstacles, such as oil rigs and 
islands, proved a Soviet KIEV class carrier with surface escorts could operate for a 
limited time in the North Sea/Norwegian Sea area with a large degree of success and 
survivability.
254
 The exercise was also useful to the RAN ‘particularly in the 
understanding of Soviet use and co-ordination of their long range missiles, air forces 
and submarines.’255 Operational training between the Royal Navy and the RAN was 
often accompanied by fleet visits of each service to their counterparts’ nation. 
 
Much value was placed on ‘showing the flag’ visits to overseas ports by both 
the RAN and the Royal Navy.  This was especially true in regards to the United 
Kingdom and the Royal Navy’s role as global ambassador; 
 
A physical piece of Great Britain carrying a cross section of her male population 
arrives in a port without any infringement of sovereignty. The community from King 
or Government downwards returns calls or receives British hospitality, tradesmen 
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profit and in a completely non-political atmosphere an astonishing fund of goodwill 
is built up. No other Service can do this.
256
 
 
It was said that the Royal Navy’s major function in peace was ‘To safeguard British 
citizens, commerce and to uphold our prestige throughout the world. This is a role 
requiring constant patrol of the worlds oceans and frequent visits to Dominion, 
Colonial and foreign ports by vessels of a size commensurate with the importance at 
which we rate ourselves as a nation and Commonwealth.’257 In late 1965 a taskforce 
from the British Far East Fleet visited Australian ports on completion of joint 
exercises with the RAN and the USN.
258
 Following the 1968 international exercise 
CORAL SANDS, fifteen ships of the Australian, British, New Zealand and United 
States navies entered Sydney Harbour where HMS Hermes fired a fifteen gun salute 
in honour of the Australian Naval Board.
259
 British ships visited Australia in great 
numbers during the 1950s. As RAN Lieutenant Commander Swan noted;  
 
More ships of the Royal Navy were visiting Australia at this time [late 1950s] than at 
any other period since World War II, with Alert, the carrier Centaur and the frigate 
Llandaff in Sydney, destroyers Lagos at Gladstone, Solebay at Mackay and 
Finisterre at Bowen, and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Olna, Reliant, Tide Surge and 
Wave Prince at Sydney, and Retainer at Melbourne. Unhappily, later British 
governments reduced Britain’s strength east of Suez, and such visits became a 
rarity.
260
 
 
Even so, Royal Navy vessels continued to visit Australia in reasonable numbers prior 
to the retreat from east of Suez. Between the end of October and mid-November 
1966 the largest programme of visits by Royal Navy vessels to Australia ports since 
the end of the Second World War took place. The ports visited were Sydney, 
Melbourne, Adelaide, Newcastle, Fremantle, Albany, Geraldton, Bunbury, Cairns 
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and Darwin. Visiting Royal Navy vessels included HM Ships Victorious, Kent, 
Hampshire, Leander, Arethusa, Cleopatra, Ajax, Forth, Oberon, Amphion and 
Anchorite, and the RFAs Olynthus, Tidepool, Tidespring, Resurgent, Reliant and 
Fort Dunvegan.
261
 Such visits to Australia by British vessels may have subsequently 
been less regular, and this is understandable when one considers the degradation in 
British naval forces east of Suez, but these visits did continue in the early 1970s. 
Table 3 illustrates the point of continual visits by Royal Naval ships to Australia in 
the early 1970s. 
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Table 3 Visiting Ships of the Royal Navy to Australia, 1971 
 
24 December 1970-5 
January 1971 
Tartar Fremantle 
16-22 March 1971 Llandaff Darwin 
6-13 May 1971 Eskimo West Australia 
12-28 June 1971 Intrepid Brisbane and Adelaide 
13-21 July 1971 Puma, Salisbury West Australia 
3 August-9 September 
1971 
Eagle, Glamorgan, 
Danae, Achilles 
Sydney, Fremantle 
Mid-August 1971 Albion West Australia 
 
Note: Information is from Canberra, NAA, A1813, 42/24/146, Proposed RN Visits to 
Australia 1971, 19 November 1970. 
 
 Visits to Australia in the 1972-1974 period were made by HM Ships Hydra, 
Devonshire, Odin, Dido, and Jupiter, HM Yacht Britannia, and the RFAs Tidespring 
and Blue Rover.
262
 The visits of Royal Navy vessels to Australia in the early 1970s 
were appreciated by the British. HMS Hydra visited Brisbane in mid-1972 and had 
two defective main engines replaced. Following the visit the Commanding Officer 
gave his thanks to the Commander of the Australian Fleet: ‘Hydra leaves the 
Australian Station with great regret and happiest memories of whole hearted support 
given by all RAN personnel.’263  
 
As well as co-operating in operational affairs such as military assistance and 
operational training, usually accompanied by naval visits to foreign ports, the two 
services worked together to realize the goal of a British nuclear capability. Royal 
Australian Navy assistance was crucial and much appreciated during British nuclear 
testing at the Monte Bello Islands off the west coast of Australia in the 1950s. 
Operation HURRICANE successfully tested a plutonium implosion device in 
October 1952, and operation MOSAIC in 1956 resulted in the successful explosion 
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of a fusion-boosted device.
264
 The RAN provided a large proportion of the naval 
support force for both operations. This support included preliminary surveys, the 
laying of navigational buoys and moorings in the target area, safety patrols and 
logistical assistance.    
 
The detailed planning for HURRICANE commenced in May 1951, and the 
operation was divided into three phases.
265
 Phase I lasted from 26
th
 April to the 8
th
 
August 1952, during which the preliminary civil engineering works were carried out. 
Phase II followed with the arrival of the main force bringing scientific personnel, 
stores and equipment, and the installation of equipment necessary for the test, and the 
detonation of the weapon on 3
rd
 October. Phase III comprised re-entry, recovery of 
records, salvage of material and final withdrawal, and ended on 31
st
 October 1952.     
 
A preliminary survey of the Monte Bello Islands was carried out in 
November 1950 by representatives of the Ministry of Supply and the Admiralty 
Hydrographic Department: ‘The Australian Naval, Air, Army and Security 
authorities afforded every assistance to the expedition, including the services of 
HMAS Karangi.’266 In March 1951 a formal approach was made to the Australian 
government for the use of the islands to carry out the test. A second more detailed 
survey was agreed to by Australia and HMAS Warrego was nominated for the 
task
267, a chore ‘that was completed in a remarkably short space of time’ according to 
the Naval Commander of the operation.
268
 In May 1951 the Australian Prime 
Minister agreed to the use of the islands for the atomic test. Planning to carry out the 
test continued, although the final decision for the test was not taken by the British 
government until December 1951.  
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 Prior to this, in May 1951, the British Official Committee on Atomic Energy 
appointed an Executive Committee known as the ‘Hurricane Executive’ to conduct 
the operation on their behalf. The Admiralty Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff was 
appointed Chairman reflecting the major naval aspect of the operation. Subjects that 
required Australian assistance or advice were referred to the UKSLS in Melbourne 
who in turn referred them to the ‘Hurricane Panel’. The latter was the Australian 
equivalent to the Hurricane Executive. The Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Australia) 
was the chairman of the panel, again a reflection of the strong naval facets of the 
planned operation. This was also a manifestation of the strong naval relations 
between the RAN and the Admiralty at the time. On the 15
th
 May 1952 it was 
reported that a test of a British atomic weapon would be carried out at the Monte 
Bello Islands off the north-west coast of Australia.
269
 The Australian government 
would co-operate closely, as would the Australian fighting services including the 
RAN. 
 
A meeting was held in August 1952 in Fremantle between Rear Admiral 
Torlesse, Flag Officer of the Special Squadron and the staff of the Flag Officer 
Commanding Australian Fleet at which many operational and communication 
problems associated with Australian co-operation in the planned testing was 
settled.
270
 Soon after Royal Navy and RAN vessels sailed for the Monte Bello 
Islands. Australian vessels initially utilised in preparation for the tests included HMA 
Ships Hawkesbury, Koala, Limicola, Warreen, Karangi and Motor Refrigerator 
Lighter (MRL) 252 and Motor Water Lighter (MWL) 251. Hawkesbury carried out 
patrols of the prohibited area, while Koala was said to be ‘a valuable asset to the 
force’ and assisted in maintaining moorings.271 Rear Admiral Torlesse was ‘most 
impressed with the efficiency of the organisation at Onslow [a small town of some 
four hundred inhabitants, 90 miles away] and the good work done in support of the 
forces at Monte Bello.’272  
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HMAS Mildura later arrived at the islands with Captain Morris, NOIC West 
Australian Area embarked. This gave the opportunity for future requirements and 
Australian assistance to be discussed.
273
 Torlesse later took over operational control 
of HMAS Culgoa which was stationed as a weather reporting ship. Culgoa’s reports 
were said to be of great assistance.
274
 Units of HM Australian Fleet comprising Task 
Force 75, under the command of Rear Admiral Eaton, arrived in the area on the 27
th
 
September. The flagship HMAS Sydney was escorted by HMAS Tobruk and the 
frigates Shoalhaven, Murchison and Macquarie.
275
 Units of the task force co-
operated by providing air and surface patrols during the latter stages of Phase II and 
over the actual period of the trial.
276
 These patrols were said to be valuable and 
provided assurance that the ‘Danger Area’ was clear before firing, both from the 
point of view of security and of safety.
277
 RAN vessels greatly assisted with the 
logistical requirements of the operation. Warreen, Limicola, MWL 251 and MRL 
252 operated with the force acting as the Fleet Train.
278
 In addition Karangi and 
Koala transferred the moorings from HMS Zeebrugge, a slow process, however ‘any 
time lost…was made up by the speed and accuracy with which the Karangi and 
Koala laid the moorings’.279 By the beginning of October all preparations for the trial 
had been completed and it was necessary to wait for suitable weather before the test 
could commence.
280
 The weapon was successfully exploded on the 3
rd
 October 1952.  
 
There were perceived advantages for Australian security following the test. 
British vessels later returned to the site of the initial explosion to recover records.
281
 
It was thought that the information obtained would assist in the protection of British 
and Australian harbours. Professor Titterton, head of the nuclear physics department 
of the Australian National University was quoted as saying ‘We know far more now 
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of what would happen if an atomic bomb was smuggled in the hold of a cargo ship 
and detonated in Sydney harbour, or Port Phillip Bay, Melbourne.’282 The experience 
was thought to be equally relevant to the task of protecting London, Liverpool and 
Glasgow and ports and estuaries on the British coast. Koala, along with some of her 
crew, was slightly contaminated following the operation ‘due to carelessness in 
allowing certain contaminated moorings to be raised on the horns and hauled aft 
inboard before being hosed down and monitored’.283    
 
It was reported that a further series of British atomic bomb tests would be 
held at Monte Bello in April 1956. HMS Narvik would lead a joint RN-RAN 
operation.
284
 The Australian Minister of Supply said the RAN had carried out a great 
amount of preparatory work before the proposed testing at Monte Bello.
285
 The RAN 
again provided a high level of assistance to the MOSAIC atomic tests including 
logistic support such as fuel and berths and the checking of buoys and other 
navigational aids in the islands.
286
 The device was successfully detonated on the 19
th
 
June 1956. 
 
The assistance given by the RAN to the two operations was greatly 
appreciated by the British. Following the 1952 explosion, Torlesse flew to Onslow to 
thank the Australian services for ‘their invaluable assistance and co-operation 
throughout the operation’.287 An official statement from the Ministry of Supply 
described the test as ‘an outstanding example of a combined operation in which the 
Governments of the United Kingdom and Australia worked in close co-operation.’288 
According to the Manchester Guardian HMA Ships Warrego and Karangi 
performed ‘indispensable services in the early preparations for the [HURRICANE] 
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test’.289 The co-operation of the RAN in the atomic testing was not only appreciated 
by the Admiralty but also by British scientists and Royal Engineers officers 
associated with the atomic tests.
290
  
 
An interesting footnote to the co-operation between the RAN and the 
Admiralty with atomic testing was the fact that the RAN sought Admiralty advice as 
to the possibility of the procurement of nuclear weapons. In August 1954 there was a 
suggestion by the Melbourne Sun that the United States should equip the RAAF with 
atomic weapons as part of any long-range SEATO defence plan.
291
 It was suggested 
that a highly-mobile formation with atomic weapons, airborne and air-supplied, 
would be the surest method of wiping out an enemy bridgehead on Australia soil.
292
 
No mention was made in the article on the possibility of the RAN providing such a 
capability but the Admiralty subsequently was asked to provide advice on the 
availability of a tactical atomic weapon for use by aircraft from RAN light fleet 
carriers.
293
 The necessity for such a capability was due to the alarmingly high total of 
the naval vote taken by the fleet air arm, of which, said the ACNB ‘we cannot claim 
any real offensive power…and our Australian opponents know it.’294 The answer of 
course is the ‘tactical atomic weapon carried by the Sea Venom or indeed any 
fighters capable of operation from a light fleet carrier.’295 The response was a 
somewhat guarded: 
 
Aircraft to carry the atomic weapon would require CENTAUR Class or later Light 
 Fleet Carrier. It is too early to answer precisely what number of weapons referred to 
 will be available, since allocation to United Kingdom services is uncertain. By 1965, 
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 when apparently the RAN is thinking of a new carrier, the chances must be better, 
 and will of course go on improving as availabilities increase.
296
  
 
Cooper suggested that the ‘the idea of the RAN acquiring tactical nuclear weapons 
did not go very far. Whether it was an idea of Dowling’s alone, one discussed within 
Navy Office, or dropped because of lack of Australian political or Allied support, is 
unknown.’297 Dowling however did discuss the issue of nuclear weapons with Sir 
Frederick Shedden, the Secretary of the Department of Defence: 
 
 I have by no means made up my mind on the way ahead for the RAN but hope to do 
 so sometime this year. One of the important factors is whether or not aircraft from a 
 Light Fleet Carrier will be capable of carrying the tactical atomic weapon. Without 
 this the Navy has no real punch and can play only the defensive role.
298
  
 
The RAN did not acquire nuclear weapons and it is difficult to see the possession of 
such weapons as being anything but a resource drain on the service.  
 
The issue on nuclear weapons for Australian forces was also discussed in 
high-level military circles:  
 
We assume that short of the outbreak of a global war or of a major limited war 
 involving a direct threat to Australia’s security, Australia will neither acquire a 
 nuclear capability nor become a nuclear base. However, developments…might 
 require modification of this assumption, which should be reviewed at least 
 annually.
299
 
 
Later it was stated that: 
 
The existing policy is that there is no immediate requirement for an Australian 
nuclear capability, but the possibility is not excluded that we may need this in the 
longer term…the introduction by British forces of nuclear weapons would constitute 
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one of the possible alternatives to our manufacturing our own nuclear weapons 
whereby Australia could independently or otherwise become a nuclear power.
300
 
 
Australian efforts to acquire an atomic weapon capability, whether half-hearted or 
not, are not within the remit of this piece, and have been addressed elsewhere.
 301
 A 
salient point however is that this research has generally focussed on the nuclear 
options available to the RAAF rather than the RAN.
302
 The fact that the RAN sought 
advice from the Admiralty rather than the United States is a reflection of the strong 
ties between the two services, ties that were only strengthened by continuing 
operational co-operation.     
 
 The Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Navy worked very efficiently 
together in operational interactions throughout the period 1945-75 and beyond. On 
one hand, this is only to be expected considering the historical, doctrinal and cultural 
ties between the two services. On the other hand, the sharp strategic divergences 
between the United Kingdom and Australia in the post-war period could have been 
expected to lead to a greater operational disassociation between the two services than 
did in fact occur. Even where overt military co-operation between the Royal Navy 
and the RAN, as evidenced in the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency and the 
Indonesian confrontation was no longer required due to the alteration in the strategic 
stance of both countries, the two services continued to work together in matters of 
operational training. The Royal Navy continued to send its warships to Australia to 
‘show the flag’ and foster relations between the two countries. Australian warships 
took part in joint exercises in the United Kingdom, a region far removed from 
Australian strategic concerns. Even so the RAN in particular was not tied to one 
operational associate, and the importance of the United States as a strategic partner 
was plain. As much as Australian warships were comfortable operating with their 
British cousins, they were increasingly at ease working with their American allies as 
well.   
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As one observer noted: 
 
It was nothing unusual for [an Australian] ships’ company to find itself at defence 
watches and at a heightened state of alert for air and submarine attack off Vung Tau 
one day, and a few days later be patrolling for Indonesian infiltration craft in the 
Malacca Strait.
303
     
 
This should not detract from the fact that Australian and British warships worked 
seamlessly side by side throughout our period of interest and beyond. 
 
Photograph 2 HMS Glamorgan, Sydney Harbour, October 1968 
 
 
 
Photograph courtesy of the Sea Power Centre of Australia. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Co-operation in Matters of Manpower, Personnel and Training 
 
 Perhaps the greatest example of post-war co-operation between the Royal 
Australian Navy and the Royal Navy was the exchange of personnel between the two 
services.
1
 This trade of personnel helped to strengthen the bonds between the RAN 
and the Royal Navy, especially where the exchange of the officer class of both 
services was concerned. This was not a trade or exchange of personnel that was 
necessarily on a one-for-one basis, and in effect the RAN gained much more than the 
Royal Navy in the transfer of personnel. It was a migration of personnel that took 
place in a very fluid strategic situation, with both the UK and Australia greatly 
altering their strategic positions between 1945-75. There were perceived advantages 
for both the RAN and the RN in continuing with the personnel migrations between 
the services. Even so, both services felt great anxiety about the lack of manpower in 
the post-war period, and these concerns very much affected the exchange of 
personnel at various times.  
 
Personnel exchanges consisted of the inter-service loan of serving officers 
and men between both services, the exchange of such personnel, and the recruitment 
of ex-Royal Navy officers and ratings by the RAN. This last course of action 
somewhat mirrored the movement of British nationals to Australia in the post-war 
period and the trend had clear implications for the Royal Navy and its ability to 
utilise discharged personnel in a reserve capability. Nonetheless, and almost without 
exception, the British acquiesced to RAN entreaties to carry out recruitment drives in 
the UK as it was viewed that manning the RAN with officers and men with a UK 
background was an excellent way of ensuring its continued closeness and affinity to 
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the Royal Navy.
2
 The personnel exchanges were at times substantial, and these 
exchanges took place in an environment where the Royal Navy was having great 
manpower issues of its own. Any transfer of either ex or serving personnel to the 
RAN meant the Royal Navy had less ‘apples to pluck from the tree’. There were 
benefits to the Admiralty however, not the least of which was the propagation of the 
idea of an ‘Empire Navy’. Quite apart from the strategic aspects of having an empire 
naval air presence in the Pacific, the sale of aircraft carriers to the RAN addressed 
another manpower issue of the immediate post-war period, namely that the Royal 
Navy did not have enough men to man the vessels available.
3
 These vessels included 
CVLs either in reserve or undergoing construction. Transferring carriers to the RAN 
made sense as this would lessen the manpower shortages felt by the RN, although 
this was somewhat negated by the fact that the carriers would have a reasonably 
heavy contingent of Royal Navy personnel, at least until those billets could be filled 
with trained Australian sailors.
4
  
 
 In the late 1940s the Australian Naval Chief, Sir Louis Hamilton, realised that 
manpower concerns would trouble the RAN with officers being the key to the 
problem.
5
 The crisis was such that it was suggested that the RAN would be 40%-
50% short of naval commitments by the end of 1947. In his closing letter to the 
Australian Prime Minister, Hamilton was frank about the manpower issues facing the 
RAN: 
 
There is a serious shortage of trained and experienced officers and men, particularly  
of Lieutenants of over 4 years seniority and ratings in the 22-27 years age group of 
all branches. The loss of this age group extending over some six years will have its 
effect on the morale and manning of the Royal Australian Navy for at least a 
decade.
6
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Hamilton had fought hard for the creation of the Australian naval air arm, and 
remained concerned for the future of the RAN. While accepting that the approval of 
the carrier purchase was a victory, Hamilton’s successor as the new Australian Naval 
Chief, John Collins, complained about manpower issues and rising costs. Though 
thankful for the personnel to be loaned by the Royal Navy to assist in the manning of 
the new carriers, he also observed that ‘a way out presents itself by the desire of 
many ex Royal Navy ratings, as expressed to Australia House in London, to join the 
Royal Australian Navy and emigrate.’7 Following Collins’ communication regarding 
manpower concerns the British First Sea Lord asked for clarification on the current 
position regarding the loan of personnel to the RAN, whether the RAN was likely to 
succeed in recruiting up to 1,000 ex-Royal Navy ratings in the UK, and if so, how 
would this ‘affect our Reserve situation? Do we object?’8 In reply, the Royal Navy 
Director of Manning stated ‘if sufficient publicity is given to the scheme, and 
conditions of service made attractive, it is thought that a large number will volunteer’ 
and while the loss of 1,000 actual or potential reservists would be a serious setback 
to Admiralty efforts to build up the Reserves, ‘this would be more than offset by the 
potential gain in Empire Naval strength during the period of their full time service in 
the RAN’. 9 The Second Sea Lord concurred with these views and even suggested 
that ‘We could help them through our recruiting offices if they could give us 
information on the pay and conditions, and also the emigration aspect.’10 The First 
Sea Lord agreed and promised to refer Australia House to the ‘National Association 
for Employment of Regular ex-Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen’, the body to whom men 
were advised to seek employment with on leaving the British services.
11
  
 
The quantity of the proposed loan of active service ratings included in the 
aircraft carrier proposal was 245 for the Naval Air Station and 257 for the first 
carrier, HMAS Sydney. In addition two hundred of the proposed 1,000 ex–ratings 
were needed to complete the complement of the carrier.
12
 The complement of the 
vessel was 1,789 men, including the carrier air group, and so the total proportion of 
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both serving and ex-Royal Naval ratings on the vessel was substantial. Moreover, as 
the mariners in question were highly trained, and the vessels and aircraft were British 
in origin, they were not available from elsewhere. There were instances where RN 
ratings who were not volunteers for service with the RAN were drafted to Australian 
ships as a normal RN foreign draft.
13
 This situation was deemed as ‘most 
undesirable’14 however such were the dangers to the nascent air arm that the practice 
was accepted. As one interested party emphasised ‘We must get the necessary 
Ratings by hook or buy crook or the whole Aviation programme will break down.’15 
It was impossible that the first RAN aircraft carrier, and her complement of aircraft, 
could have been manned without Admiralty support, and the offer testified to the 
strong ties between the services at the time.  
 
 Prior to Lord Fraser of North Cape taking over as First Sea Lord in 1948, 
Collins wrote to him with high hopes for the recruitment campaign as manpower 
shortages were slowing up the 5-year naval plan.
16
 Collins later reported to the 
Admiralty that the recruitment of ex-RN ratings ‘had not been bad, although only 
400 instead of the desired 1,000 men were expected to be available’.17 It was 
presently relayed to the Admiralty that the limiting factor to the 5-year plan was not 
money but manpower and materials.
18
 Another recruitment drive was suggested by 
the RAN in April 1949.
19
 It was stated that any such scheme would receive 
favourable consideration by the Admiralty, although there were doubts about 
whether RN backing could be provided for the second Carrier Air Group on the same 
scale as for the first. Bearing in mind the reasonably heavy contingent of Admiralty 
support for the first carrier this was neither a surprise, nor evidence of degradation in 
the inter-service relationship. No impression on the ratings already recruited from ex-
RN ranks could be given, however the Australian First Naval Member had heard 
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nothing to their detriment.
20
 The fact that another recruitment drive was desirable 
probably reflected the suitability of the recruited personnel as well as ongoing issues 
with recruitment in Australia. RAN ratings were given as 9,454 at the start of 1949 
with nearly 1,000 of this total being ex-RN sailors recruited since July 1948.
21
 In 
addition 214 men were on loan from the RN. This was a sizeable proportion of the 
entire Australian naval strength at the time, and reflected continued Admiralty 
support for the RAN.  
 
 All was not plain sailing with the new recruits to the Australian service 
however. In late 1949 Collins reported that they had ‘struck some trouble’ with the 
ex-RN ratings over accommodation.
22
 According to Collins, there were problems 
with adequate housing for the families of the ratings, so much so that the RAN was 
in danger of ‘becoming real estate agents ourselves, and running a village of pre-
fabs.’ Collins minimised the amount of ‘trouble’ the RAN had struck. The issue was 
not only a serious lack of accommodation, but more a case of the lack of 
accommodation being an obstacle to the men being in a position to bring their 
families across from the UK. The availability of suitable accommodation was a 
prerequisite for the migration of the ex-RN ratings families. With the initial sign-on 
period being six years, the thought of families being separated for such a lengthy 
term was a worrying one. As a result a number of ratings deserted the RAN; twenty-
two men out of the 349 married men initially recruited by the service deserted, and a 
number attempted to abscond to Britain, some successfully.
23
 Parliamentarians were 
involved in the resolution of the matter and the resultant poor publicity was heavy.
24
 
In mitigation some of the periodicals were said to be ‘irresponsible and sensational’ 
though ‘widely read’.25 The controversy cannot have made further attempts to boost 
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RAN manpower by the use of UK naval sources any easier. Nevertheless, the terms 
on offer did appear clear and stated that:  
 
It is not the intention of the Naval Board to transport families to Australia as is done 
in respect to loan personnel, but ratings will be able to nominate dependants under 
the Immigration Scheme when they have secured accommodation after their arrival 
in Australia.
26
  
 
Even so there were reports of the terms on offer not being correctly passed on to all 
of the recruits in question
27
, although the reliability of such reports was questioned. 
In addition the RAN later made arrangements for accommodation as best they could 
including the purchase of two hostels
28
 and the appointment of billeting officers in 
Melbourne and Sydney.
29
 Loan personnel also had issues with accommodation, and 
there were instances where the number of members of the families of ex-RN 
personnel precluded the satisfactory housing of the families of loan personnel.
30
 The 
Mayfield NSW branch of the Australian Labour Party felt the necessity to complain 
to the Minister for the Navy in 1949, stating that: 
 
 …when a definite promise such as this had been made, it should be honoured both in 
 the interests of the happiness of the men concerned and the hope that these women 
 and children may be ambassadors of goodwill between the Mother Country and 
 ourselves.
31
  
 
British sailor George Woodley volunteered for service with the RAN and was 
accepted, later serving at HMAS Cerberus and HMAS Lonsdale in 1948-50.
32
 He 
                                                          
26
 ADM1/21605, Royal Australian Navy-Recruitment from Ex-R.N. Personnel, 
N.2/N.5957/48, 18 June 1948.  
27
 ADM1/21605, Letter from Commonwealth Relations Office to Naval Branch (II) 
Admiralty, 16 August 1949. 
28
 ADM1/21605, Telegram UKSLS1500/3 from UKSLS to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 
11 October 1949.  
29
 MP150/1, 569/201/2188. It should also be pointed out that accommodation for native 
RAN personnel was at a premium, see MP150/1, 569/201/2162, Letter from Flag-Officer-in-
Charge NSW to ACNB, 19 August 1949.  
30
 MP150/1, 569/201/227, Message from Secretary Naval Board to 2
nd
 Naval Member, 16 
August 1950. 
31
 MP150/1, 569/201/2158, Letter from the ALP Mayfield Branch to the Minister for the 
Navy, 16 September 1949.  
32
 Woodley, Sound Recording 28460/18/16. 
142 
 
enjoyed his service very much, as it was cheap compared with England, the pay was 
better, and the food was better with no rationing. Although it took 13 months for his 
family to join him, his children got on very well in Australia. Accommodation was a 
concern, with the family being housed in a ground floor flat; it ‘wasn’t a very good 
place at all, but it was somewhere to stay.’ Woodley’s two-year contract ended in 
December 1950; ‘When I left Australia I came home with other sailors who had been 
on loan, [and] there were 52 people who came down to see us off, I was very 
honoured. My wife made a lot of friends out there.’33 
 
 The Admiralty did not accept any liability for the predicament in which the 
ex-RN ratings found themselves, however the accommodation issue was taken up on 
a High Commissioner level due to the men being UK nationals.
34
 The seemingly out 
of the ordinary arrangement whereby nationals of one nation, would be permitted to 
serve in an armed force of another nation, without becoming a citizen of the latter, 
left the sailors in question in a peculiar state of limbo. Collins was of the opinion that 
legally the RAN were in the clear, but ‘morally we must do something’, especially as 
‘we must have some results to show before we start another drive for ex-RN’s, which 
we hope to do early next year’.35 This was a somewhat pragmatic approach to say the 
least. 
 
 On the 15
 
September 1949, following concerns from the Australian Prime 
Minister about officer shortages in the RAN, permission was asked for another 
recruitment drive for ex-RN personnel, this time targeting Engineering, Air-
Engineering and Electrical branch officers.
36
 The shortage was said to be such that it 
would ‘retard the achievement of the Post-War Naval Plan and hinder the efficient 
performance of the duties of those branches’. It is no great surprise that much 
importance was given to the fact that applicants should be under no illusion about the 
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continued acute shortage of housing in Australia.
37
 It was agreed that a copy of any 
proposed advertisements would be forwarded to the Commonwealth Relations Office 
before placement in any British newspapers or journals.
38
 A draft advertisement was 
later sent for approval and the warning was stark; ‘remember, the housing situation 
in Australia is still critical’.39 The advertisement was approved and later placed in a 
number of newspapers and journals.
40
 In mid-1950 the number of UK-based officers 
required by the RAN was given as eleven Mechanical, two Aeronautical and ten 
Electrical Engineers.
41
 The proposed advertisement again mentioned the housing 
shortage in Australia
42
 even though the accommodation conditions placed on ex-RN 
ratings did not apply to those being offered commissions.
43
  
 
 Robert Tunstall was one such RN officer who served with the RAN on 
HMAS Sydney during the Korean War between 1950-51.
44
 Tunstall’s wife followed 
him to Australia and spent two years in the country. Tunstall added great air 
engineering experience to the new naval squadrons in Australia. He served as the Air 
Engineer Officer, a role that precluded him from combat flight operations, and 
developed a system utilizing anti-freeze to stop undercarriage failure in the very cold 
conditions of the Korean theatre. The MBE awarded to Tunstall following his service 
in Korea read: 
 
Any successes which the Air Group (HMAS Sydney) may have enjoyed are in no 
small way attributable to the outstanding work of this officer. As Air Engineer 
Officer  of the Air Group he has time and time again produced the seemingly 
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impossible. By  his drive and tact he has never failed to produce the requisite 
number of aircraft. He has worked very long hours, indeed uncomplainingly and 
cheerfully, and has indeed done an outstanding job of work.
45
  
 
Norman Craggs was a Royal Naval officer attached to the RAN in the early 
1950s, who served at HMAS Rushcutter as an instructor in Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) operations and on various ships including HMAS Arunta. He did not 
generally enjoy the experience due to his family still being in England. The reasons 
for this separation are unclear; as the duration he spent in Australia was three and a 
half years, his less than perfect experience is perhaps understandable.
46
 Alan Dobson 
served on attachment with 723 and 805 Squadrons of the RAN between 1953-58. 
Dobson and his wife travelled to Australia first-class, and due to the great transfer of 
personnel between the services, Dobson already had friends from the UK serving 
with the RAN. Even so his wife did not cope very well with the move.
47
 Lieutenant 
David ‘Ben’ Bathurst, later First Sea Lord between 1993-5, was offered an exchange 
to the RAN at 6 weeks notice. He accepted and served as an instructor with the Fleet 
Air Arm from 1965-67.
48
  The first three months were difficult for his wife and 
young family, with problems in finding accommodation. A home was found but it 
had its shortcomings; there was ‘no loo, just a can up the garden, [my wife Sarah] 
stated that if the loo wasn’t fixed she would be back to the UK on the next boat’. 
Bathurst subsequently installed an entire septic tank system on the property. ‘We had 
some wonderful times...it was the outdoor life and couldn’t have really been more 
fun.’ So much so that, ‘At the end of the 2 years we were very reluctant to come 
home, we debated whether we would stay as the Australian Navy were always quite 
keen to take on people and I probably could have transferred, but we decided not 
to…due to too many ties in the UK.’ Relocation of families from one side of the 
world to the other is never without difficulties, and following the initial housing 
problems the RAN did much to improve matters, although Bathurst’s experiences 
suggest that more could have been done.   
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 Communications from the Australian Naval Board to the Admiralty reported 
both satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the manpower situation of the RAN. In 
mid-1950, Collins reported to the Admiralty that the RAN were ‘holding their own’ 
at about 10,000 men a year with the Korean ‘affair’ giving an impetus to 
applications.
49
 He also reported plans for a ‘ministerial high powered campaign’ to 
improve recruiting following cabinet disquiet over the impact of National Service on 
the RAN. Following a recruiting campaign led by the Prime Minister, RAN 
recruitment increased but doubts were still expressed about whether a long–term 
target of 15,173 officers and men in the Permanent Naval Forces by June 1952 would 
be met.
50
 In February 1951 retired Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead suggested 
that only about two-thirds of the RAN’s approved strength of 15,000 was in 
service.
51
 Less than a month later Collins reported that recruiting was on target at 
almost 3,000 men per year.
52
 Again no mention was made of increased utilisation of 
RN personnel. National Service for 18-year-olds was introduced on the 1
st
 May 
1951, but was not well thought of by the Navy Board.
53
 The short period of service, 
only 176 days, with only 154 of these being continuous, allied to the added training 
requirements only worsened the personnel shortages. In total the RAN trained 6,826 
National Servicemen, and raised few objections when it was abolished in 1957.
54
 
Although national manpower requirements were causing ministerial concern in mid-
1951, ‘the modest demands’ of the RAN were not questioned.55 Later that month, the 
Admiralty received another request for additional ex-Royal Navy ratings, on this 
occasion 100 Electrical and 210 Communications ratings.
56
 Significantly there was 
not an entitlement for any return passage to the UK for either the rating or his family 
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after his six-year term.
57
 This appeared to be a reflection of a lessening of Australian 
reliance on British naval personnel resources. Again the housing issues associated 
with Australia were made plain, and the prospective ratings were made to sign a 
disclaimer certifying they had read and understood the conditions of service.
58
 The 
Admiralty once again gave their full approval to the recruitment plans.
59
 The 
continued approval given by the Admiralty to Australian employment of ex-RN 
ratings was explained by the pervading view that ‘it is very much in the UK’s interest 
that the Royal Australian Navy should be developed on UK lines and with the 
maximum closeness and affinity to the Royal Navy. To man it with officers and men 
with a UK background is an excellent way of ensuring this.’60 
 
 At the end of Collins’ tenure as First Naval Member manpower issues again 
caused anxiety, with the RAN being unable to man any additional vessels, even if 
they had the money to purchase the ships. Collins wrote ‘with full employment, high 
wages and “music while you work” it’s hard to persuade young men to join the 
Navy’.61 In Collins’ last letter to the Admiralty as First Naval Member he reported ‘I 
think I’ll turn over a fairly small balanced Navy to Dowling with manpower about 
1,000 short of the 14,400 ceiling and a budget of £48 m. which he may find difficulty 
in spending.’62 His successor, Vice Admiral Roy Dowling confirmed the manpower 
figures on taking up his post.
63
 Dowling’s later assertion that, if his personnel were 
not married, ‘we would have no re-engagement problems’64 was questionable, as 
well as impracticable. In any case the RAN still experienced manpower shortages 
and there were further plans to recruit ex-RN ratings, as well as the possibility of 
direct transfer of personnel from the RN to the RAN.
65
 The recruitment issues were 
still a worry in late 1962 with the possibility of the Q Class frigates being placed in 
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reserve.
66
 In effect, the manpower issues experienced by the RAN in the immediate 
post-war period endured throughout the period of study. They were lessened by the 
migration of both serving and ex-personnel of the Royal Navy to the RAN, a 
migration that took place when the Royal Navy were experiencing manpower 
difficulties of its own. 
 
 The great level of co-operation on the part of the Admiralty towards 
Australian naval recruitment should be viewed in the context of manpower concerns 
also plaguing the Royal Navy. The conflict in Korea meant it was possible to make 
an increase of effective strength by the compulsory retention of officers and men due 
to leave the service. In mid-1952, however, it was expected that the loss of 17,000 
highly trained and experienced men over the next two years would mean a reduction 
in the war complements in the Far-East, with consequences that ‘will inevitably be 
very severe’.67 Nor was this situation greatly helped by conscription. Indeed the 
Admiralty tended to view conscription as a burden.
68
 Training conscripts required 
regular navy personnel who would no longer be available for duty at sea, and the 
one-year length of conscription, later increased to two years, did not lend itself to 
increasing the efficiency of the sea-going fleet.
69
 The two-year period of service did 
at least permit the conscripts to serve at sea, and in 1956, nearly 10% of the total RN 
strength, 11,600 out of 122,100 was made up of National Servicemen.
70
 Serious 
reductions in the strength of the Far-East Fleet were later considered ‘in the light of 
the known difficulties in manning the Fleet’.71 It was suggested that the Australian 
Fleet Air Arm could fill any gaps in operational efficiency following any withdrawal 
of UK naval air power from the Far-East Station
72
 but the aircraft carried by the 
Australian carriers were not suited to the role of interdiction, being optimised for 
anti-submarine and trade protection duties.
73
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There was a view in the Admiralty that the RAN drew too heavily on officers 
from the RN, with limits being imposed to some extent. This was because RAN 
officers had more freedom to resign than their RN counterparts, a situation made 
worse when times were good and more lucrative jobs ashore were available.
74
 Even 
so, the relations with the RAN were said to be very good, and the exchange of 
officers was ‘particularly welcome’.75 Nevertheless, the exchange of personnel did 
cause problems for the Admiralty. In late 1955 the First Sea Lord sent a letter to a 
number of Commonwealth Naval Chiefs, including the First Naval Member of 
Australia, describing manpower as ‘one of the most pressing and important problems 
with which we must deal today…’76 
 
 Manpower concerns continued to trouble the Admiralty; a Board 
Memorandum of mid-1962 warned of manpower issues which ‘unless they are 
solved, may make it impossible to meet the Naval Staff requirements.’77 In late 1962 
it was reported to the Admiralty Board that figures for both recruiting and wastage 
had not fulfilled previous expectations.
78
 It was pointed out that lack of personnel 
was having a palpable affect on the fleet; ‘we cannot at the moment get to sea with 
the Active Fleet even the numbers authorised in 1957-the missing escorts exist in 
reserve but they cannot be commissioned because of lack of manpower.’79 The Vice 
Chief of the Naval Staff later stated that the situation with the total suggested 
manpower of 103,000 in 1968 was serious but manageable
80
 but the Admiralty Board 
suggested that the implications of the manpower situation were so serious that they 
should be bought to the notice of the Minister of Defence however ‘The picture 
should not be made to seem so depressing as to invite really harmful cuts in the size 
or role of the Navy.’81  
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 In 1964 the Secretary of State’s attention was drawn to the fact that the Royal 
Navy’s biggest problems concerned manpower,82 and that radical measures would be 
necessary to deal with it. The Navy was 1,300 men short of its present requirements. 
There was also a shortage of officers, particularly electrical officers and aircrew, at a 
time when the RAN was actively recruiting for such personnel in the UK. It was 
assessed that the requirement would grow to 107,500 by 1968, with forecast strength 
by that time of no more than 103,000. Of particular concern was the re-engagement 
rate that had fallen from 65% in recent years to 53%, with the blame lying with the 
austere conditions of service when serving ‘East of Suez’. By late 1963, the 
manpower situation had deteriorated since the previous review.
83
 In discussions on 
how best to improve the situation it was questioned whether enough was being done 
to attract back senior ratings who had left the service.
84
 Many of these ratings 
however, senior or otherwise, had responded to advertisements placed in the UK to 
attract them to the RAN, and were no longer available to the Admiralty.     
 
 Early employment of ex-RN naval personnel by the RAN was followed by 
continued recruitment, but the advertising was much more specific, targeting 
Aeronautical Engineering and Electrical officers. Free passage to Australia for the 
successful applicants, as well as their wives and families was offered, and 
superannuation would be payable on reaching retirement age.
85
 Later requests were 
made for the same officer branches for either permanent or short-term 
commissions.
86
 Even in the early 1970s advertisements were released in the UK 
asking for Direct Entry Officers of all branches, with vacancies also existing for most 
branches of ex-RN sailors; again it was stated that selected officers ‘may 
subsequently be offered permanent commissions.’87 Interestingly the advertisement 
was headed by a photograph of HMAS Perth, a US-built Charles F. Adams class 
guided missile destroyer.
88
 Thus the possibility was raised of ex-RN personnel being 
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coveted on account of their experience on British vessels, serving with a foreign 
navy, on a warship built in another country.
89
 In contrast with advertisements of 
previous administrations that depicted a British-designed Destroyer Escort,
90
 the 
acquisition of the DDGs was used to full advantage in recruitment campaigns in 
Australia with applicants being urged to ‘gain invaluable technical training, while 
travelling the world in missile-age ships of the Royal Australian Navy’.91 
 
 The Royal Navy also saw the value of advertising as a method to increase 
recruitment numbers; the total of new recruits had gone up progressively from 5,400 
in 1961/2 to some 7,150 in 1964, mainly as the result of greater expenditure on 
advertising.
92
 Indeed it was the view of the Second Sea Lord that ‘a direct 
relationship exists between the amount of money spent on recruiting and the numbers 
who come forward’.93 Even with greater resources invested in recruitment the Royal 
Navy struggled with the issue, and, in 1971, it was suggested that on present 
expectations there was very little prospect of the RN avoiding a manpower gap in 
two or three years time unless service pay and conditions were substantially 
improved.
94
 Meanwhile the RAN continued to use the UK as a ‘ready-use store’ for 
various types of personnel. 
 
 It was not only British servicemen that the RAN found useful. Civilian 
personnel associated with a variety of naval interests were highly sought. In 1950 
Draughtsmen and Senior Draughtsmen with previous experience in the layout of Her 
Majesty’s ships were required, with the applicants having to serve a minimum of 
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three years.
95
 In 1955 advertisements ran in The Times seeking ‘legally qualified 
medical practitioners’ for appointment as Surgeon Lieutenants, the first appointment 
on offer being four years, with the prospect of transfer to the Permanent Naval Force, 
or alternatively an extension of short service, up to a maximum of eight years.
96
 An 
Aircraft Maintenance and Repair Engineer was required by the RAN in May 1965, 
with no minimum term being stipulated.
97
 British physicists and electrical engineers 
were required to assist with the development of Ikara, the Australian designed ASW 
missile system, however the contracts were only offered for either three or five years, 
with no suggestion of permanent re-settlement.
98
 Following the announcement of a 
$A355,000,000 project for the design and production of three light destroyers 
(DDLs), the Department of the Navy advertised in The Times for the position of 
Director-General of Naval Design.
99
 Arguably, the potential loss of civilians with a 
range of naval expertise also had an impact on Admiralty efficiency.  
 
 There were issues over the likelihood of defence personnel on exchange 
serving in theatres where their mother-service was not involved. During the Suez 
Crisis, complications arose leading to the removal of Commonwealth personnel from 
ships taking part in operation MUSKETEER.
100
 The Royal Air Force wanted 
clarification on such personnel after the withdrawal of Commonwealth members of a 
bomber crew, and were hoping for a clear agreement with Commonwealth countries 
that ‘unless we can use their aircrews as we wish we cannot have them in’.101 The 
Second Sea Lord was against any restrictions which would weaken the exchange 
programme, and preferred the current arrangements whereby the Admiralty would 
honour a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ that personnel on loan would not be involved in 
operations without their Government’s consent, with the slight risk that they may 
have to be withdrawn for political reasons. Commonwealth Chiefs of Naval Staff 
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fully agreed with this stance.
102
 The Royal Australian Navy too, had complications 
with loan Royal Navy personnel during the Vietnam conflict. In late 1967, the British 
Secretary for Defence was forced to describe a report that Royal Navy personnel had 
been involved in secret military operations in Vietnam as ‘totally untrue’.103 It was 
said that since 1965, some 30 British service personnel, on loan or exchange, had 
been on short visits to South Vietnam, mainly in ships of the RAN, but that ‘The 
arrangements under which they were exchanged or on loan precluded any active 
military operations.’104 If personnel on loan were in the main kept out of conflict, 
there were no guarantees against peacetime casualties. Four Royal Navy officers and 
two ratings were serving in HMAS Voyager prior to its collision with the aircraft 
carrier HMAS Melbourne in 1964. The personnel were part of an exchange 
arrangement with the RAN. Two of the officers and two of the ratings were reported 
as missing.
105
 The accident also claimed the life of an ex-RN senior sailor; Chief 
Petty Officer Jonathan Rogers was posthumously awarded the George Cross, the 
highest peacetime award, following the sinking of Voyager.
106
 Rogers was a former 
RN Petty Officer who joined the RAN in 1950. Chief Petty Officer Rogers, who won 
the Distinguished Service Medal while serving with the Royal Navy in 1944, 
organised the evacuation of some 50 men from the rapidly sinking forward section of 
the vessel, and stayed behind with those who could not escape and ‘led them in 
prayer and hymn’. Rogers’ widow received the award from the Queen at 
Buckingham Palace on the 8
th
 July 1965.
107
    
 
 Officer exchanges took place at the highest levels. The most obvious 
examples of this were the Royal Naval officers serving as Australian Naval Chief 
prior to John Collins taking the position in February 1948. The Admiralty had no 
issues with the proposal for Collins, the Australian First Naval Member, to be given 
a sea-posting with the Royal Navy, following his retirement from the position of 
head of the RAN. Such an exchange was viewed as beneficial in binding the 
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Commonwealth and its navies together.
108
 The exchange was later disallowed on 
purely political grounds
109
 but the fact that the Admiralty had no objections says 
much about the strength of the bonds between the services at the time. Indeed such 
exchanges bolstered the ties between the navies. When concerns were raised about 
the gradual drifting apart between the Royal Navy and Commonwealth navies, a 
tendency said to be most marked in the Royal Canadian Navy, no similar signs were 
noted with the Royal Australian Navy.
110
 Admiralty views were that the problems 
were not so acute with the RAN due to the exchange of officers.
111
 Following the 
Indonesian confrontation, Vice Admiral Sir Nicholas Hill-Norton, then a Lieutenant, 
was ‘sent to Australia in exchange for an Australian officer who’d been doing the 
course [Electronics Warfare] with me and wanted to stay in England for two years; I 
had a year on a ship, had a year ashore teaching tactics at their anti-submarine school 
which I quite enjoyed. It was interesting in seeing another country; interesting 
experiences in how another navy operated.’112 According to the RAN Navy List, Hill-
Norton served on HMAS Stuart and at HMAS Albatross. Hill-Norton stressed that 
the RAN was another navy; if he had been transferred to the RAN at the start of our 
period of interest it is unlikely this would have been his view. Even though, cultural 
bonds existed between the services throughout our period of research.  
 
 Within the overall theme of inter-service migration, the conditions and 
requirements placed on personnel wishing to join the RAN continued to alter. In 
early 1960 applicants, in this case for the Junior Recruit Training Scheme, had to be 
‘resident in Australia and be British subjects or Non-British residents complying with 
certain conditions.’113 By late 1965 it was stated that applicants must be ‘an 
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Australian citizen or a British subject ordinarily resident in Australia’, 114 whereas 
Army enlistment, not RAN or RAAF, was open to non-British nationals intending 
Australian naturalisation.
115
 By late 1975, it was mandatory that personnel needed ‘to 
be, or intend to become an Australian citizen’.116 Thus the option was open, at least 
initially, for ex-RN personnel to join a foreign navy without necessarily becoming a 
citizen of that country, another reflection of the strong national ties between the UK 
and Australia, ties that altered, and in many ways mirrored, the altering ties between 
the RN and the RAN.   
 
 The strong cultural bonds between the services meant that personnel, 
especially officers, were exchanged constantly. This was, as Alastair Cooper 
correctly pointed out, ‘to the RAN’s almost exclusive advantage.’117 Cooper carried 
out initial analysis of the relevant RAN Navy Lists to show how the trends of inter-
service migration very much favoured the RAN.
118
 Cooper readily acknowledged 
that his initial analysis did not include the number of Royal Navy officers as a 
percentage of the total RAN officer corps.
119
 Table 4 lists such statistical analysis, 
while Diagram 2 illustrates the high reliance of the RAN on RN officers, either on 
loan or exchange.
120
 This percentage is especially high during the period of 1948-53 
and the creation of the Australian Fleet Air Arm. The migration tapered off sharply 
towards the early 1970s, which might seem to reflect a diminution in the overall 
strength of relations between the two services, but an analysis of RAN officer 
migration (Table 5 and Diagram 3) shows that RAN officer transfer to the Royal 
Navy during the same period remained strong. The reduction of Royal Navy officer 
movement to the RAN thus illustrates a lessening of RAN reliance on RN officers.   
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 An analysis has been made of the appropriate RAN Navy Lists to illustrate the 
incidence of RAN officers serving with other navies. In the early 1970s, the 
incidence of RAN officers serving with the RN is high compared to those serving 
with other navies such as the United States Navy, the Royal New Zealand Navy, the 
Malayan/Royal Malaysian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Navy. This shows the 
ongoing strength of the relationship between the RAN and the RN and that for all of 
the increased reliance of the RAN on navies other than the Royal Navy, for 
equipment and vessels, an Australian naval officer was still more likely to serve on a 
Royal Navy ship if he was transferred to another navy.      
 
 In early 1953, prior to Sir William Slim taking up the position of Governor-
General of Australia, the First Sea Lord sent him a letter containing Admiralty views 
of the relationship between the services. The following makes plain the mobility of 
officers between the services at the time: 
 
Rear Admiral Eaton of the Royal Navy, is the Flag Officer commanding the 
Australian Fleet, but he will be relieved by an Australian Flag Officer this year. 
Commodore Price, Royal Navy, is the Fourth Naval Member for Air. Captain 
Sanderson, Royal Navy, commands the Royal Australian Naval Station at Schofield, 
and Captain Beattie, V.C. Royal Navy, commands [the ] Australian First Frigate 
Squadron, in exchange for Captain Mackinnon, Royal Australian Navy, who is 
commanding the British Minelayer, Apollo, in our Home Fleet. There is also Captain 
Hutchinson, Royal Navy, in the U.K.S.L.S. in Melbourne.
121
   
 
 Following the First Lord of the Admiralty’s visit to the Far East in 1958, a 
trip that included Australia, he remarked that he had been struck by the strength of 
personal bonds that existed between the Royal Navy and navies of the 
Commonwealth.
122
 He suggested that ‘the growing national consciousness’ of those 
countries would make it difficult to maintain those bonds, and that a ‘growing 
reluctance of the Commonwealth navies to accept RN officers on loan could be 
offset by a more vigorous development of exchange officers’.123 He also urged that 
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everything should be done to encourage Commonwealth navies to send their young 
officers to the United Kingdom for training. 
 
 The Royal Navy had a manpower crisis in the post-Second World War 
period. This may seem paradoxical in a time of National Service but due to the 
limited availability of conscripts for use at sea, and the additional burden placed on 
the regular forces for the training of the conscripts, conscription was generally 
viewed by the Admiralty as an encumbrance. Despite the manpower crisis, the Royal 
Navy had a number of additional priorities including developing an ‘Empire Navy’, 
selling warships and ensuring that in times of joint action, such as the Korean 
conflict, the Royal Navy and other Commonwealth navies could work together with 
common understanding and procedure so adding to the strategic effectiveness of their 
naval presence. In light of these other priorities, assisting the RAN with their own 
manpower issues made sense.  
 
 The trends of manpower exchanges in the post-war period were stark. In the 
immediate post-war period, the percentage of RN officers in the RAN was relatively 
small at a time when the Royal Navy was a sizeable naval force; the RAN was a 
small adjunct of its much larger relative. Between 1948-53, and the introduction of 
the British-built aircraft carriers, the reliance on Royal Naval personnel was great. 
The percentage of Royal Navy personnel serving with the RAN steadily declined, but 
during the period of 1967-73 the percentage of Royal Naval officers serving in the 
RAN remained remarkably similar, albeit at a relatively small level considering the 
high levels of officer exchange and loans during the creation of the Australian Fleet 
Air Arm. Conversely, an Australian officer was much more likely to carry out his 
duties on a Royal Navy warship than that of another navy if he was not serving with 
his own service.  
 
 There were many advantages for the RAN in the personnel exchanges with 
the Royal Navy. The RAN had a ready-use resource-pool of trained and competent 
personnel on which it could call on.
124
 Commander Arthur Francis Turner of the 
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Royal Navy, served on loan with the RAN from 1946-50. He was reported to have 
‘done a remarkably fine job in setting up the technical side of naval aviation in 
Australia.’125 David Bathurst, a Royal Navy officer who served with the RAN as an 
aviation instructor in the late 1960s, described the operational experience as 
‘tremendous fun, [a] tremendous challenge, one really felt one was earning ones 
pay… I had never flown so hard in my life…about 60-70 hours a month’.126 Bathurst 
was filling an important billet for the RAN; he took part in the Wessex 31B engine 
proving trials, and his first nine months were spent flying and instructing on that 
aircraft as he was the only qualified instructor. The exchange of personnel between 
the services was not without its difficulties, with concerns over accommodation, 
separation of families and cultural differences. Generally, RN personnel serving with 
the RAN faced more teething-problems than Australian officers and sailors seconded 
to, or training in, the UK.   
 
 The longevity of the personnel exchanges outlasted the strategic necessity of 
such exchanges and carried on through a period of great strategic change for both 
Australia and the UK. British strategic priorities altered from ‘empire defence’ in the 
immediate post-war period, to ‘empire co-operation’ as evidenced in the Korean 
conflict, to a ‘retreat from empire’ and the ‘East of Suez’ policy with a resultant 
priority given by the UK to the defence of Europe and the strengthening of ties to 
NATO. Australia, too, saw much alteration in her strategic stance, with an increase in 
the national ties between the United States and Australia and a lessening of such ties 
between the UK and Australia. The ANZUS treaty and close military co-operation 
between Australia and the US during the Vietnam War were high-level indications of 
this strategic shift. The purchase by the RAN of US-built warships was but one 
indication of a lessening in the reliance felt by the RAN on RN support. Even so, 
personnel loans, exchanges and the recruitment of ex-naval personnel between the 
services continued, evidence of the strong historical and cultural ties between the 
RAN and the Royal Navy, as well as a certain amount of pragmatism on the part of 
the RAN.    
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 Training was an important area of co-operation between the Royal Navy and 
the RAN. In the immediate post-war period the Admiralty considered that although it 
was desirable for the Dominions to maintain naval forces as required to suit their 
own needs, their squadrons and flotillas should form part of the ‘Empire Navy’ as a 
whole.
127
 As such, the policy of exchange of personnel between the Royal Navy and 
the Dominion Navies should be greatly extended. It was viewed that a rigid 
adherence by the Dominion forces to their respective areas would preclude adequate 
training and thus the development of a common empire naval doctrine.
128
 It was 
assumed that the Royal Navy would be primarily responsible for the training of 
Dominion navies, including the RAN. A common view at the time was that 
disproportionate sums were spent in small Dominion navies on local training 
facilities that were poor duplications of equipment and institutions already available 
in the United Kingdom.
129
 Common training of officers, and to a lesser extent, 
sailors, of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy would allow personnel of 
both services to be interchangeable, but training of naval personnel was a drain on 
manpower and finance, and ships taking part in training duties were not always 
available for operational tasks. Inter-service training benefited the RAN to an even 
greater extent than did the exchange of personnel, as the burden of training personnel 
fell in the main on the Royal Navy. This was especially the case with the officer 
classes, but the cohesive training doctrine also served to strengthen the bonds 
between the services.   
 
 The Admiralty were extremely compliant towards Commonwealth navies 
such as the RAN, in offering support with training matters. In his haul-down report, 
the Australian First Naval Member Louis Hamilton, was at great pains to emphasise 
the aid provided by the Admiralty with, amongst other assistance, training 
establishments, ‘without which the Australian Navy could not exist for long as an 
efficient force’.130 Officers in Commonwealth Navies had long been trained in Royal 
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Navy establishments, a privilege not always attended to non-Commonwealth 
officers.
131
 In considering changes to the initial entry of cadets to the Britannia Royal 
Navy College at Dartmouth, the Admiralty felt that, although the main consideration 
should be the impact on cadets of the Royal Navy ‘the cohesion of the Navies of the 
Commonwealth would be very adversely affected if the common early officer 
training of these Navies was discontinued’.132 It was strongly recommended that ‘the 
Commonwealth Navies should be given every encouragement to continue to send 
their Cadets to Dartmouth and then the Training Ship after the Thomas Scheme is 
introduced’. It was thought that some 50 RAN Midshipmen would join Dartmouth 
each year with a distribution amongst the branches being similar to that of British 
entrants.
133
 Organisationally the college would remain as one, with Commonwealth 
and Royal Navy Midshipmen and Cadets spread over the houses.
134
 This integration 
of Commonwealth cadets with those of the Royal Navy was thought of as crucial in 
promoting links between the Royal Navy and those of the Commonwealth.
135
 The 
First Lord of the Admiralty urged that everything should be done to encourage 
Commonwealth navies to send their young officers to the United Kingdom for 
training.
136
 While there were practical difficulties involved, it was thought that they 
should be approached with a willingness to accept some small loss in the efficiency 
of the Royal Navy for the sake of long-term dividends which closer personal 
association with the Commonwealth navies would produce.  
 
 The training assistance given by the British had financial implications for 
both the Admiralty and the RAN. Cooper correctly stated that ‘The lack of support 
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infrastructure represented an underlying weakness in the RAN’s capabilities…[as] 
rather than dilute a limited program budget, the RAN usually preferred to acquire a 
larger number of operational platforms, which would directly contribute to its 
fighting strength’.137 The support given by the Admiralty in training matters allowed 
the RAN to focus their resources on operational concerns. Conversely, resources 
devoted by the Admiralty to the naval education of members of the RAN, were assets 
that could not be used elsewhere. To alleviate the possibility of young officers at 
Dartmouth being housed indefinitely in undesirably cramped accommodation, either 
Commonwealth entrants would have to be excluded, or additional buildings at a cost 
of some £75,000 would have to be erected.
138
 It was decided that in order to sustain 
British naval influence, Commonwealth countries should have the fullest opportunity 
of sending their young officers to the new-style Dartmouth. This would involve large 
capital costs for the Admiralty, therefore fees would have to rise to £600 a year. This 
amount only covered half the cost of training.
139
 By March 1965 the Royal Navy 
were training approximately 700 officers and men from 30 different countries. 
According to the RAN Navy List of that time, RAN officers accounted for 90 
personnel of this total, a significant amount.
140
 An examination of Admiralty 
discussions on the matter of non-British trainees make plain that ‘older members of 
the Commonwealth’ such as Australia, were much less of a burden than nations 
sending personnel for primarily political reasons, or when such personnel failed to 
reach an acceptable standard of English or were considered a potential security risk. 
Even so, assisting navies such as the RAN with the maritime education of their 
personnel was a financial drain on the Admiralty.  
 
 As British economic woes increased, it was felt that rationalisation of defence 
training offered to foreign and Commonwealth countries was necessary. In mid-1969 
it was proposed that fees for foreign students on courses with the British Army 
should be increased ‘in the order of 100 per cent, and in many cases a great deal 
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more’.141 Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Ashmore was not aware of 
any similar proposals for increased fees on naval courses, but he suggested that any 
intention to do so could have ‘a most serious effect on sales of ships to foreign 
countries’. It was later agreed that tuition charges should be standardised on the 
Army/Air Force model, and this resulted in a steep rise in Navy charges, a sign that 
the fees previously being paid by overseas students at naval training establishments 
were not completely covering the costs of training.
142
 Charges were sometimes 
waived for countries with whom Reciprocal Training Arrangements had been agreed, 
and Australia was one such country.
143
 The Admiralty wished to minimise the impact 
of increased charges on nations such as Australia, even though it was viewed that 
Australia would continue to send students to the United Kingdom. This was due to 
the fact that Australia could afford to pay the increased charges, and due to the high 
value they attached to the military and technical expertise available at, and the 
standard of instruction of, British training establishments.
144
 The RAN continued to 
send personnel to the UK for professional advancement but it increasingly found 
itself willing and able to take more of the burden for training its own personnel.     
 
 The RAN gradually transformed its own training resources, but there was still 
ongoing aid given by the Admiralty. During a visit to Australia during April-May 
1955, Vice Admiral Sir Frank Mason, the Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet, felt able to 
speak of unsatisfactory accommodation and facilities available to cadets at HMAS 
Cerberus, while pointing out that the Electrical School was excellent.
145
 The speech 
was said to have been very well received, and Mason was thanked most cordially for 
the help and advice he had given during his trip. HMAS Cerberus remained the entry 
point for officers and ratings until the 1950s when a number of other establishments 
assisted with its responsibilities for recruits and cadets.
146
 In 1956 HMAS Nirimba 
became the Royal Australian Naval Apprentice Training Establishment. The Royal 
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Australian Naval College was returned to Jervis Bay in 1958 and commissioned as 
HMAS Creswell, and HMAS Leeuwin became the Junior Recruit Training 
Establishment in 1960.  
 
 Cooper was correct to point out that the lack of change in the RAN’s training 
policy, and the continued reliance on the Royal Navy, ‘is conspicuous’, especially 
when one considers the degree of change in other operational areas.
147
 Non-
commissioned members of the RAN were not generally trained in the UK but 
following initial tuition in Australia, Royal Australian Naval College Graduates 
completed their specialist courses in Britain as late as 1968.
148
 Following the 
discontinuation of the Royal Navy’s specialist warfare courses, the RAN continued 
to send its warfare officers on the replacement Principal Warfare Officers (PWO) 
course until 1985.
149
 An analysis has been made of the appropriate RAN Navy Lists 
to illustrate the level of RAN officers under training in the United Kingdom between 
1945-73. As Diagram 4 ‘RAN Officers on Course and/or Training with the RN, 
1945-1973’ shows, there was a high reliance on RN training resources for Australian 
naval officers throughout the post-war period. Indeed, as Table 6 illustrates, the 
number of RAN officers under training in the UK in October 1973 was over 50% 
higher than in October 1945. The period 1948-70 showed remarkably stable figures 
for British-based Australian naval officers under training. Even so, Australia 
increasingly found itself able to be less reliant on the UK for training purposes. 
Training for non-UK equipment such as the Charles F. Adams Class DDGs could not 
be carried out in the United Kingdom and such training was carried out in 
conjunction with the United States Navy. Submariner training continued to be held in 
the UK
150
, but by 1970 the RAN offered 750 training courses, 586 of which were 
offered by the service itself.
151
 This was a sign of the RAN’s growing independence.   
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 There were benefits for the United Kingdom in assisting with the training of 
overseas students such as members of the RAN. Foreign officers especially, by 
expressing the ideas and the experience of their country, were thought to ‘make a 
positive contribution to the military thought and breadth of outlook of British 
Officers’.152 This was viewed to be even more advantageous when British officers 
were more likely to be confined to Europe following the withdrawal from the Far 
East. It was said to be ‘clearly in the UK’s interest to maintain and improve the 
capability and efficiency of friendly foreign and Commonwealth forces so they can 
undertake tasks for which they might otherwise seek assistance from UK forces’.153 
Again, this would be even more of a benefit when consideration is given to the 
British cutbacks in defence. In addition, training foreign and Commonwealth officers 
helped in selling military hardware and ‘by advocating the purchase of UK 
equipment, they assist service cooperation by commonality and thus interoperability 
of equipment’.154 The fact that the RAN felt such heartache in reaching the decision 
to purchase non-British warships in the 1960s lends credence to this point. Finally it 
was assessed that by absorbing UK training methods and tactical doctrine, the 
difficulties associated with military co-operation in training or operations between 
other countries forces and those of the UK were lessened. This was certainly the case 
when one considers the Korean conflict where Commonwealth naval forces were 
able to operate together almost seamlessly.
155
 This was in contrast to Commonwealth 
naval operations with the United States Navy, at least during the initial stages of the 
conflict, before operational procedures were agreed. 
 
 An example of the consequence of Admiralty aid in matters of personnel 
exchange and training is seen in the experience of W N Swan, a Royal Australian 
Naval Cadet in the immediate post-war period. In early 1947, Swan was sent to the 
UK to undergo a Physical Training and Welfare course at Portsmouth followed by 2 
years exchange service with the Royal Navy. He was delighted with the opportunity 
to serve with the Royal Navy; ‘all my thoughts were 12,000 miles away with the 
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mother of all Navies’156 Swan recorded that ‘Most [RAN officers] would have 
jumped at the 2 years exchange in the RN…’157 He said of his arrival in Portsmouth, 
‘This was not my first visit to the most famous naval base in the British 
Commonwealth but it was my first in uniform, and I loved every minute of it.’158 
Swan later took a Combined Operations course at HMS Drake, instruction in 
Minesweeping at HMS Vernon, Chemical Warfare tuition at HMS Excellent, a Joint 
Tactical course at HMS Sea Eagle, a Defence Officers course at HMS Victory,
159
 and 
Boom Defence instruction at HMS Safeguard.
160
 Swan sailed for Australia on 19
 
January 1950, having been absent from Australia for 2 years and 8 months, much of 
this time gaining professional qualifications at Royal Naval establishments.
161
 Swan 
was only one of thousands of Australian naval officers who benefited from 
professional advancement in the United Kingdom. The officer class of the RAN 
owed the Admiralty much, for the generosity provided in matters of naval education 
and training.     
 
 There were advantages to the United Kingdom in supporting the training of 
RAN personnel. Common training strengthened the bonds between the services and 
made a drift away from the Royal Navy less likely as RAN members, in particular 
the officer class, had such close ties with the parent service. It was thought that 
common training of Commonwealth naval forces would solidify empire relations as a 
whole. The sale of British ships to foreign nations was viewed as more likely if there 
were relations between the Royal Navy and the navy of the prospective purchaser. 
Training of non-Royal Navy sailors and officers was a drain on Admiralty resources, 
but it was generally thought that the advantages of doing so outweighed the 
disadvantages. There were clear rewards to the RAN in utilising the resources of its 
much larger parent service. Training personnel in the UK made economic sense, and 
allowed the RAN to devote scarce resources to operational requirements. The 
Admiralty did not charge exorbitant fees for such training, and when pressured by 
external sources such as the Treasury to increase fees, the Admiralty generally 
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resisted. The facilities able to be offered by a large navy such as the Royal Navy 
were better than those able to be provided by the RAN. The RAN gradually 
increased its training facilities and this was an indication of its growing 
independence, but officers continued to be educated in the UK throughout our period 
of interest. The continuation of utilising the Royal Navy for training purposes by the 
RAN indicates a level of pragmatism on its part, as well as a measure of the close 
historical bonds between the services. This reliance is in contrast with the state of 
flux associated with other aspects of the relationship between the services during the 
same period. One observer remarked in early 1949, ‘…how much more effectively 
the potentially excellent human material, could be enticed into the Navy, and 
employed and trained, if it could circulate freely among the warships of the Empire 
and its training centres…’162 After the idea of an ‘Empire Navy’ lost favour, 
personnel exchanges between the Royal Navy and the RAN continued, as did much 
co-operation in matters of training. 
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Table 4 RAN to RN Officer Ratios, 1945-1974 
 
 
Year 
Total Officer 
strength of the 
RAN 1945-74 
(This does not 
include personnel 
listed as 
Emergency or 
Retired) 
RN Officers 
serving with  the 
RAN 1945-74 
(This does not 
include personnel 
listed as 
Emergency or 
Retired) 
RN Officers 
serving with  the 
RAN 1945-74 as a 
% of the total 
officer strength 
Oct-45 768 18 2.34% 
Oct-46 707 13 1.84% 
Oct-47 712 19 2.67% 
Oct-48 868 129 14.86% 
Oct-49 990 182 18.38% 
Oct-50 1085 260 23.96% 
Oct-51 1109 213 19.21% 
Oct-52 1202 242 20.13% 
Oct-53 1286 251 19.52% 
Oct-54 1299 193 14.86% 
Oct-55 1348 191 14.17% 
Jul-56 1343 135 10.05% 
Oct-57 1338 109 8.15% 
Oct-58 1311 86 6.56% 
Oct-59 1292 81 6.27% 
Oct-60 1291 77 5.96% 
Oct-61 1272 66 5.19% 
Oct-62 1270 63 4.96% 
Sep-63 1307 58 4.44% 
Sep-64 1386 59 4.26% 
Sep-65 1434 51 3.56% 
Sep-66 1545 46 2.98% 
Sep-67 1579 30 1.90% 
Sep-68 1699 31 1.82% 
Sep-69 1824 44 2.41% 
Sep-70 1923 47 2.44% 
Sep-71 2010 41 2.04% 
Sep-72 2120 40 1.89% 
Sep-73 2164 39 1.80% 
Sep-74 2058 27 1.31% 
Note 1; All totals are of members of the Permanent Naval Forces only and do not take 
account of Reserve or Citizen Naval Forces 
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Diagram 2 RN Officers Serving with the RAN as a % of the Total Officer Strength, 
1945-1974 
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Table 5 RAN Officers Serving with Other Navies, 1945-1974 
 
 
Year 
RAN 
Officers 
serving 
with the 
RN 1945-74 
RAN 
Officers 
serving 
with the 
USN 1945-
74 
RAN 
Officers 
serving 
with the 
RNZN 
1945-74 
RAN 
Officers 
serving with 
the Malayan/ 
Royal 
Malaysian  
Navy 1945-74 
RAN 
Officers 
serving 
with  the 
RCN 1945-
74 
Oct-45 66 0 0 0 0 
Oct-46 23 0 0 0 0 
Oct-47 27 0 0 0 0 
Oct-48 15 0 0 0 0 
Oct-49 15 0 0 0 0 
Oct-50 12 0 3 0 0 
Oct-51 18 0 3 0 0 
Oct-52 33 0 1 0 0 
Oct-53 33 0 1 0 0 
Oct-54 33 0 0 0 0 
Oct-55 31 0 0 0 0 
Jul-56 35 0 0 0 0 
Oct-57 47 0 1 0 0 
Oct-58 57 0 1 0 0 
Oct-59 53 0 0 0 0 
Oct-60 55 1 1 1 0 
Oct-61 43 1 0 6 0 
Oct-62 45 2 0 7 0 
Sep-63 51 2 0 8 0 
Sep-64 50 2 0 9 0 
Sep-65 54 5 0 9 0 
Sep-66 45 7 0 10 12 
Sep-67 38 45 0 10 17 
Sep-68 34 7 0 8 0 
Sep-69 37 5 1 5 0 
Sep-70 41 6 1 3 0 
Sep-71 34 6 0 4 0 
Sep-72 37 14 1 6 0 
Sep-73 35 17 1 3 0 
Sep-74 35 13 1 0 0 
Note 1; All totals are of members of the Permanent Naval Forces only and do not take 
account of Reserve or Citizen Naval Forces 
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Diagram 3 RAN Officers Serving with Other Navies, 1945-1974 
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Table 6 RAN Officers on Course and/or Training with the RN, 1945-1974 
 
 
Year 
RAN Officers on Course and/or Training with the RN 
1945-1974 
Oct-45 38 
Oct-46 47 
Oct-47 43 
Oct-48 98 
Oct-49 107 
Oct-50 99 
Oct-51 114 
Oct-52 106 
Oct-53 148 
Oct-54 136 
Oct-55 108 
Jul-56 175 
Oct-57 171 
Oct-58 116 
Oct-59 95 
Oct-60 92 
Oct-61 82 
Oct-62 82 
Sep-63 89 
Sep-64 106 
Sep-65 85 
Sep-66 100 
Sep-67 92 
Sep-68 100 
Sep-69 102 
Sep-70 96 
Sep-71 65 
Sep-72 71 
Sep-73 60 
Sep-74 40 
Note 1; All totals are of members of the Permanent Naval Forces only and do not take 
account of Reserve or Citizen Naval Forces 
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Diagram 4 RAN Officers on Course and/or Training with the RN, 1945-1974 
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Chapter 7 
 
Co-operation in Equipment Design and Procurement 
 
 Resource collaboration in matters of military equipment between the RAN 
and the Royal Navy was an extremely important aspect of the inter-service 
relationship.
1
 Great assistance was given by the Admiralty in the implementation of 
the Australian Naval Air Arm, indeed the creation of the latter was unthinkable 
without the former. There were often occasions where vessels would be loaned from 
one service to another, with the majority of cases being from the Royal Navy to the 
RAN. Exchange of vessels between the two services was very much thought of as 
beneficial, even though lack of military resource on both sides prohibited any great 
progress in this regard. Although Australia reached agreement with the United States 
on standardisation of military equipment, this had little effect upon Anglo-Australian 
naval co-operation in procurement of major vessels. Equipment design co-operation 
between the RAN and the Royal Navy was evident during the post-war period, 
perhaps most notably with the Ikara Anti-Submarine Warfare missile system, a 
weapon system fitted to both RAN and RN vessels, albeit in moderately different 
variants. The Admiralty based submarines in Australia to assist the ASW training 
requirements of the Australian Fleet, and when Australia implemented a submarine 
capability of its own, primarily due to dwindling British resources, British 
submarines were chosen. The RAN also accepted Admiralty support following the 
loss of the destroyer HMAS Voyager in 1964. The purchase of non-UK built or 
designed vessels by the RAN, in particular the Charles F. Adams class guided 
missile destroyers (DDGs) from the USA, will be covered in a subsequent chapter, 
                                                          
1
 Literature relevant to this broad topic includes Burrell, Mermaids Do Exist, especially pp. 
183-85, 245-48, 270-71, Donohue, From Empire Defence to the Long Haul, especially pp. 
27-33, 55-62, Horner, Defence Supremo, Frame, Pacific Partners, especially pp. 102-5, 
Goldrick, ‘Carriers For the Commonwealth’, pp. 220-30, Grove, Vanguard to Trident, pp. 
314-15, Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval Policy in the Korean War Era’, Grove, ‘Advice 
and Assistance to a Very Independent People at a Most Crucial Point’, Grey, ‘The Royal 
Australian Navy in the Era of Forward Defence, 1955-75’, Cooper, ‘1945-1954: The Korean 
War Era’, pp. 164-70, Cooper, ‘1955-1972: The Era of Forward Defence’, pp. 187-93, Jones, 
‘1972-1983: Towards Self-Reliance’, pp. 216-21, Stevens, A Critical Vulnerability, 
especially pp. 304-43, Wright, Australian Carrier Decisions, pp. 133-61, and Wilson, ‘The 
Eagle and the Albatross’, pp. 227-58. 
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however the purchase of such vessels will be addressed in this chapter when the topic 
provides a contrast to the UK-Australian naval procurement processes.  
 
The RAN relied on British resources to satisfy their naval requirements in 
varying degrees between 1945-75. In the immediate post-war period the reliance was 
almost total. The political implications of the increasing void between the United 
Kingdom and Australia, and the amplified sense of Australian independence, 
manifested themselves in a gradual weaning of the RAN from the Admiralty’s 
embrace. Allied to these trends was the growing readiness of the Australian naval 
establishment to seek equipment from non-Admiralty sources. By the early-1960s the 
RAN had sourced major naval vessels, from the United States, a process that would 
have been virtually unthinkable in the mid-1940s. This did not herald a complete 
switch to American ships as some envisaged, and the RAN continued to source 
British designed and/or built vessels and aircraft till the end of our period of concern 
and beyond. This was a measure of the continuing, albeit reduced strength, of the 
Anglo-Australian naval relationship. Related to the reduced reliance of the RAN on 
the Admiralty for its naval hardware requirements, was a growing willingness to gain 
vessels from a number of sources, itself a demonstration of increased Australian 
naval independence.   
 
 There were clear benefits for both Australia and Great Britain in widening the 
scope of the naval capability of the RAN to include naval air-power. The addition of 
a naval air-power capacity to the RAN was seen as an important part of Imperial 
defence, with strategic benefits to Great Britain as well as Australia. The close ties 
between the two services at the time meant that realistically any assistance given to 
the RAN would have to come from the Admiralty. The process of transferring the 
requisite vessels and aircraft was anything but simple, and the negotiations were long 
and drawn-out, with economic, political and technical issues affecting the overall 
transfer process.
2
 The Australian government was unwilling to pay more than was 
absolutely necessary for the carriers.
3
 The Admiralty made a number of concessions 
during the negotiations including putting pressure on the British Treasury to make 
                                                          
2
 The aircraft carrier procurement and transfer process has been extensively covered most 
notably in Wright, pp.133-61.  
3
 Ibid., pp. 143-45. 
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the purchase of the vessels as attractive as possible to the Australians. There was 
confusion about the technical capabilities of the proposed vessels, however Australia 
accepted the ships as being best suited to provide the backbone of the post-war fleet. 
After protest by the Royal Australian Air Force, the RAN was given the right to 
control the aircraft on the carriers, an outcome that suited the Admiralty as much as 
the RAN. The carrier negotiations should be viewed in the wider context of Anglo-
Australian relations in the immediate post-war period.  
  
 In the immediate post-war period Australian defence resources were viewed 
as an important part of Imperial defence. Following the examples set by the major 
naval forces during the Second World War on the efficacy of naval air-power, the 
Royal Australian Navy could only contribute to Imperial defence in the post-war 
period if the service possessed aircraft carriers. A navy without aircraft carriers 
would be significantly less able to execute certain missions than a navy that 
possessed such vessels. The lessons learned from the conflict included the fact that 
organic airpower, that is airpower that was part of the naval force it was tasked to 
protect and work with, as opposed to land-based air-cover, was much more efficient. 
This was due to a variety of reasons, perhaps most importantly that the naval force 
would have a much greater range of effectiveness as it did not have to rely unduly on 
land-based air-cover. This was particularly significant in the case of Australia, the 
largest island on the planet. As late as 1971 the necessity of naval aviation was 
stressed by one observer: ‘I think it will always remain a requirement in any navy, 
not only in my navy, but any navy of any consequence, for organic airpower of some 
sort…’4 It was viewed by the RAN that it was technically viable for the service to 
possess aircraft carriers, and this fact was politically acceptable to the Australian 
government. 
 
 As early as 1944 the Australian Defence Committee resolved that the RAN 
should have a balanced ‘Naval Task Force’ including aircraft carriers, the immediate 
                                                          
 
 
4
 Hill-Norton, Speeches and Lectures 1968-73, 73/135/2, Transcript of a Press Conference 
Given at the British High Commission, Canberra, 7
 
July 1971. 
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provision being for one carrier, with consideration given to a second vessel.
5
 The 
need for a balanced force was crucial as far as Admiral Sir Guy Royle, the wartime 
Australian Naval First Member was concerned.
6
 A balanced naval force, whether that 
force be an entire fleet, or a task force despatched from the fleet, was one that was 
expected to be capable of carrying out a number of tasks across the spectrum of naval 
operations, while possessing the requisite types of vessels to provide protection from 
a variety of potential threats, whether airborne, surface or sub-surface in nature. An 
example of a balanced fleet would be that proposed in Admiralty Memorandum 435 
‘The Composition of the Post War Navy’; 4 battleships, 4 fleet carriers, 10 light 
carriers, 32 cruisers, 64 destroyers, 60 escorts and 45 submarines.
7
 The Anzac 
contribution was expected to be 1 carrier, 3 cruisers, 8 destroyers and 8 escorts. This 
appeared to be a balanced force as the aircraft carrier would be expected to provide 
organic air-cover for the group, the cruisers would provide protection from surface 
vessels, as would the destroyers, who would assist in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
duties with the additional escorts. The carrier’s aircraft could also be utilised in 
harmony with the surface vessels in projecting power onto the land as and when 
required, as well as providing ASW aircraft to assist in the protection of the task-
force from submarines.
8
 An example of an unbalanced force would be if the 
aforementioned task-force, minus its organic air cover, entered an environment 
where enemy aircraft were expected, especially if this location was out of the range 
of land-based air protection, or if the carrier was sent into an environment without 
adequate support and escort vessels to protect it from attack from either surface or 
sub-surface vessels. The RAN did not possess aircraft carriers during the war and its 
vessels had had to rely on air-cover from allied forces. The addition of naval 
airpower was thought of as a crucial capability if the service was to play its part in 
Imperial defence as a modern naval force.  
 
                                                          
5
 Canberra, NAA, A2031, 269/1944, Aircraft Carriers in the Royal Australian Navy: 
Agendum Number, 18 August 1944. For a discussion on an earlier proposal for the transfer 
of a carrier to the RAN by the Admiralty see Goldrick, ‘Selections from the Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Captain James Bernard Foley, CBE, RAN (1896-1974)’, p. 520. 
6
 Wright, p. 69. 
7
 Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval Policy in the Korean War Era’, p. 248. 
8
 For the an example of the expected utilisation of the carriers see Eaton, Personal Papers 
1951-1970, GB99 KCLMA Eaton, Transcript of Lecture given to the Australian Joint Anti-
Submarine School at N.A.S. Nowra, Maritime Power and its General Application in War, 9 
March 1953. 
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The Australian War Cabinet rejected any wartime acquisition, deeming it 
‘prudent to defer any decision until the post-war position could be more accurately 
determined.’9 The Defence Committee’s report of 19th June 1945, in considering the 
‘nature and functions’ of the necessary post-war forces, recommended that defence 
co-operation with the United Kingdom and the United States was essential, and that 
Australia ought to participate fully in the putative World Organisation for Collective 
Security, by maintaining ‘highly mobile offensive Naval, Army and Air Forces...’10 
It was recommended that such forces include a balanced naval task force, 
incorporating aircraft carriers. The purpose of a balanced fleet was to contribute to 
Imperial defence. The fleet would of course be used for the defence of Australia, but 
this was tied into the defence of the empire as a whole, at least as far as the British 
were concerned: 
 
The basis of Imperial Defence is the control of sea communications. Without this 
 control, members of the British Commonwealth become disconnected units each one 
 too weak for defence against a first class power. With assured sea communications 
 the whole strength of the Empire can be brought to bear in any part of the world with 
 the greatest economy and effect.
11
  
 
At the end of the Second World War the Admiralty regarded the RAN as part 
of a single Imperial fleet.
12
 The Dominions were expected to shoulder some of the 
burden of Imperial defence:  
 
Every encouragement should be given to the Dominions to bear their share of 
Imperial defence. The numbers of ships and personnel contributed by them to the 
Empire Navy will affect the numbers which it is necessary for the United Kingdom 
                                                          
9
 Canberra, NAA, A2676, 4241, War Cabinet Minute No 4241-Transfer of Ships from the 
Royal Navy to the Royal Australian Navy, 6 June 1945; For the reasons behind the failure to 
loan carriers from the Royal Navy during the latter years of the Second World War see 
Goldrick, ‘Carriers For the Commonwealth’, especially pp. 220-30.  
10
 A2031, 234/1945, Nature and Functions of Post-War Defence Forces: Agenda Number - 
107/1945 and Supplementary 1, Appendix A, 19 June 1945.  
11
 ‘The Empire’s Post War Fleet’, Draft 28 April 1944, cited in Grove, ‘British and 
Australian Naval Policy in the Korean War Era’, p. 247. 
12
 Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval Policy in the Korean War Era’, p. 245. 
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to provide. The decision, however, as to what ships can and will be maintained by 
the Dominions must remain a matter for their own Governments.
13
  
 
Implicit in this statement is the fact that the more vessels and sailors provided by the 
RAN, the less would have to be provided by the Royal Navy. By the first half of 
1947, the term ‘Imperial Defence’ was no longer being used, however the idea of the 
security of Great Britain and the Commonwealth as being intertwined was still 
strong: ‘The British Commonwealth must…to the limit of her economic capacity, be 
strong and prepared at all times to contribute a share adequate to her world wide 
responsibilities as a first class power.’14   
 
 Britain’s principles of defence were specified as the ability to defend the 
resources on which the Commonwealth would draw on to prosecute a major war, 
until ‘with our allies we can develop an all out offensive’, and ‘the building of bases 
from which this offensive can be launched.’ It was reiterated that ‘The integrity of 
each member of the Commonwealth is the concern of all. Close co-operation on 
defence matters will greatly increase the strength of the Commonwealth as a 
whole.’15 The defence of each individual Commonwealth territory was considered 
crucial, but so were the sea communications linking them. It is no surprise that such 
emphasis was placed on the maintenance of sea communications when one takes into 
account the stranglehold placed on the United Kingdom by German U-boats during 
the Second World War.
16
 A naval aviation capability would greatly assist the RAN in 
meeting the perceived responsibilities the service had to perform in Imperial defence. 
Any resources that the RAN could provide to the defence of the empire would be 
resources that Great Britain, and more specifically the Royal Navy, would not have 
to provide.  When the resource in question was one that the RAN did not currently 
possess, such as a naval aviation capability, the Admiralty would have to assist in the 
implementation of the capability in the first place.  
                                                          
13
 ‘Composition of the Post War Navy’, cited in Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval Policy 
in the Korean War Era’, p. 248. 
14
 COS(47)5 in DEFE5/3, cited in Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval Policy in the Korean 
War Era’, p. 250. 
15
 COS(47)227 in DEFE5/4 cited in Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval Policy in the 
Korean War Era’, p. 252. 
16
 For an assessment of the perceived threat to Australia’s sea-communications in the 
immediate post-war period see Stevens, A Critical Vulnerability, especially pp. 287-318. 
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 The Australian government agreed on the necessity for carriers for the RAN. 
John Dedman, the Australian Minister of Defence, made a statement to parliament on 
the 4
th
 June 1947 on Australian Post-War Defence Policy.
17
 Dedman quoted Admiral 
Richmond, ‘the greatest modern writer on Imperial Strategy’, in justifying the 
increase of the RAN to two light fleet carriers, two cruisers, six destroyers, three 
frigates and thirteen support ships, with fifty vessels in reserve. Dedman noted that 
‘at no time in its history will Australia have made as great a peace-time contribution 
to British Commonwealth Defence and to the maintenance of peace and security at 
large than is contemplated in this programme.’18 One observer has noted that ‘This 
programme was of fundamental importance in setting the shape of postwar defence 
forces. The acquisition of naval aviation meant that the RAN would be able to play a 
principal role in naval cooperation with Australia’s allies.’19 The then Australian 
Chief of Naval Staff Louis Hamilton wrote to the British First Sea Lord in great 
spirits. Enclosing a copy of the statement made by Dedman, Hamilton was heartened 
as according to him ‘it is the first concrete evidence that the British Empire is not 
going to disintegrate as a world power…’ and ‘It means that Australia, for the first 
time in her history is going to take a real share in Imperial Defence on a planned 
basis’.20 Hamilton had long been a proponent of an Australian naval air capability: 
 
I feel my main job out here is to convince the Australian government of the necessity 
for a modern RAN including FAA and carriers, which can act as a self contained 
unit of the future Empire fleet.
21
 
 
It is telling that both Dedman and Hamilton made reference to Imperial defence as 
being the prime requisite for the increase in Australian naval capability, as opposed 
to the defence of Australia per se.     
 
                                                          
17
 ADM205/68, Letter from Hamilton to Cunningham, 17 June 1947. 
18
 ADM205/68, Post-War Defence Policy, Statement to Parliament by the Minister for 
Defence, 4 June 1947. 
19
 Horner, p. 254. 
20
 ADM205/68, Letter from Hamilton to Cunningham, 17 June 1947. 
21
 Cambridge, CCAC, Alexander, Private Papers, AVAR5/10/35, Letter from Hamilton to A. 
V. Alexander, 6 August 1945.   
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 Bearing in mind the historical and cultural ties still in place between the RAN 
and the Royal Navy, any assistance given to the RAN in implementing a naval air 
capability by another naval force would have to come from the Admiralty. If it was 
clear that the RAN should possess carriers, and it was equally clear that any 
assistance should be provided by the Admiralty, it was perhaps less clear about how 
the creation of an Australian Fleet Air Arm could best be implemented. What 
followed were varying degrees of co-operation on differing levels of governmental, 
military, and personal affairs in regards to the implementation of the Australian 
Naval Air Arm.  
 
The First Sea Lord was of the opinion that ‘the proposal of the Australian 
Government to establish a Naval Air Arm was a step of very great strategic 
significance which the United Kingdom government, in their own interest, should do 
everything possible to encourage.’22 A draft brief for the First Lord regarding the 
RAN carrier capability assists to emphasise some of the reasoning behind the stance 
of the Admiralty; ‘The fundamental principle on which the proposals in this paper 
are based, is that the Australian naval aviation plan should not be jeopardised.’23 The 
Australian government were to be pacified as much as possible, ‘…the issue is not 
[whether] Mr. Chifley’s state of mind is justified or not, but that this state of mind is 
a fact that may jeopardise the naval aviation plan’.24 Concessions were thought to be 
necessary however any financial concessions should be the minimum necessary, 
‘subject to the overriding proviso that the Australians must not reject it’.25 It was 
viewed that the Admiralty ‘must subsidise the start of Australian naval aviation, up 
to the point at which the Australian Government is thoroughly committed to it; once 
they are committed, it should be neither in accordance with UK nor with Australian 
policy for us to continue subsidies’.  
 
The Admiralty saw a special naval interest in addition to the political and 
strategic significance of the creation of an Australian Air Arm. Inter-service rivalry 
between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force was great, especially where the 
                                                          
 
22
 ADM205/69, Establishment of the Australian Naval Air Arm, 19 December 1947. 
23
 ADM205/69, Draft Brief for First Lord, D.O. (47) 95.  
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
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thorny issue of naval air-power was concerned. This also was the case concerning the 
Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force. During the Australian 
Defence Committee meeting of February 1946 the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice 
Marshal Jones, wanted clarification on a naval air arm independent of the RAAF 
before agreeing to support discussions with the Admiralty. During July and August 
of 1947 discussions took place in Defence Committee meetings over who was best 
suited to provide the carriers with the sea-going and land-based portions of the Air 
Component. This included aircraft, air ammunition and stores, flying and air 
maintenance personnel, training, relevant shore facilities and motor transport. This 
was a considerable amount of resource that both the RAN and RAAF were keen to 
provide. Captain E. W. Anstice,
26
 then on loan from the Royal Navy, and serving as 
Director, Naval Aviation Planning Staff, was part of the evaluation team tasked with 
reporting on the advantages and disadvantages of either RAN or RAAF control of the 
air complement. Hamilton wrote that the report was ‘masterly’ and brought ‘out all 
the overwhelming advantages’ of RAN control of these assets.27 After much 
discussion the Defence Council accepted that the status and control of the Naval 
Aviation Branch should be determined in accordance with the principles of the Naval 
Plan which entailed RAN control of the aircraft on the carriers. Chifley gave 
governmental approval to the recommendation
28
, and the Cabinet endorsed this 
decision on the 15
th
 August 1947.
29
 
 
The Admiralty were informed by Hamilton of conflict with the Chief of Air 
Staff regarding the issue of how best to utilise air power in the defence of Australia; 
‘[the Chief of Air Staff] launched out into a diatribe on the iniquities of two Air-
Forces, the duplication and extravagance of two-training set-ups, and that [the] Royal 
Australian Air Force would man the [aircraft on the] Carriers under Naval 
operational control’.30 As Wright pointed out, the arguments and counter-arguments 
                                                          
26
 Anstice was the 4
th
 Naval Member of the ACNB and Chief of the FAA, 1946-48. On 
return to the RN he served as FO Flying Training and 5
th
 Sea Lord, see Cooper, ‘The 
Development of an Independent Navy for Australia’, p. 528.  
27
 ADM205/68, Letter from Hamilton to Cunningham, 17 June 1947. 
28
 Canberra, NAA, A2700, 1347A, Shedden to Chifley, 3 July 1947 and Chifley’s 
endorsement thereon of the same date.  
29
 A2700, 1347A, Cabinet Agendum 1347A, 25 July 1947 and Secretary to Cabinet to 
Chifley 15 August 1947. 
30
 ADM205/68, Letter from Hamilton to Cunningham, 18 March 1947. 
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of the RAN and RAAF were really a reproduction of the conflict of opinion between 
the Admiralty and the Air Ministry in Britain between 1918 and 1937 over control of 
the Fleet Air Arm.
31
 It cannot have hurt the RAN’s cause to have officers such as 
Anstice and Hamilton, knowledgeable of past inter-service rivalry between the RN 
and the RAF, and able to use such knowledge to their advantage, fighting its corner. 
The First Sea Lord noted that he was ‘glad to learn that the RAN are to man their 
own Carriers’.32 As a close relation of the Royal Navy, the fact that the RAN were in 
control of their own aircraft gave political benefits to the parent service; ‘the 
allocation of responsibility and the provision of money for this service in Australia to 
the Navy, and not to the Air Force, represents a very satisfactory decision in a 
controversy that has occurred in the past in this country and may yet be revived’.33 
   
 After much support from the Admiralty, the RAN had been given the 
wherewithal by the Australian government to implement an aircraft carrier 
capability. In addition the RAN had been given the political support to take control 
of the air component of the carrier force against the wishes of the RAAF, again with 
the support of British Naval officers. In many respects it suited Britain to enable 
Australia to contribute as much as possible to Imperial defence, and one important 
way to do so, was by building a naval aviation capability for the RAN. As Grove 
pointed out, in August 1946 there was barely 122 aircraft in Britain’s recently named 
‘Naval Aviation’.34 Any increase in RAN capability meant that the Royal Navy 
could, as part of an Imperial force, do more with less. An additional benefit to the 
Royal Navy was the fact that manpower was an issue in the immediate post-war 
period and the navy did not have enough men to man the vessels available.
35
 These 
vessels included CVLs either in reserve or undergoing construction. Transferring 
carriers to the RAN made sense as this would lessen the manpower shortages felt by 
the RN, although this was somewhat negated by the fact that the carriers would have 
a reasonably heavy contingent of Royal Navy personnel, at least until those billets 
could be filled with trained Australian sailors.     
 
                                                          
31
 Wright, p. 148. 
32
 ADM205/68, Letter from Cunningham to Hamilton, 16 July 1947. 
33
 ADM205/69, Draft Brief for First Lord D.O. (47) 95. 
34
 Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval Policy in the Korean War Era’, p. 249. 
35
 See Goldrick, ‘Carriers For the Commonwealth’, p. 232. 
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 The evidence hardly supports Wilson’s assertion that the acquisition of a light 
fleet carrier was in the interest of the United Kingdom and the Royal Navy, and not 
that of the RAN or Australia. He claimed that this was primarily due to the 
‘considerable socio/economic importance to shipbuilding areas in which the carriers 
were constructed’.36 This may have been true, and is somewhat supported by 
Hamilton’s assertion that saw his main job as ‘selling a FAA and carriers to this 
Labour Government…’37 Even so the expected advantages associated with post-war 
shipbuilding was not thought to be a one-way street. Hamilton’s predecessor, Royal 
Navy Admiral Sir Guy Royle, pointed out that:  
 
Australia was now capable of building ships up to the size of Battle class destroyers 
and it may well be that if an agreed Imperial defence policy can be arrived at, we 
could come to an arrangement whereby they built destroyers for us and in return we 
built cruisers etc. for them. This policy might go further and Australia might 
undertake production of certain types of war material for use in British ships.
38
 
 
In addition, the creation of a naval aviation capability, controlled by the RAN, to the 
Australian defence repertoire was desired by not only those in Australian defence 
circles with a vested interest such as the RAN, but the Army as well.
39
 There were 
dissenters such as the RAAF but inter-service rivalry, especially when one considers 
the implementation of naval air power, was not unheard of. The Admiralty certainly 
did all in their power to further the cause of Australian naval aviation. A cynic may 
say that this was to reduce weight from the groaning level of British defence 
resources, but one must remember the ‘special relationship’ between the RAN and 
the RN worked both ways.  Following the Second World War it was evident to many 
that any modern naval force ‘worth its salt’, especially one such as the RAN, 
expected to, and expecting to, contribute to a high level of Imperial defence, needed 
to possess aircraft carriers. It was also evident that in the immediate post-war period, 
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the RAN required the support of ‘great and powerful friends’, in this case the 
Admiralty.  
 
 The carrier HMAS Sydney, formerly HMS Terrible, was accepted by the 
RAN in 1949. Her sister ship HMAS Melbourne, ex-HMS Majestic, was not 
commissioned until 1955, due to the necessity for an angled flight deck, mirror deck-
landing system and steam catapult. The Admiralty provided the carrier HMS 
Vengeance on loan from 1953 to 1955 to satisfy the RAN’s requirements for a two-
carrier navy.
40
 The First Naval Member at the time wrote ‘From the Prime Minister 
down we are all most grateful to the Admiralty and the United Kingdom for her.’41 
The carrier’s first Australian commander also viewed the loan as a generous act on 
the part of the Admiralty.
42
 Sydney served with distinction in the Korean War, while 
Melbourne remained a key part of the fleet throughout our period of interest, only 
being decommissioned in 1982. One former Chief of the Naval Staff remarked that 
Melbourne served ‘an invaluable and memorable career’ and ‘her presence added 
prestige and credibility to Australia’s position in SE Asia and Pacific areas during 
her 27 years service’.43 Cooper suggested that ‘perhaps the most interesting feature 
of the RAN’s entire campaign for the adoption of carriers is that at no time in the 
whole process was any consideration given to acquiring the carriers, aircraft, or 
aviation experience from any source other than the Royal Navy.’44 This was true, and 
was a sign of the close inter-service ties between the RN and the RAN in the 
immediate post-war period. 
 
 As well as the extensive exchange of personnel between the Royal Navy and 
the RAN, exchange of ships was thought of as advantageous by both services. 
Agreement in principle was expressed for the exchange of military units by political 
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figures in both the United Kingdom and Australia in late 1949.
45
 The Admiralty were 
very supportive of the idea and proposed that the exchange should be between fully 
operational units of the RAN and the Mediterranean Fleet, on the basis of one cruiser 
or carrier, or of two destroyers or frigates, to be put into effect some time in 1951.
46
 
In response the Australian Naval Board cited manning difficulties as reason why 
such an exchange of units could not take place, ‘although the desirability of doing so 
is fully appreciated and will be kept constantly in mind.’47 The RAN later suggested 
that ‘this interchange should now be seriously considered. Nothing but good could 
come of the exchange…’ and it was proposed to the Admiralty that two Battle class 
destroyers be allocated for exchange from January 1956 to August of the same 
year.
48
 The Admiralty response was that the refit requirements of the Royal Navy 
precluded an exchange of vessels in the months suggested and a deferment of six 
months was suggested.
49
 The RAN could not agree as the absence of any RAN units 
from the Strategic Reserve, would not be ‘politically acceptable’.50  
 
 In early 1956 it was proposed that one Battle class destroyer be exchanged 
with a unit of the Royal Navy for six months commencing in February 1957.
51
 
Subsequently it was suggested that either or both Battle class destroyers could be 
made available from February 1957, either or both HMAS Voyager and HMAS 
Quiberon could be made available in the latter half of the same year and, dependant 
on meeting her Strategic Reserve commitments, the carrier Melbourne might also be 
made available in 1957.
52
 This was a substantial portion of a strained Australian 
Fleet. Before these proposals could be forwarded to the Admiralty for consideration, 
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the Flag Officer Commanding HMA Fleet insisted on modifications to the proposals 
due to the Fleet’s considerable extraneous commitments.53 As such the proposed 
units available for exchange were revised to two Q-class frigates.
54
 Subsequently the 
First Naval Member instructed that no further action concerning possible exchange 
with the Royal Navy should be taken, although the matter should be raised again 
towards the end of the year.
55
 The exchange of units was considered on later 
occasions however the issue was problematic for the RAN due to the shortage of 
ships, men and money,
56
 an outcome that was viewed by the Admiralty as 
disappointing.
57
  
 
 There were perceived benefits to the RAN associated with the exchange of 
ships with the Royal Navy in the morale, recruitment and re-engagement of its 
sailors. Even so this benefit was reduced somewhat due to Australian ships in service 
with the Strategic Reserve and taking part in multinational exercises in the SEATO 
area.
58
 Another perceived drawback was the political implications connected with an 
Australian warship serving with the Mediterranean Fleet ‘if the present tension over 
the Suez Canal is prolonged’.59 The exchange or loan of ships was viewed by the 
Admiralty as an important aspect of co-operation between the navies of the 
Commonwealth.
60
 Yet both the RAN and the Royal Navy was prevented from 
implementing the exchange process due to constraints on the resources of both 
services.  
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 The question of standardisation of Australian military equipment is pertinent 
to the level of RAN-Royal Navy co-operation in matters of naval hardware and 
vessels. In late 1947 the United Kingdom took part in discussions with the United 
States and Canada on standardisation of equipment, and it was viewed that this may 
have had an impact on ‘the future training and equipment of [Australian] forces, in 
that they have been closely modelled on, and to a greater or lesser extent integrated 
with ours in the past’.61 The Australian Prime Minister was assured by the British 
Prime Minister that ‘There is nothing in our plans that would change or harm this.’ 
The Admiralty later considered measures to be taken to encourage the 
standardisation of doctrine, tactics and equipment between the Royal Navy and other 
Commonwealth Navies.
62
 It was proposed to make available to the RAN, as well as 
the Royal New Zealand Navy and the South African Navy, information on the most 
modern equipment then in use with the Royal Navy to enable either the purchase of 
equipment from UK production or the production of similar or interchangeable 
equipment from Commonwealth resources. The Australian Commonwealth Naval 
Board accepted the proposals and recommended adding a specialist executive officer 
to the Naval Liaison Staff to assist in duties associated with standardisation issues.
63
 
At this time there was already a very high level of RAN standardisation with the 
Admiralty; as the Director of Naval and Air Stores pointed out ‘it has always been 
the policy of the RAN to adopt Admiralty patterns and specifications for all types of 
stores and equipment so that units of the RAN could operate with sister ships of the 
RN and avail themselves of the storing facilities of RN bases or supply ships’.64  
 
 On the 4
th
 April 1957 the Australian Prime Minister announced that 
Australian weapons would be standardised as much as possible
 
with American 
patterns.
65
 This was because Great Britain would find it difficult to maintain a supply 
line to South-East Asia in a global conflict, a war in which it was assumed that 
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Australian forces would be fighting alongside those of the USA.
66
 Tellingly, while 
the RAAF would rearm with fighter and transport aircraft of a performance 
equivalent to those already in service with the United States Air Force, and the 
Australian Army would be equipped with small arms and artillery on American lines, 
no major changes were proposed for the Navy.     
 
 A United States Technical Mission visited Australia at the end of 1957 and 
recommended to the US Department of Defense that ‘the United States and Australia 
pursue a policy of progressive standardization of military equipment’. One of 
Australia’s reservations was that while standardisation of equipment should be the 
ultimate goal, compatibility of equipment should be emphasised as an immediate and 
acceptable substitute. A particular concern of the RAN was the continuing need to be 
able to work closely with the Royal Navy however the Deputy Chief of the Naval 
Staff stated the proposed agreement ought not to be read to preclude that.
67
 Indeed, 
the report from the Technical Mission indicated that the United States ‘was looking 
to the Australian Navy for anti-submarine capabilities and for operational 
compatibility with United States forces with their present basic armament rather than 
for complete standardization.’68 The RAN agreed with this approach. A draft 
Agreement was subsequently prepared by the US Department of Defense stating that 
the ‘Proposals…of Australian military equipment on United States models should be 
considered favourably’, however standardization matters would proceed on a 
service-to-service level.
69
 Following revisions of the draft, the Defence Committee, 
including the Chief of the Naval Staff, supported the Agreement.
70
 It was suggested 
that there were many advantages in having an understanding with the US, and the 
revised version ‘does not require us to do anything unless we so agree’.71 Athol 
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Townley, the Australian Minister of Defence signed the Agreement on the 21
st
 
September 1960. Although some feared that the United Kingdom would feel that the 
new agreement would exclude them from equipment orders in due course, it was 
stressed that Australia did not consider that to be the case; compatibility was the 
important objective, and not a formal goal of standardisation.
72
 Thus the RAN was 
free to purchase Admiralty hardware as and when they saw fit.    
 
 There were clear political benefits for Australia in formalising equipment 
standardisation with the United States; as one observer stated ‘This could be viewed 
as a real commitment by the US to Australian defence and in this sense a culmination 
of searching diplomatic policy since the war.’73 In formalising such agreements 
however there was no political pressure to force the RAN towards only purchasing 
from the USA. The Minister of Defence stated that policy of standardisation with the 
US did not mean that ‘where we have to buy from overseas we automatically buy 
from the United States.
74
 He used the RAN’s example of purchasing the bulk of its 
equipment from Great Britain as a case in point. Australia in general, but the RAN in 
particular, continued to co-operate with Great Britain in matters of equipment 
procurement after the agreements were reached with the United States. Indeed it was 
hoped that a successful standardisation agreement between Australia and the US may 
lead to freer negotiations between the UK and Australia.
75
  
 
 Standardisation did not greatly affect the level of arms purchased by the RAN 
from Admiralty sources. Even in the late 1960s it was deemed preferable that in 
provisioning overseas the fundamental premise should be to assure supply, account 
being taken to the basic policy of compatibility of US equipment, together with 
performance and cost factors; ‘In this context compatibility does not carry the 
implication that the US must be thought of as the primary source of supply.’76 It was 
considered by the Defence Committee that too much emphasis was placed on 
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reliance with the US, and that ‘the United Kingdom, although gradually re-
orientating militarily and economically towards Europe, will still remain a major 
customer of Australia’.77 The standardisation process illustrated the strong ties 
between the RAN and the Royal Navy. While willing to accept the concept of 
standardisation, the RAN also stressed that the service did not wish its dealings with 
the Royal Navy to be unduly affected.    
 
 The Admiralty provided much assistance with the Anti Submarine Warfare 
requirements of the RAN. The lack of submarine availability to enable ASW training 
was felt deeply by the RAN in the immediate post-war period, especially when ‘our 
only potential enemy [the USSR] is in possession of a powerful submarine fleet, a 
substantial part of which is based on the Far-East’.78 Following an Australian request 
for assistance in anti-submarine training for the fleet, it was agreed in mid-1949 that 
two British submarines would be based in Sydney to meet the training needs of the 
RAN and the Royal New Zealand Navy.
79
 The advantages of ‘this very generous 
Admiralty offer’ were ‘numerous and obvious’, namely that the urgent need for 
ASW training would be met at comparatively low cost to Australia.
80
 Following 
combined exercises with the Fourth Submarine Division the Australian First Naval 
Member wrote that ‘the RN submarines are worth a guinea a box.’81 Appreciation of 
the British submarines was relayed continually to the Admiralty.
82
 
 
 The Admiralty underwent strains in supporting its overseas-based vessels. In 
1959 the Admiralty felt that the Royal Navy was not in a position to substitute 
nuclear for conventional submarines due to the necessity to provide 36 operational 
vessels in training the Royal Navy and to meet its obligations, ‘specific or moral’, to 
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assist in the training of Commonwealth Navies.
83
 It was felt that more would have to 
be done to induce the wealthier Commonwealth countries with well-developed 
navies to provide more self-help in anti-submarine training. It was assessed that the 
Royal Canadian Navy in particular should embark on a submarine service of its own 
‘a good deal sooner than it apparently intended to do.’ No mention of the RAN was 
made during the same discussions. It was the view of the Commander-in-Chief Far-
East Station in late 1955 that any suggestion of the RAN opening up a submarine 
squadron was put ‘out of court’ by the state of the Australian economy.84 As such it 
was considered ‘politically impossible’ for the RAN to take up submarines. Even so 
a level of pressure was placed on Australia to implement its own submarine service. 
On the 27
th 
March 1962 the Australian Minister for the Navy, Senator John Gorton, 
admonished Rear Admiral Mckenzie, flag officer commanding the RN submarine 
fleet, for comments attributed to him, urging the RAN to implement its own 
conventional submarine force lest the RAN become outmoded.
85
 Refuting the 
implication that pressure was being placed on Australia by Great Britain, Gorton was 
reported as saying ‘If and when the time comes that we can afford a submarine 
service of our own and decide that it is of higher priority than something else, we 
shall make up our own mind as to when we shall buy and from whom we shall 
buy.’86   
   
 The implementation of an Australian submarine service was problematic 
however. In late 1959 the Australian Cabinet considered ‘Australia could face a 
situation where it could be called upon to defend for a limited time independently of 
allies. As such the military should be developed to be self-supporting to some degree, 
however a decision concerning the introduction of a submarine service was to be 
deferred’.87 The Chief of the Naval Staff believed that a reasonable case had been 
presented for the introduction of a submarine service, particularly if, as appeared 
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likely the Fleet Air Arm was to be discontinued.
88
 Submarines were thought of as 
necessary due to the growth of Chinese, Soviet and Indonesian seapower.
89
 In 
addition it was assessed that ‘within the foreseeable future the Royal Navy would be 
unable to provide modern submarines for this [training] duty…unless modern 
submarines are provided, the training of Australian anti-submarine forces will 
become unrealistic’.90  
 
 The Minister for Defence, Athol Townley, appeared to have a negative view 
of the value of submarines to Australia, having been on record as stating ‘Australia 
will have to be pretty careful before it goes into the submarine arm again and will 
have to take every precaution and examine the position very thoroughly, because 
three times this country has become involved in submarines and three times it has 
been pleased to get out of this arm of the Navy.’91 Even so, the inability of the 
Admiralty to provide the vessels ad infinitum meant the Australian government were 
forced to make alternative arrangements. The three-year defence plan of late 1962 
did not mention the creation of an Australian submarine capability, although the 
government was seriously considering such an act, while not yet having decided on 
the British Oberon class, or re-commissioned submarines of an older United States 
class.
92
 The former were chosen and the RAN placed a £6 ½ million order for two 
Oberon Class submarines in late 1963.
93
 The first vessel was expected to be 
completed by December 1966, and the second by October 1967. A further two 
submarines were ordered in mid-1964.
94
 The last of the initial four Oberon class 
submarines, HMAS Onslow, was commissioned in late December 1969 in 
Greenock.
95
 Two additional submarines were ordered and commissioned as vessels 
of the RAN; HMAS Orion on 15
th
 June 1977 and HMAS Otama on 27
th
 April 1978. 
The RAN viewed the vessels as particularly valuable:  
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 Against countries such as Indonesia which are obliged to make use of sea 
 communications in support of distant or external operations, the submarine is a 
 potential threat with considerable deterrent threat. This is likely to have still greater 
 emphasis when the country concerned is also heavily dependant on sea 
 communications to sustain its own economy.
96
   
 
The basing of British submarines in Australia suited both the RAN and the 
Admiralty:  
 
 The Royal Navy…makes an important contribution to Commonwealth naval 
 development in the submarine field. The Fourth Submarine Division operates under 
 the control of the Royal Australian Navy...In addition Royal Navy submarines make 
 long passages to take part in joint anti-submarine exercises with Commonwealth 
 Navies. This service is vitally important to the fighting efficiency of Commonwealth 
 Navies and constitutes a direct link with them.
97
 
 
The British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Denis 
Greenhill, viewed the proposal to have a Royal Navy submarine presence east of 
Suez, in collaboration with the RAN, as a useful addition to bilateral defence links.
98
 
The main threat to sea communications was viewed by the First Sea Lord as from 
Russian submarines and raiders.
99
 As the primary role of the RAN was viewed as the 
defence of the sea lanes in the AMZAM area, any assistance the Admiralty could 
provide to the RAN in anti-submarine operations was considered very worthwhile. 
The Admiralty were relieved of a substantial part of the operating costs of the 
Division, as well as the freedom to withdraw the boats without notice in a genuine 
emergency. Australian Naval Chiefs repeatedly passed on their appreciation to the 
Admiralty for the vessels,
100
 as the submarines were essential for ASW training.
101
 In 
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early 1956, the Australian First Naval Member Vice Admiral Dowling, made plain 
his view on the importance of submarines: ‘I believe the submerged vessel is by far 
the most important vessel of the future.’102 The threat of Russian submarines, with 
the future potential to carry ballistic missiles, was made plain to Australian 
authorities.
103
 Britain was unable to provide the capability forever, as the advent of 
nuclear powered vessels meant fewer conventional powered submarines in the Fleet. 
The Fourth Submarine Division was disbanded on the 18
th
 August 1967 when the 
RAN was in a position to provide a submarine capability of its own, with British 
built vessels. Admiralty assistance did not end there as a number of RN officers and 
senior sailors transferred to the Australian submarines, and UK-based training for 
Australian submariners continued, in the case of simulated escape training, until 
1988. The assistance given by the Admiralty in the implementation of the RAN 
Fourth Submarine Squadron was substantial.        
 
 Following the collision between the Australian ships HMAS Melbourne and 
HMAS Voyager, and the resultant loss of Voyager it was suggested by the British 
Defence Liaison Staff (BDLS) in Canberra that the prompt offer of the loan of a 
replacement escort vessel would be appreciated.
104
 During subsequent discussions in 
the Admiralty it was decided that the best vessel to be offered as a replacement was 
either HMS Duchess or HMS Defender.
105
 As the latter was just completing a long 
re-fit, Duchess was viewed as the best alternative so as to ‘avoid the danger of 
criticism of over-generosity’. The Admiralty were extremely pro-active in these 
discussions at this time, as there were no indications from the RAN itself that such a 
loan would be welcome.
106
 If the chancellor approved this loan, the First Sea Lord 
would be expected to make the initial approach to the RAN on an unofficial basis. 
The BDLS put the offer to the RAN for the loan vessel, intimating that while there 
would be no cost for the ship, the RAN would be responsible for running costs, 
stores and any necessary refits.
107
 The Australian Chief of the Naval Staff informed 
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the Admiralty that he was most appreciative of the offer and asked for details of the 
two alternative ships and their pros and cons.
108
  
 
 The Admiralty furnished the details of Duchess and Defender with a fair 
warning that the former would require a refit in June.
109
 The RAN were advised that 
questions would be asked in the British parliament about what offers had been given 
to the Australian government about a replacement for Voyager.
110
 It was thought that 
these questions may have embarrassed the RAN as a firm offer had not been 
furnished by the British. The RAN thanked the Admiralty for the warning and 
assured them no embarrassment would be suffered.
111
 Later that morning the BDLS 
reported to the Admiralty that the Australian CNS had informed him that he hoped 
for Duchess for four years, followed by 2 new Type 12 vessels. Failing approval for 
the latter, then Duchess would be required until the end of her useful life.
112
  
 
 The Australian cabinet met to consider possible ways to replace the lost 
warship; these included a firm offer from the United States and a provisional offer 
from the British.
113
 On learning that the United States had made a firm offer for a 
replacement ship, the British High Commissioner was most anxious that the initiative 
was not lost and suggested that Britain should make an offer immediately. The 
Admiralty soon reported to the BDLS that the British Government was willing to 
offer the loan of a Daring class ship to replace Voyager.
114
 The British were rightly 
concerned about being trumped by the Americans; in an Australian cabinet meeting 
on the same day, the cabinet expressed particular interest in the United States offer 
and directed that an immediate evaluation be made by the RAN.
115
 The 
Commonwealth Relations Office soon confirmed that, following discussions between 
the Admiralty and the RAN, the loan of Duchess was available to Australia ‘for as 
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long as they need her without charge’.116 The Australian Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies was thankful for the offer and promised to let the British ‘have our answer 
as soon as possible’.117 A few days later the Australian Cabinet accepted the RAN’s 
recommendation that the British offer be accepted.
118
  
 
 While appreciative of the British and American offers of assistance, naval 
studies showed that the Daring class vessel was in all respects more compatible to 
the RAN than the US offer of a Fletcher class destroyer, due to logistic, manpower 
and financial aspects. Significantly, it was viewed that the requirement to man 
another USN ship, concurrently with HMAS Perth, the first of the three US-built 
DDGs, would introduce serious manning and drafting problems to the RAN.
119
 The 
RAN later wanted two improved British-designed Leander class frigates as long-
term replacements for Voyager.
120
 These vessels would be in addition to the existing 
British-designed Type 12 frigates, Parramatta, Stuart, and Yarra and the Derwent, 
then still under construction. HMA Ships, modified River class frigates Swan and 
Torrens were later constructed as ostensible permanent replacements for Voyager.  
Duchess was commissioned as a RAN vessel on the 8
th
 May 1964, and was 
purchased outright by the Australian Government in 1972 for the cost of £150,000 
sterling. The vessel was not paid off from service until late 1977.       
 
 A number of aspects of the loan of a British vessel to replace the loss of 
HMAS Voyager are important in the overall scheme of Anglo-Australian relations. 
The British government were obviously keen to use the loan of the vessel to keep 
national ties between themselves and Australia strong, and there were valid fears that 
the US would beat them to the punch in assisting the RAN. The fact that the 
Admiralty were extremely proactive in the respect of aiding the RAN after the 
Melbourne-Voyager collision greatly assisted the political aim of providing 
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assistance to the Australians. This high level of pro-activity lessened the strain felt by 
the RAN in meeting its Far East Strategic Reserve and SEATO commitments. 
Although there was some political bias towards the American offer on the part of the 
Australian cabinet, the British offer had clear advantages from a naval point of view. 
The fact that the initial British approach was made through the naval network meant 
that the Australian CNS was free from political pressure as to whether or not the 
British offer was accepted. The loan process took place at a time where the RAN had 
already broken with tradition by purchasing American-built ships; even so, there 
were clear benefits for the RAN in accepting Duchess as the replacement for 
Voyager. This shows a level of pragmatism on the part of the RAN. If US-built 
vessels such as the Charles F. Adams class destroyers were found to best suit the 
needs of the service, so be it. This did not mean, however, a complete switch from 
British designed or built equipment.  
 
 The Australian Light Destroyer (DDL) Project followed the RAN experience 
during the confrontation with Indonesia and the apparent need for a lighter type of 
surface ship suitable for confrontation-style operations. A design contract worth 
£100,000 was let with Yarrow/Vospers for a joint RN/RAN frigate, with the vessel 
being conceived as a cheap frigate of smaller displacement and complement than 
designs built to normal RN standards, but close to a projected requirement for the 
RAN.
121
 The Admiralty realised that the concept of the ship could be inflated under 
pressure from the Australians, with the end result differing from RN requirements. 
The proposed Australian time-scales slipped due to financial issues, and there were 
publicity issues surrounding the project due to a strong lobby in Australia for the 
vessels to be built in Australian yards: ‘Any publicity for the concept of a joint 
project had therefore to be handled carefully at this stage’.122 Even so, the Admiralty 
were assured that all steps had been taken on a ‘Navy to Navy basis’ to show the 
Australians that their association with the project was welcomed.
123
 The project was 
renamed the Type 21 frigate,
124
 and although the design was partially funded by the 
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RAN, with the intention to purchase a number of vessels, no ships of this class were 
built or procured by the RAN. An amount of design-creep as well as a change of 
government in Australia in late 1972 meant the DDL did not come to fruition, 
however British involvement in the project, especially in its early phases, was great.   
 
 At one stage the British Type 42 Destroyer was thought of as the overseas 
vessel that most closely met the DDL requirements but ‘following that design in toto 
would introduce serious logistic and personnel problems’.125 There was also a 
necessity for the vessels to be distinctively ‘Australian’, not biased unduly by anyone 
else's design and with as much equipment as possible produced in Australia.
126
 Co-
operation with the British was thought of as preferable to dealing with America; ‘So 
far as any design of US origin is concerned, the nature of American standards and 
practices is such that almost complete rework of the design would be necessary’, and 
‘Australian and UK standards and practices are similar and in the case of a UK 
design, rework of drawings for this reason would not be necessary.’127 
 
 The fact that the RAN were willing to co-operate with the Royal Navy in the 
design of the proposed ships, following the earlier procurement of US-built surface 
combatants is a salient point, and again illustrates a level of pragmatism on the part 
of the Australian service. Off-the-shelf vessels did not meet Australian requirements 
so a new design would be necessary. The Admiralty were the preferred partner for 
this process, at least in the initial stages, but for a number of reasons the project did 
not come to fruition. The necessity for a replacement destroyer remained and, 
between September 1973 and March 1974, studies were carried out on various ship 
types from a number of countries including the UK, USA and the Netherlands. In 
April 1974, the government announced that it proposed to purchase two Oliver 
Hazard Perry class frigates (FFGs) from the United States. The first of these vessels, 
HMAS Adelaide was commissioned on 15
th
 November 1980. The FFG-7 had earlier 
been assessed as a ‘second rate escort that falls short of the DDL requirements on 
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virtually every respect’128 but the practicalities of fitting the American SM-1 missile 
system in the British Type 42 vessel was a bridge too far for the beleaguered project.   
 
 The largely Australian designed Ikara ASW missile system was an example 
where the Admiralty had the benefit of Australian naval expertise. In 1962 it was 
reported that a British working party had examined and taken a favourable view of 
the prospects of Ikara. The system was perceived as necessary as the Wasp helicopter 
had always been regarded as an interim system pending the advent of a satisfactory 
Anti-Submarine (A/S) weapon.
129
 In view of the Royal Navy’s urgent need for more 
satisfactory means of dealing with attacks by nuclear submarines, the Minister of 
Defence was informed in July 1963 of proposals already endorsed by the Defence 
Research Policy Committee to undertake a Project Study of a Royal Navy version of 
the Ikara system.
130
 This resulted in the decision of the Royal Navy to purchase a 
modified version of Ikara.
131
 The Australian Cabinet approved the decision for 
Australia to undertake the research and development programme to modify Ikara to 
meet British requirements in August 1964.
132
 British designed sections of the system 
included the launching and handling system, system state and command panel, 
weapon setting panel and associated switch and fuse panels.
133
 The Admiralty 
required that Ikara be placed in service as soon as possible, so much so that the 
additional cost of £600,000 to upgrade the first five Leander class vessels on long 
refit would have to be found from existing production resources.
134
 
 
 Design co-operation between Australia and Great Britain continued into the 
1970s. In February 1971 a British delegation visited Australia with the object of 
reviewing the general field of underwater warfare research and development between 
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the two countries and of focussing attention upon those areas where collaborative 
support would be of mutual benefit.
135
 A Royal Navy Ikara policy mission visit to 
Australia took place in mid-1971 to investigate the possible use of the US MK46 
torpedo in the British variant of the system.
136
 It was reported that it was ‘a pleasure 
to record the total co-operation shown by members of Department of Supply and 
Department of the Navy in responding to the detailed technical enquiries of the UK 
mission.’137  
 
 Many of the engineering defects in the RAN variant of Ikara were corrected 
following the engineering processes associated with the British derivative of the 
same system.
138
 This was an added benefit for the RAN, over and above the more 
obvious financial gains associated with overseas sales of the system. Additional 
advantages to Australia in allowing Ikara to be modified for RN purposes included 
future access, if required, to a variant capable of carrying alternative payloads and of 
operating in European conditions, and integrated with Royal Navy technical 
equipment.
139
 
 
 There were political implications associated with the continued reliance by 
the RAN on the Admiralty. It was viewed that in global war, the RAN would 
probably operate under direct US command, and it was not expected that the USN 
fleet train would carry spares and ammunition suitable only for Australian ships.
140
 
The experience of British designed vessels serving in the Vietnam conflict with the 
RAN showed this fear to be largely unfounded, however the apprehension did exist. 
The strategic shift of Australia from the United Kingdom towards the USA was 
somewhat mirrored by the gradual movement of the RAN away from the Admiralty, 
especially as far as the procurement of hardware was concerned. Even so, there was 
no complete transfer from one powerful friend, the Admiralty, to another, the USN. 
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Following difficulties with the Australian construction of Daring class ships, a 
request was made to the Admiralty to transfer two vessels to the RAN. This could 
not be met due to shortages in the British Fleet, but there were fears that the RAN 
would source vessels from the United States if assistance was not forthcoming from 
the Admiralty.
141
 The Australian First Naval Member John Collins had previously 
hinted that he might turn to the USN for assistance.
142
 The First Sea Lord was very 
concerned about this possibility and wrote:  
 
…we would much prefer that the RAN stuck to British built or British type ships. 
The reasons are many-standardisation of equipment, and subsequent logistic 
problems, training problems, and last but not least, tradition and sentiment. What is 
also important is that the US ships are a great deal more expensive than ours. Once a 
move towards the US has been started, I feel it might be difficult to resist further 
diversions.
143
  
 
The initial idea may have been bluff as Collins later stated he had abandoned the idea 
and would concentrate on getting the Australian vessels completed.
144
 The actual 
procurement of American vessels by the RAN will be covered in more detail in a 
latter chapter, but the fear of such a process taking place was very real. During a visit 
to Australia in 1955, the Commander-in-Chief Far-East Station was given a brief to 
persuade the Australians from switching to American equipment.
145
 Certainly Vice 
Admiral Dowling, Australian First Naval Member, felt much angst over the possible 
purchase of American vessels. He recognised the advantages of the RAN continuing 
with the process whereby they ‘deliberately and consistently worked on the principle 
of complete interchangeability with the RN in all respects’ but due to doubts about 
whether the ‘UK can provide us with what we want in the future’ the RAN found 
themselves ‘at the Crossroads’.146 This was not so clear-cut. In announcing the 
purchase of American vessels the Minister of Defence, Athol Townley, also 
announced a decision to purchase British helicopters for HMAS Melbourne as well 
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as the British Seacat surface-to-air missile system for other fleet units.
147
 Even after 
the purchase of American ships the RAN continued to source vessels and aircraft 
from British sources. The gradual trend away from the Admiralty as a single source 
is evident in Table 7. If this information was expanded to include ships of the late 
1970s and early 1980s more American vessels such as the Oliver Hazard Perry 
frigates would be in evidence. If the timeline was expanded even further into the 
1990s, and new millennium, Collins class Submarines based on a Swedish design, 
Anzac class frigates derived from the German Meko 200 class, and the Hobart class 
air-warfare destroyers, based on a Spanish vessel would be added to the mix. In 
addition the RAN planned to purchase the British aircraft carrier HMS Invincible in 
1982 only for the British government to withdraw its offer to sell the vessel 
following the Falklands conflict. Thus a growing ability of the RAN to source non-
Admiralty items did not mean a self-imposed embargo in doing so if British 
equipment was seen as fit for purpose.    
 
 Issue should be taken with Tom Frame’s assertion that, ‘It was one thing for 
the RAN to hanker after the Royal Navy for support and guidance. Britain’s 
continuing ability and willingness to respond was quite another. The power of the 
Royal Navy had declined significantly by the mid-1960s.’148 The power of the Royal 
Navy had declined significantly but that did not mean the Admiralty was unable or 
unwilling to offer assistance to the RAN. In mitigation Frame conceded that, 
following the loss of HMAS Voyager on 10
th
 February 1964, ‘…there seems to have 
been almost immediate consideration in Whitehall as to how Britain might assist the 
RAN…’ 149 Frame correctly stated that the purchase of US vessels ‘did not signal the 
start of the Americanisation of the RAN in material terms’.150 The RAN continued to 
purchase ships of British origin if they were viewed as the best option, and the 
purchase of US-built ships did not mean abandonment of Admiralty hardware.   
 
 There were occasional issues with inadequacy of the supply of British 
equipment, and in these circumstances, the RAN did occasionally depart from UK 
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standards.
151
 Although it was sometimes stated by the RAN that information from the 
Admiralty was not as readily available as they would have liked, there were formal 
agreements in place to ensure Admiralty developments were relayed to the RAN.
152
 
These included the distribution of Admiralty Staff Targets and Staff Requirements. 
In addition the Admiralty held monthly meetings with Commonwealth 
representatives at which they were informed of current developments. Indeed, 
following general Australian concerns with the lack of forthcoming British military 
information, and a resultant review of the role of liaison officers, it was assessed that 
in the case of the Royal Navy, that there were so many links between the RAN and 
the Royal Navy at many levels that no procedural changes were necessary.
153
 Indeed 
of the three services the Royal Navy Liaison Officer had the least amount of ‘selling’ 
to do due to ‘the very close liaison and sense of kinship between the RN and the 
RAN’.154 In early 1956 the RAN were still very much reliant on the Admiralty for 
advice on matters such as the value of the fleet air arm, guided weapons for 
destroyers and frigates, the defence of Australia against mines, and the possible 
availability of tactical nuclear weapons for use by aircraft from light fleet carriers.
155
 
This level of reliance soon altered and the RAN showed willingness towards a more 
self-determining stance. Indeed if anything, the trend in post-war RAN procurement 
was one of increased independence, allied to a level of pragmatism, that was not in 
evidence at the conclusion of the Second World War.  
 
 As well as concerns about a growing sense of isolation from Admiralty 
thought, there were fears that the RAN were always in the position of ‘taking what 
Father says is good for us’.156 Some within the RAN were unhappy due to the 
perception of the Admiralty placing the RAN ‘on a lower level than the Canadians, 
on the same footing as the South Africans and almost on the same footing of the 
Indians and Pakistan’.157 This was not the case and it was more likely that the ‘old 
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Dominions’ of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and to a lesser extent South Africa, 
were treated on a rank higher than newer nations of the Commonwealth.
158
 Even so 
the perception did exist, and possibly did much to foster the necessity for more than 
one source of naval assistance. The suggestion that the RAN would purchase frigates 
and minesweepers from Canada in the early 1950s was only one manifestation of this 
trend.
159
 The Australian First Naval Member in a national broadcast in early 1955 
said ‘We depend on the Mother Country for research and development of our ships, 
and everything in them, for “know-how” in building ships and manufacture of 
ammunition…’160 This situation would not continue. Following the decision to 
purchase American destroyers, the Minister for the Navy, Senator John Gorton stated 
that the choice could lead to the standardisation of the RAN on American 
equipment.
161
 This did not occur, in the main because the RAN did not wish to swap 
one single-source for another.  
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Table 7 Major Vessels of the Royal Australian Navy, 1947-1975 
 
 
Class Ship Built Commissioned 
Majestic Class Aircraft-
Carrier/Fast Troop Transport 
Sydney UK 16/12/48 
Colossus Class Aircraft Carrier Vengeance UK 13/11/52 
Modified Majestic Class Aircraft-
Carrier 
Melbourne UK 28/10/55 
County Class Cruiser Australia UK 24/04/28 
County Class Cruiser Shropshire UK 20/04/43 
Modified Leander Class Cruiser Hobart UK 28/09/38 
Infantry Landing Ship Manoora UK 12/12/39 
Infantry Landing Ship Kanimbla UK 01/06/43 
Tribal Class Destroyer Arunta AUST 30/03/42 
Tribal Class Destroyer Warramunga AUST 23/11/42 
Tribal Class Destroyer Bataan AUST 25/05/45 
Q Class Destroyer/Frigate Quiberon UK 06/07/42 
Q Class Destroyer/Frigate Quickmatch UK 14/09/42 
Q Class Destroyer/Frigate Quadrant UK 18/10/45 
Q Class Destroyer/Frigate Queenborough UK 29/10/45 
Battle Class Destroyer Tobruk AUST 08/05/50 
Battle Class Destroyer Anzac AUST 14/03/51 
Daring Class Destroyer Voyager AUST 12/02/57 
Daring Class Destroyer Vendetta AUST 26/11/58 
Daring Class Destroyer Vampire AUST 23/06/59 
Daring Class Destroyer Duchess UK 08/05/64 
River Class/Type 12 Frigate Yarra AUST 27/07/51 
River Class/Type 12 Frigate Parramatta AUST 04/07/61 
River Class/Type 12 Frigate Stuart AUST 28/06/63 
River Class/Type 12 Frigate Derwent AUST 30/04/64 
River Class/Type 12 Frigate Swan AUST 20/01/70 
River Class/Type 12 Frigate Torrens AUST 19/01/71 
Grimsby Class Sloop Swan AUST 21/01/37 
Grimsby Class Sloop Warrego AUST 22/08/40 
River Class Frigate Gascoyne AUST 18/11/43 
River Class Frigate Barcoo AUST 17/01/44 
River Class Frigate Hawkesbury AUST 05/06/44 
River Class Frigate Lachlan AUST 14/02/45 
River Class Frigate Diamantina AUST 27/04/45 
River Class Frigate Barwon AUST 10/12/45 
River Class Frigate Macquarie AUST 07/12/45 
Bay Class Frigate Murchison AUST 17/12/45 
Bay Class Frigate Condamine AUST 22/02/46 
Bay Class Frigate Shoalhaven AUST 02/03/46 
Bay Class Frigate Culgoa AUST 01/04/47 
Ton Class Minesweeper Curlew UK 21/08/62 
Ton Class Minesweeper Gull UK 19/06/62 
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Ton Class Minesweeper Hawk UK 18/07/62 
Ton Class Minesweeper Ibis UK 07/11/62 
Ton Class Minesweeper Snipe UK 11/09/62 
Ton Class Minesweeper Teal UK 30/08/62 
Tide Class Fleet Oiler Supply UK 15/08/62 
Moresby Class Survey Vessel Moresby AUST 06/03/64 
Charles F. Adams Class Destroyer Perth USA 17/07/65 
Charles F. Adams Class Destroyer Hobart USA 18/12/65 
Charles F. Adams Class Destroyer Brisbane USA 16/12/67 
Oberon Class Submarine Oxley UK 18/04/67 
Oberon Class Submarine Otway UK 23/04/68 
Oberon Class Submarine Ovens UK 18/04/69 
Oberon Class Submarine Onslow UK 22/12/69 
Destroyer Tender Stalwart AUST 19/02/68 
Flinders Class Survey Vessel Flinders AUST 27/04/73 
 
 
Photograph 3 HMAS Melbourne in company with HMA Ships Vendetta and 
Voyager 
 
 
 
Photograph courtesy of the Sea Power Centre of Australia.
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Chapter 8 
 
Australia, Allies and the RAN 
 
 Australia’s strategic priorities underwent a great change of direction in the 
post-war period and this subject has been covered in great detail elsewhere.
1
 Even so, 
national strategy does have an impact on military and naval strategy, and thus the 
alteration in Australian strategic concerns should be considered in the context of 
Anglo-Australian naval relations. In the immediate post-war period Australian and 
British links remained strong. Co-operation in naval planning between the RAN and 
the Admiralty was great, with almost complete reliance by the former on the latter. 
By the mid-1970s Australian military links with the British were much reduced. This 
was due to the British withdrawal from east of Suez as well as increased co-operation 
between Australian military forces and those of the United States. For the RAN this 
was illustrated by the purchase of American naval hardware and by the conflict in 
Vietnam where Australian naval units carried out major combat operations 
unaccompanied by British units for the first time. Yet the USN did not replace the 
Admiralty, nor did it perform the same role as the latter did during the Second World 
War, and in the immediate post-war years. By the mid-1970s the Royal Australian 
Navy was a much more independent service and this somewhat reflected the 
experience of the nation itself.  
 
 The post-war period saw a decrease in Anglo-Australian relations on national, 
military and naval levels. In the immediate post-war years Anglo-Australian co-
operation was strong and the ties of empire and Commonwealth were healthy. In 
mid-1946 it was reported that the Australian Prime Minister J.B. Chifley stated that 
Australia must be prepared to shoulder greater responsibilities for the defence of the 
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Pacific.
2
 Following the Empire Defence talks, Chifley said he could not help feeling 
disturbed at the burden of armaments resting on Britain after a war that had resulted 
in complete victory for the United Nations, and added that any proposals should lead 
to a notable advance in empire co-operation for British Commonwealth security. 
Even so, following an Australian Council of Defence meeting in 1947, the Australian 
Chief of the Naval Board bemoaned the lack of Australian strategic direction: 
 
This Government in pinning its faith to new weapons and largely looks on its 
contribution to Defence as being the Guided Weapons Range and the ‘Higher 
Defence Machinery’ organisation, and regard this as implementing their promises at 
the Prime Ministers’ Conference in 1946. The logical argument then follows is that a 
small population can not do everything, so if they are involved in War in the future 
such old fashioned forces as the Navy will be catered for by the Royal Navy and the 
United States Navy, assuming the unlikely event that a modern Navy will be 
required at all!
3
      
 
This attitude was replaced by a level of optimism following the statement made by 
the Australian Minister for Defence to Parliament on the 4
th
 June 1947 on Australian 
Post-War Defence Policy.
4
 In late April 1948 it was reported that the Australian 
Minister for Defence had announced that Australia was to be developed as a main 
forward base in the Pacific and that this policy related not only to the armed forces, 
but to the strategic development and distribution of the armed forces of the British 
Commonwealth.
5
 On the 15
th
 March 1949, the Australian Defence Minister stated 
that Australia’s defence plans were based on security arrangements, which might be 
made in co-operation with the United Kingdom and other British Commonwealth 
nations; ‘a Pacific regional pact is the best thing to aim for.’6  
 
 In December 1949 Australia elected the Liberal-Country Party coalition 
under Robert Menzies and in early 1950 the new Prime Minister made a speech 
stressing ‘in no mean terms’ the importance of sea power to the British 
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Commonwealth.
7
 The change of government reflected Australian concerns over the 
onset of the cold war and the perceived threat of communism. In 1954 the Australian 
Minister of Defence Sir Philip McBride asserted that Australia’s defence policy was 
to co-operate in repelling Communist aggression and maintaining the gap between 
Australia and ‘the present high-water mark of the southward flow of communism’.8 
Menzies asserted that if Vietnam were abandoned at the outset of 1965 ‘in the long 
run, and not so very long at that’ Australia would be menaced ‘almost at our doors’.9 
 
 This fear of communism meant a strengthening of Australian-American ties, 
perhaps best typified by the 1952 ANZUS treaty and the commitment to Vietnam, 
but this did not mean an end to Anglo-Australian co-operation. As Ward noted: 
 
By the early 1950s the Australian Government had come to view an American 
defence guarantee as vital to Australian security in the light of the obvious decline in 
British  power in the region in the post-war years. But this by no means implied that 
Britain had become obsolete in Australian defence considerations…10 
 
 There were signs however of altering Australian attitudes to Great Britain. In 
early 1962 Sir William Oliver, the UK High Commissioner in Canberra, stated that 
‘there had been a general change in the attitude of Australia towards the United 
Kingdom. He attributed this to a number of causes including:  
 
The view that the UK was prepared to give only lip service to the SEATO alliance 
and had only a mild interest in the defence of South East Asia, and there had, in 
consequence, been a tendency for Australia to fall more and more under United 
States influence as regards defence thinking. They had also, to some extent, become 
disenchanted with the Commonwealth in general, and felt certain United Kingdom 
policies, particularly on immigration and the Common Market, were contrary to 
Australia’s best interests and would increase her isolation from the mother country.11 
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Even so, the Australian Defence Committee was clear on the necessity to keep 
British influence in the Far East as robust as possible: 
 
 Should the [British] Defence Review lead to decisions contrary to Australia’s 
 interests it would well nigh be impossible to have them reversed. It is considered 
 therefore that it would be to Australia’s advantage to attempt to influence United 
 Kingdom consideration of the problems before the Defence Review is completed.
12
  
 
This stance also had perceived benefits for Australian-American relations: 
 
 The awareness by the United States of Australia’s efforts to influence the United 
 Kingdom to maintain her commitments on the mainland of South East Asia could 
 strengthen the United States’ resolution to continue with her present policies in the 
 area.
13
  
 
This view was taken was only six months after Australian troops had been deployed 
to Vietnam and was a sign that Australia was eager to maintain strategic relations 
with both the United Kingdom and the United States. The strategic links between 
Australia and Great Britain were, however, greatly affected by loss of British 
prestige and the reduction of military forces east of Suez. 
 
 As previously described, the diminution of British military forces in the Far 
East was a consequence of strategic necessity and a reduction of British economic 
power. The strategic decisions taken by Great Britain had a great impact on 
Australian strategic thinking and on the relationship between the RAN and the Royal 
Navy.
14
 On the British inability to reinforce the Far East region due to NATO 
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commitments, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Peter Hill-Norton said ‘All this may not be 
easy for all of us to swallow, or perhaps for our good friends overseas to accept, but 
it is the reality of today.’15 Australia had long held doubts about the willingness and 
ability of Britain to maintain a significant military force in Southeast Asia.
16
 These 
doubts not only helped solidify the strategic bonds between Australia and America 
but also aided in the alteration of Australia from an outpost of the empire to a more 
independent nation in the Asia-Pacific region. Britain was aware of the impact of 
withdrawal on Australian defence sensibilities but British domestic considerations 
were viewed as paramount. As Hill-Norton noted:  
 
In considering the type and size of the forces we have decided to retain in South East 
Asia we had to have regard to two overriding military factors. First that, except 
perhaps in the longer term, manpower and costs will for all practicable purposes rule 
out the  possibility of providing naval and air forces over and above our present 
overall force levels. The second factor, which stems partly from the first, arises from 
the fact that the  previous Government had planned and announced that after 1971, 
virtually all our UK and European based forces would be declared to NATO, thus 
the provision of forces for SE Asia had to be at the direct expense of our planned 
priority contribution to NATO.
17
   
 
This followed Hill-Norton’s earlier statement that:  
 
Any adjustments made in our Far East presence can be no more than relatively 
marginal, unless we are prepared to make major inroads into NATO posture; and I 
earnestly hope  that no-one contemplates that.
18
 
 
British strategic priorities were clearly at odds with those of Australia. Benvenuti 
suggested that ‘In due course…irreconcilable strategic aims were severely to 
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undermine the Anglo-Australian relationship.’19 This statement may be unduly harsh 
but Canberra certainly reacted with shock and dismay on hearing the news of the 
proposed British withdrawal.
20
 In a sign of growing Australian self-reliance, 
Australian policymakers recognised the inevitability of Britain’s withdrawal from the 
region, and regarded the Conservative Party’s threat to reverse the decision as 
potentially unfavourable to Australia’s position in the region. Ward noted that: 
 
 It is hardly disputed that, from the fall of Singapore in February 1942 through to the 
 Australian commitment of ground troops to Vietnam in 1965, Australia’s traditional 
 ties to the Mother Country came under enormous strain, revision, and ultimately, 
 reorientation towards a more self-reliant future.
21
 
 
This is true and the need of Australia to have ‘a great and powerful friend’ led to 
greater ties with the United States. Even so Australia would not place complete 
reliance on the United States. In a 1967 study on the ‘Long Term Order of Battle of 
the RAN’ it was postulated that Australia must be prepared to meet a level of 
military forces required for Borneo confrontation type operations leading to possible 
limited war with Indonesia arising from difficulties over New Guinea, on its own for 
an indefinite period.
22
 It was assumed that ‘because of the manner in which we have 
honoured our obligations with the United States in South East Asia’ the period of 
independent action would not be prolonged unduly.
23
 Even so there was no 
expectation that the United States would automatically support Australia. A growing 
sense of Australian independence meant that the nation did not exchange one 
colonial yoke for another: 
 
With Australia’s development to a relatively strong country in the [Indian Ocean] 
region both economically and militarily, and bearing in mind the reduced future role 
of Britain and the uncertainty of United States intentions in the area…a new period 
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of greater Australian political involvement is developing…the attitude of the non-
aligned nations, many of which were once members of the British Empire, is gaining 
importance in  relation to Australian actions in the region as Australia takes more 
responsibility and initiative in an area of growing importance to Australia.
24
  
 
 The RAN developed much stronger bonds with the United States Navy in the 
post-war period.
25
 The US Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Pacific Fleet, Admiral 
Louis E. Denfeld visited Australia in 1947 and met with the Australian Chief of the 
Naval Board, Sir Louis Hamilton. An offer was made to send American naval 
officers to Australia every six months to discuss plans for Pacific defence with the 
Australian Defence Committee. Both the ACNB and the Minister of Defence deemed 
this to be worthwhile.
26
 The First Sea Lord also thought this was a good idea and 
suggested that the Commander-in-Chief of the British Pacific Fleet was made aware 
of the staff discussions ‘so that he can send a representative if he feels like it.’27 
According to Hamilton, Denfeld ‘made it quite clear that neither he nor his 
Government wanted anything to do with agreements on a high level. On the other 
hand he was very much in favour of staff discussions on a Service level’.28 
Communications between the two services continued in the post-war period and 
increased due to increased co-operation in matters of operations, intelligence and 
equipment procurement.  
 
 Senior Australian naval officers regularly visited the United States. Vice 
Admiral Collins visited Pearl Harbor in 1948 and discussed areas of responsibility 
‘in the event of the only possible trouble’, with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
(CICPAC).
29
 The details of these meetings were relayed to the Admiralty who made 
plain that ‘it is very satisfactory that you have such good contacts’ with the American 
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navy.
30
 As discussed previously meetings were held between Collins, and the United 
States Admiral Arthur Radford, meetings that led to the Radford-Collins agreement 
of early 1951.
31
 In 1956 Vice Admiral Dowling reported to the Admiralty that he 
would be visiting a number of US naval establishments and vessels as the guest of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke.
32
 Dowling’s successor, Vice 
Admiral Burrell visited the United States in 1960 on a fact-finding mission 
concerning the question of Surface-to-Air Guided Weapons ships for the RAN. 
During the visit Admiral Arleigh Burke ordered that the Australian First Naval 
Member be given salutes of 17 guns rather than the 15 to which he was entitled.
33
 On 
landing in Washington DC Burrell was greeted by Arleigh Burke with full military 
honours; ‘It was a great compliment to the Royal Australian Navy as were similar 
events in the next nineteen days.’34 There may have been an ulterior motive in the 
pomp and circumstance in that the USN were keen to break the monopoly held by 
the Admiralty in supplying major warships to the RAN. Alternatively, RAN and 
USN units had served in combat together during the Second World War and the 
Korean war and there was undoubtedly a measure of genuine respect between the 
two navies.   
 
 Australian naval vessels regularly exercised with units of the United States, 
and ships of both nations increasingly visited the home ports of each other. This was 
more so the case in the latter part of our period of interest when the strategic 
connections between Australia and America solidified. Burrell recalled that ‘I was at 
pains to point out the benefit to us of joint exercises whether in Australia, Hawaii or 
South East Asia. Our liaison with the USN has always been happy at all levels. There 
really was no need to make an effort to keep our friendship alive.’35 In preparation 
for the purchase of the DDGs, supplies of ammunition and missiles, provision of 
base spares and US dollar schemes for payment had to be agreed. Burrell noted 
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‘Fortunately our USN liaison wheels were well oiled’36 and he appreciated American 
co-operation in the pre-purchase process.
37
  
 
 All was not plain sailing and tensions between the two services did arise. A 
1968 friendly-fire incident when HMAS Hobart, deployed with the US Seventh Fleet 
off Vietnam, was struck by missiles fired from an American F-4 Phantom aircraft, 
resulted in a US Navy inquiry. The inquiry readily acknowledged that the USN was 
responsible for many operational shortcomings and the incident ‘was quickly 
assigned to history and no significant or lasting damage was done to Australian-
American naval relations.’38 The 1969 collision between the Australian aircraft 
carrier HMAS Melbourne and the American destroyer USS Frank. E. Evans proved 
more problematic to inter-naval relationships. One observer called the resultant 
inquiry ‘One of the most disappointing incidents in naval and national relations 
between Australia and the US…’39 In addition, there were doubts about American 
intentions to support the RAN in any future conflict. In mid-1963 Australian Rear 
Admiral Alan McNicoll wrote: 
 
I know it is assumed in some quarters that our powerful friends would supply air 
cover in the South China Sea. They might, but I feel it would be prudent to assume 
that in a hot war situation their carriers would be in their own offensive postures. So 
far as I know the USN has never been able to spare a strike carrier for a SEATO 
Exercise.
40
 
 
 Even considering the occasional setback in Australian-American naval 
relations, the partnership has in many ways been remarkable. This is even more so 
when one considers that at the end of the Second World War, the RAN was almost 
totally reliant on the Admiralty for support in areas as broad as strategic and tactical 
guidance, equipment procurement and the training of personnel. By 1975 the RAN 
would have strategic relationships with a number of regional powers including the 
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USA, have sourced equipment, including major surface vessels from the United 
States, and it would have deployed ships in combat operations alongside American 
forces, unaccompanied by units of the Royal Navy for the first time. 
 
 The RAN had toyed with the purchase of major units from non-British 
sources for some time before the eventual purchase of the Charles F. Adams class 
DDGs in the 1960s. The purchase of these vessels was a turning point in Anglo-
Australian naval relations, but was preceded by a period where a shift away from the 
Admiralty was real. Allied to the strong cultural and historic ties between the RAN 
and the Royal Navy, the fact that the RAN had always utilised British equipment 
meant that any alternative would not come without difficulties for the service. These 
difficulties, such as logistics, training, cost and inter-operability were recognised by 
the RAN and the Admiralty, and were used to a greater or lesser extent to maintain 
the status quo. The status quo could only be maintained however, if the RAN was 
willing to continue procuring equipment from the British, and if the Admiralty were 
able to meet RAN requirements.        
 
 In 1951 Vice Admiral Collins informed the Admiralty that considering 
construction delays in vessels being built in Australia, and following the agreement 
on American mutual aid, he was ‘toying with the idea of trying to get some 2100 
tonners. It would be a big departure and would cause tremendous logistic problems, 
but it may prove the only solution. I should be glad to have your views on the latter 
proposal if by any chance the Darings cannot be made available.’41 The First Sea 
Lord did not immediately respond to the proposal as ‘you will appreciate that this 
question will need a lot of thought and consideration’.42 As discussed in a previous 
chapter, the fear held by the Admiralty that the RAN would source non-British ships 
was real.
43
 To lessen the chance of any such purchase the Admiralty suggested that 
‘if the threat to sea communications in the ANZAM region becomes serious on the 
outbreak [of any future war], we should be able to allocate two of the ‘CO’ Class 
Destroyers which will be in the Far East to the ANZAM Task Force’.44 Collins was 
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most grateful for the offer and wrote ‘as a result I have given up the idea of US 
ships…’45 Cooper correctly pointed out ‘It is difficult to imagine an RN officer 
raising the prospect of the Australian Navy buying second-hand USN destroyers, as 
Collins did in 1951.’46 Thus, the fact that the professional head of the RAN was 
Australian, itself a sign of growing Australian independence, meant that any further 
shift of the RAN from the Admiralty was possible and, bearing in the mind the 
alterations of Australian national strategy in the post-war period, very likely. 
 
 The likelihood of procuring American equipment did not disappear and in 
1956, Collins’ successor, Vice Admiral Dowling reported to the Admiralty that the 
RAN found itself: 
 
at the Crossroads solely because we very much doubt that the UK can provide us 
with what we want in the future. We have no wish to become American but there is 
a very strong belief in this country that the sensible action for Australians is to 
acquire war equipment from [the] USA now. One telling reason is of course that, 
certainly in global war our salvation in the Pacific will depend chiefly on the aid of 
that country. For that we are not less loyal members of the Empire!
47
   
 
In addition to perceived shortcomings in the ability of the British to meet RAN 
requirements, in global war ‘the RAN would probably operate under direct US 
Command, except in Australian waters. That also means using a USN Fleet train 
which could not be expected to carry spares, ammunition etc. suitable only for 
Australian ships.’48 There was clearly a partial meeting of national and naval 
strategic interests, whereby the United States was viewed as the most likely ally in 
any future global conflict. Even so, the RAN did feel not compelled to exchange 
Admiralty support for that of the USN. On the 4
th
 April 1957 the Australian Prime 
Minister announced weapons such as aircraft, artillery and small arms would be 
standardised as much as possible with American patterns.
49
 Perhaps significantly no 
major changes were proposed for the Navy. 
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 Dowling’s successor Vice Admiral Burrell considered an American ESSEX 
class carrier as a replacement for Melbourne even though ‘according to the CNO 
these are getting very worn out.’50 The offer was not taken up due to doubts over the 
future of the Australian Naval Air Arm, but the offer was significant; as Cooper 
pointed out, ‘the RAN was developing ties with a navy other than the Royal Navy-a 
considerable change from 1945’.51  
 
 As discussed in a previous chapter the RAN did eventually secure vessels, 
aircraft and other equipment from non-Admiralty sources, primarily, but not solely 
the United States of America. Examples are legion but include the 1964 
announcement of the replacement of Melbourne’s Gannet and Sea Venom aircraft 
with 14 US Tracker anti-submarine aircraft.
 52
 US Skyhawk aircraft were later added 
to the ships complement.
53
 The greatest indication of movement towards the United 
States as a supplier to the RAN, however, was the purchase of the Charles F. Adams 
class destroyers in the 1960s. The purchase of the Charles F. Adams class DDGs 
from the United States was a turning point for the RAN. The ships were the first 
major RAN vessels to have been designed outside the United Kingdom and 
constructed outside Britain or Australia. The historical and cultural ties between the 
RAN and the Royal Navy were difficult to ignore, and had an impact on the decision 
making-processes involved in the purchase. Even so, the RAN recognised that the 
American vessels were superior and the best solution for the service.  
 
 The proposed disbandment of the RAN Fleet Air Arm announced in 1959, 
and planned for 1963, made the acquisition of surface-to-air guided weapons 
(SAGW) escorts by the RAN an urgent priority. In early 1960 the First Naval 
Member Vice Admiral Burrell and the Third Naval Member Rear Admiral Urquhart 
visited the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States to study possible designs 
for the SAGW ships. The three contenders for the contract were the British County 
class destroyer, the United States Navy’s Charles F. Adams class destroyer and the 
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Brooke class frigate. The Countys were designed around the Sea Slug missile and the 
lead ship was still six months from launch. The Charles F. Adams class offered by 
the USN was equipped with the Tartar surface-to-air missile, as was the Brooke class 
although the lead-ship of the latter class would not be commissioned until the end of 
December 1962.
54
                
 
 As Burrell recounted the simple answer was ‘to acquire ships of the County 
class…’55 The ‘initial fly in the ointment’ however was the Sea Slug missile and 
Burrell was embarrassed to have to say to the Admiralty that ‘our authorities were 
not impressed with the weapon then undergoing trials at our testing station at 
Woomera.’56 Burrell was aware of the superiority of the Tartar system over the Sea 
Slug and ‘invited the Admiralty to incorporate design changes to install Tartar [to the 
County design]. Admittedly this was asking a lot.’57 Burrell was politely informed 
that drawing-office resources were not available to make the proposed changes. ‘I 
was disappointed. I was not anxious to look elsewhere for guided missile ships. The 
entire life of the RAN had been built around RN classes of ship, their armaments and 
stores items...everything except Royal Marines and rum.’58  
 
 Burrell suggested that his proposed alterations of the British County class to 
the Admiralty was perhaps ‘a trifle impertinent and not really a goer’59 and ‘I really 
could not have expected any other answer.’60 The fact that he did ask for 
modifications was a reflection of the growing independent stance taken by the RAN, 
and also reluctance to leave the Admiralty-nest. During a later visit to Vickers at 
Barrow-on-Furness, Burrell was informed ‘on the side…that they could handle the 
drawing office side of the County class proposal. I was not prepared to consider 
white-anting the Admiralty by those means.’61 An unwillingness to offend Admiralty 
sensibilities is an indication of the courteous relations between the services at the 
time.       
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 The decision-making processes involved in the selection of the SAGW 
vessels has been covered elsewhere and need not be recounted here in any great 
detail.
62
 In short, the choice of the Charles F. Adams class was primarily due to the 
superiority of the Tartar missile system, although the cheaper cost, advantageous 
credit terms, and expected delivery dates certainly made the transition to an 
American designed and built vessel easier for the RAN and Australia to accept.
63
 It 
was announced that the RAN would purchase two DDGs initially, with HMA Ships 
Perth and Hobart entering service in 1965. A third vessel HMAS Brisbane was 
commissioned in 1967. Following HMAS Hobart’s final fitting out period in the 
Boston Navy Yard, it was ‘assessed as most important to subject the ship and her 
company to the full USN schedule for shake-down…in order to gain a very close 
understanding of USN drill, operations and procedures…this would allow an 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages, if any, of USN doctrine’.64 The 
purchase of the DDGs was timely as less than sixteen months from the 
commissioning of Hobart the ship had started her first operation deployment to 
Vietnam working with the United States Seventh Fleet.
65
 
 
 The purchase of the DDGs was understandably viewed in conflicting ways by 
the RAN and the Royal Navy. There was much unease on the part of the RAN in 
buying non-British vessels. One Commanding Officer of HMAS Hobart recalled that 
‘there was much agonising in the late 1950s and the early 1960s in deciding whether 
or not the RAN should purchase [British vessels] or the American Charles F. Adams 
class’.66 Indeed there is much to suggest that the RAN were compelled to purchase 
US vessels only because the Admiralty could not meet RAN requirements. In his 
memoirs Burrell described ‘being forced to turn to the USN’.67  Following the public 
announcement of the Cabinet decision to purchase the US ships, the Minister of the 
Navy, Senator John Gorton stated ‘The main reason we bought from the United 
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States was that Britain has no guided missile destroyers of this kind developed to this 
stage.’68 This statement allied with Burrell’s views on not wishing to buy non-British 
ships unless there was no choice but to do so, leads one to conclude that there was no 
great overriding political or military reason for the RAN to switch from Admiralty 
supply, unless RAN demands could not be met by the British. Hyslop suggested that 
the new Australian policy of standardisation of weapons and tactics with the United 
States ‘made it possible for the Minister for the Navy, J. G. Gorton, to secure the 
approval of the Government in 1961 to purchase guided missile destroyers in the 
United States.’69 This may have been so, but it was the inability of the Admiralty to 
meet RAN requirements that made the purchase a far-sighted one. Interestingly 
Cooper wrote that ‘The driving force behind the DDG purchase was…Gorton who 
opted for the US ships despite the preference of Burrell.’70 This statement appears at 
odds with Gorton’s official statements, however there may have been political 
pressure placed on the RAN behind closed doors. In either case, the growing 
independence of the RAN made such a switch more likely, especially considering the 
perceived weaknesses of the British vessel and the lack of Admiralty interest in 
modifying the class to meet RAN requirements.  
 
 The impact of the purchase of the DDGs on the RAN was considerable, but 
especially relevant to the subject of Anglo-Australian naval relations was the 
increased operational efficiency of the RAN by exposure to USN tactics, procedures 
and training facilities. As Jones stressed, however, ‘the RAN did not adopt USN 
practices wholesale but rather modified those appropriate to suit the RAN’s British 
derived organisation’.71 As such the purchase of the DDGs should not be seen as a 
complete cessation of dependence on the Admiralty and a subsequent reliance on the 
USN. Instead, the purchase of the Charles F. Adams class ships should be viewed as 
the beginning of increased RAN independence in equipment procurement.      
 
 Quite apart from the cultural impact of utilising non-British ships, the 
purchase of the DDGs bought tangible problems for the RAN. The logistical effect 
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was great as the USN system was entirely different from the existing Anglo-
Australian system; ‘The cloud…was the prospect of introducing USN ships into the 
RAN. It was not the ships and equipment that worried me but the practicability of 
dealing with logistics of entirely different types, sizes, nomenclature etc.’72 Burrell 
wrote ‘The US stores ledgers would list thousands of items with foreign names and 
strange pattern numbers. Even the simple screws had differing threads. [Even so] the 
logistic side would have to be made to work.’73 Burrell was later told that the settling 
down of two logistics systems was considerable, but eventually proved to be a 
workable proposition.
74
 Following the addition of the DDGs to the Fleet there 
developed within the RAN the concept of ‘two navies’. The DDGs were known as 
the ‘tupperware’ ships, with their crews comfortable with USN procedures and the 
associated jargon required in manning a US-built ship. On the other side was the rest 
of the Fleet, or ‘steel ships’.75 This idea of ‘two navies’ was exacerbated by the 
service of the American-built vessels in combat operations in Vietnamese waters, 
service denied to the vast majority of the RAN escort force.  
  
 The Tartar missile system was initially not as robust as the RAN was led to 
believe. As Jones documented, there were issues with the early performance of the 
Tartar missile system and the RAN’s selection of Tartar was ‘by present standards 
based on incomplete or sketchy information.’76 Burrell’s memoirs make plain that he 
was not aware of any issues with the performance of Tartar. When discussing the 
limitations of Sea Slug, he recalled ‘I was aware that there existed a well-tried and 
proven US guided missile, Tartar, which was about to be fitted to a new DDG class 
destroyer.’77 During discussions in 1960 with USN Rear Admiral Johnson, 
Commander Destroyer Flotilla Six, Burrell remarked that ‘My earlier reports of the 
missile were now confirmed.’78 Jones stressed that the RAN were aware of the sheer 
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scale of the United States Navy’s missile programme and this should have been 
sufficient grounds for selecting Tartar over Sea Slug.
79
  
 
 As could be expected the purchase of the DDGs received substantial press 
coverage in the United Kingdom.
80
 There was a measure of Admiralty disquiet 
surrounding the purchase. RAN Vice Admiral Sir Victor Smith, Chief of the Naval 
Staff 1968-70, noted that it ‘caused a bit of an upset at the Admiralty. In the past 
we’d always had British-designed ships so this was a breakaway. There were 
probably some noses put out of joint at the Admiralty by our decision.’81 This 
disquiet was perhaps less muted than previous concerns over the RAN sourcing non-
British ships as the Admiralty had been involved in the SAGW ship process from its 
inception. It may also have been a reflection of the Admiralty’s acceptance of the 
growing independence of the RAN. Burrell suggested that ‘Turning away from 
Britain for our guided-missile destroyers produced little reaction in the UK, although 
in later years I was told that the Admiralty regretted the loss of income from the ship-
building industry.’82 If so there was a level of pragmatism on both sides. Burrell 
heard stories years later ‘that [the] Admiralty thought I was bluffing, that I would 
accept the risks of a doubtful Sea Slug and that I would not be prepared to shift to 
USN equipment and standards. There was just no time (or inclination) for me to 
bluff.’83 Interestingly this information was not included in the publication of 
Burrell’s memoirs Mermaids Do Exist, perhaps a measure of Burrell’s loyalty to the 
Admiralty and a reluctance to offend. The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Edward Ashmore, remarked that HMAS Perth was ‘an interesting ship’ and noted 
that ‘the days when [RAN] people were sent to Mercury and our other establishments 
to be taught their business is now virtually over. Both Royal Navies are accordingly 
somewhat the losers.’84 There was also overt British resentment about the purchase 
of the American vessels. Following HMAS Hobart’s participation with Royal Navy 
units in exercise SWORDHILT off the New South Wales coast in 1966, the Flag 
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Officer Second-in-Command Far East Fleet remarked that he ‘could not understand 
why the RAN had bought that American rubbish’.85 The Charles F. Adams class 
ships provided sterling service to the RAN however
86
, and were anything but 
‘American rubbish’. The DDGs were excellent vessels and gave the RAN great 
service to the end of our period of interest and beyond. As Jones pointed out, the 
acquisition of the three Charles F. Adams class DDGs from the US has been seen by 
many as one of the most successful purchases in post-war RAN history.
87
 Burrell 
recounted that ‘Over the years, I have heard from many that should know, that of 
their class, finer ships have not been built. When I ask questions about individual 
characteristics, the replies are superlatives.’88 The DDGs would soon serve with 
American naval forces in Vietnam, yet another sign of an increasing RAN drift away 
from the Admiralty, and Australian strategic drift towards the United States. 
 
 The use of RAN vessels in the Vietnam War marked another turning point for 
the service.
89
 It was the first time Australian vessels had fought in a major conflict 
without being in company with units of the Royal Navy. HMAS Sydney commenced 
ferrying Australian troops to Vietnam in May 1965, but the RAN did not enter the 
war in a combat role until February 1967, when a six-man clearance diving team 
arrived in theatre to carry out harbour defence and explosive ordnance disposal 
operations.
90
 On the 3
rd
 March 1967 it was announced that the HMAS Hobart would 
join the US Seventh Fleet in operations in Vietnamese waters. Four RAN ships took 
part in combat operations in Vietnam, the American-built DDGs Hobart, Perth and 
Brisbane and the British-designed and Australian-built destroyer Vendetta. Logistic 
support during the conflict was provided by HMA Ships Sydney, Jeparit and 
Boonaroo. The Fleet Air Arm contributed a helicopter flight and the other RAN 
personnel such as clearance divers, logistics and medical staff served in Vietnam. 
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The focus of RAN operations in Vietnam for this study, however, will be on the 
deployments of the Australian vessels in service with the United States Seventh Fleet 
as this will provide a contrast to previous RAN/RN operational interaction as well as 
gauge the efficiency of the recently purchased Charles F. Adams class destroyers. It 
will also be seen that there were issues with British-designed vessels being utilised in 
Vietnam in combat roles, primarily due to logistical support and compatibility with 
US forces. 
 
 Four RAN surface vessels carried out combat operations with the United 
States Seventh Fleet over eight deployments. Table 8 gives deployment details of the 
vessels utilised in the conflict. The fact that the DDGs had recently been purchased 
from the United States meant that the union of these types of RAN ships into the 
Seventh fleet was relatively seamless. The use of the Daring class HMAS Vendetta 
posed problems initially due to logistical incompatibility with the standard US supply 
system but the ship performed creditably during its one deployment. RAN destroyers 
on service in Vietnam generally carried out the tasks of Naval Gunfire Support 
(NGS), carrier escort duties and Operation Sea Dragon.
91
 The aim of the latter was 
the interdiction of the coastal lines of communication to the Viet Cong in the south, 
via the destruction of waterborne logistic craft, barges and junks which negotiated 
the coastal and inland waterways.
92
 These operations took place off North Vietnam 
north of the DMZ, and fire from North Vietnamese shore batteries was a constant 
threat. 
  
HMAS Hobart was the first RAN destroyer to serve with the US Seventh 
Fleet in Vietnam. The fact that the ship was designed and built in the US made the 
operational effectiveness of the ship much greater than if a British-designed vessel 
was chosen for deployment. Integration with the Seventh Fleet was complete and 
Australian vessels were reliant on the US logistic chain, apart from the provision of 
items unique to the RAN which remained an Australian responsibility. The 
Commander of HMAS Perth during that ships’ third and last deployment remarked 
of the logistics arrangements ‘In our deployment I can only say the USN logistic 
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effort was indeed superb’, although a drawback was that the USN system did not 
cater for lamb or mutton.
93
 
  
Table 8 RAN Destroyers Serving with the United States Seventh Fleet in Vietnam, 
1967-71
94
 
 
 
Ship Start Date 
of 
Deployment 
End Date of 
Deployment 
Miles 
Steamed 
Rounds 
Fired 
Number of 
Times 
Enemy Fire 
was 
Received 
Hobart March 1967 September 
1967 
52,529 9,204 9 
Perth September 
1967 
March 1968 64,750 13,351 4 
Hobart March 1968 September 
1968 
44,579 16,270 3 
Perth September 
1968 
March 1969 44,820 7,648 1 
Brisbane March 1969 September 
1969 
40,465 7,891 - 
Vendetta September 
1969 
March 1970 39,558 13,709 
95
 
 
- 
Hobart March 1970 September 
1970 
43,915 16,901 - 
Perth September 
1970 
March 1971 39,857 9,712 - 
Brisbane March 1971 September 
1971 
27,011 7,760 - 
 
 
 There were operational differences between the manner in which the RAN 
were used to functioning and those methods used by the United States Navy. 
Griffiths recounted that ‘it quickly became apparent that tough judgement was 
necessary to reduce the shore demand [during Harassment and Interdiction firings] to 
a practical and economical level of ammunition expenditure’.96 Captain Ian Burnside 
of HMAS Perth recalled the need to monitor very carefully the requests for 
Harassment and Interdiction Firings; ‘when you have been invited to virtually 
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expend your whole outfit of ammunition on one night of H&I activity, a firm line has 
to be drawn’.97 An earlier Commander of the same vessel also questioned the 
effectiveness of such tactics and suggested that Harassment and Interdiction firings 
‘were generally a waste of ammunition’.98 He questioned the necessity to fire on so 
many targets in the middle of the night. An American Army spotter agreed and said 
‘It’s good to talk to someone who understands the value of a buck, Sir!’99 The 
engagement of specific targets was thought to be much more effective; on one 
occasion during her third deployment HMAS Perth was called to engage ‘troops in 
the open’. The ship expended 126 rounds over 50 minutes; captured enemy 
documents later revealed that a Viet Cong battalion had suffered such heavy 
casualties that it was no longer effective.
100
 As Grey noted, the USN placed great 
emphasis on ‘a quantitative measurement of success in terms of effort expended’ 
while the RAN, reflecting its British orientation ‘favoured other more qualitative 
measures’.101 
 
The deployment of Australian vessels to Vietnam provided a stern test of the 
ships and crews, and this was especially useful for the recently purchased DDGs. The 
Vietnam conflict also gave the RAN an opportunity to demonstrate that older ships 
such as those of the Daring class could be utilised effectively in an operational 
manner. It also provided an opportunity of deploying a British-designed ship within 
the USN organisation, a process that was somewhat forced on the RAN by limited 
resources. 
   
 The continuous employment of the one of the DDGs in Vietnam posed 
problems for the RAN. These included training new crews, giving leave to personnel 
and working up in Australia before deployment to ensure operational readiness.
102
 As 
the Chief of the Naval Staff observed, the commitments to Southeast Asia posed a 
continuing problem for the RAN in the short-term as ‘the number of escorts cannot 
be increased’ while the commitment facing the RAN ‘was of indefinite duration’.103 
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The only way to lessen the dilemma was ‘by getting a greater usage rate from 
existing escorts’.104 The Australian vessel HMAS Vendetta, a British designed 
Daring class destroyer served in Vietnamese waters from September 1969 to March 
1970, and this did reduce the operational stress placed on the Fleet. The employment 
of Vendetta was not straightforward however, and posed two immediate problems, 
suitability and support. As the Darings were viewed as good gunfire support and 
bombardment ships, suitability would be determined primarily by a solution to the 
support problem.
105
 The support issue was a consequence of the ship was being 
standardised on the US Navy’s equipment and logistic systems, and it would not fit 
easily into the Seventh Fleet’s organisation as the American-built DDGs had done.106 
Interestingly, during a visit to South East Asia in January 1967, the RAN Director of 
Plans did enquire about the possibility of Royal Navy sources in Singapore providing 
support to RAN ships engaged in Vietnam. The unofficial answer from CSO (Plans 
and Operations) was said to be ‘somewhat vague’.107    
 
 It was viewed that on completion of Hobart’s first operational period in 
Vietnam a general assessment by Hobart as to the suitability of a Daring Class 
vessel for operational duties with the US Seventh Fleet should be made. Hobart’s 
Commanding Officer was asked to cover operational suitability, compatibility of 
operational equipment, and if possible, any particular support problems.
108
 The reply 
was lengthy and raised serious concerns about the deployment of Darings in the 
Vietnamese theatre.
109
 These included the operational capabilities of such vessels in 
anti-air warfare: 
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 Limitations in the detection and acquisition processes due to poor air warning, short 
 range FC track radar and computor [sic] parameters, combined give the Daring a 
 significantly less chance of successful defence than an equivalent USN DD.
110
   
 
In addition the Darings did not meet the minimum communications requirements of 
a ship employed in Vietnam.
111
 Conversely the Daring was thought to have the 
capability to combat the primary surface threat of PT boat attack, and was ‘well 
suited’ to the naval gunfire support role.112 In addition it was suggested that: 
 
The Daring is capable of providing ASW defence in Vietnam operations. Although 
the ship will be at a range disadvantage with detection equipment, it holds 
advantages in shallow water performance, and in mine detection capability, also the 
Mortar MK10 provides a better shallow water capability than the MK44 torpedo.
113
  
 
The operational effectiveness of the vessels was thought to be limited as the Action 
Information Organisation in Darings: 
 
As presently fitted and manned allows the employment of these ships in Southern 
GUNLINE Operations [however] the restricted capability for AAW, and Air Control 
precludes the employment of these ships in SEA DRAGON Operations, and makes 
the capability for screening a CVA in an AAW environment very marginal. 
Assignment to a CVS screen in a lesser degree of AAW threat would be possible.
114
      
  
 
There were also limitations in the Electronic Warfare capabilities of the Darings as 
‘The ECM equipment fitted in the Daring…is inadequate for operations north of the 
DMZ and in the Tonkin Gulf.’115  The supply of ammunition and stores for the 
British-designed vessels was also viewed as problematic: 
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Possibly one of the largest factors affecting the deployment [of] RAN Daring Class 
DDs in Vietnam is the supply of 4.5” ammunition…[and this] appears to provide a 
major logistic problem which will require consideration whether to attempt to 
integrate with the Seventh Fleet logistic organisation through the Naval Magazine at 
Subic Bay, or to provide a separate UNREP ship especially for use with the 
deployed Daring.
116
  
 
In addition it was pointed out that ‘it is doubtful whether many suitable stores items 
could be secured from US sources. Threads on screws, nuts and bolts and electric 
lamp fittings are not compatible.’117 As such it was thought that naval and special 
stores such as machinery spares would have to be transported by air from Australia.  
 
Underway replenishment (UNREP) was also seen as a problem: 
 
 The Daring Class DD is incompatible with USN UNREP ships to carry out 
 replenishment in accordance with normal WESTPAC procedures [however] 
 compatibility will be attained if recommended modifications are carried out.
118
      
 
In conclusion it was suggested that: 
 
In the absence of other relevant factors not available in this appreciation, it appears 
that the most economical and expedient answer is to modify a Daring sufficiently to 
allow assignment to duties on the Southern GUNLINE, south of the DMZ, with the 
possible additional use on the screen of the CVS when present. The ship may require 
a special scheduling cycle to meet any particular logistic support circumstances.
119
   
 
 The Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Fleet (FOCAF), Rear Admiral 
Richard Peek, concurred with Hobart’s appreciation and conclusions and 
recommended that the most likely vessel to deploy to Vietnam would be HMAS 
Vendetta.
120
 This was subject to the modifications to communications equipment and 
UNREP arrangements as suggested previously, as well as provision for 4.5-inch 
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ammunition and naval and special stores. It was also accepted that the vessel would 
only be employed south of the DMZ. The expected limitations in operational tasks to 
be carried out by the ship were an issue however; the Australian Chief of the Naval 
Board stated that: 
 
While a single ship is contributed to Vietnam it is preferred that it should be one 
capable of all the duties normally assigned to destroyer types, and in particular it 
should be capable of SEA DRAGON operations. Moreover while it is considered 
feasible to overcome the difficulties associated with the deployment of a Daring it is 
doubtful whether they could be resolved in time for deployment by March 1968.
121
     
 
The limitations of the Daring Class ships were expanded on in a later Minute:  
 
A Daring…would…be suitable for only three of the five duties to which  destroyers 
are normally assigned in Vietnam operations. While Australia’s contribution is a 
single ship it is considered essential that the unit provided should be capable of 
completing all five duties, and in particular should be capable of SEA DRAGON 
operations. Any limitations would place an inordinate demand on USN ships, and 
would inhibit the normal rotation of individual units to the various duties.
122
 
 
As such it was recommended that Hobart should relieve Perth in Subic Bay in 
March 1968. Even so there were concerns about Hobart’s operational state: 
 
 The ship has been engaged on fairly arduous service, will be so employed again with 
 a relatively inexperienced crew, and will be in the later stages of an extended period 
 of service. A rise in the defect rate and corresponding reduction in reliability can 
 therefore be expected.
123
  
 
 Peek, who would later serve as Australian Chief of Naval Staff, pointed out 
that the revised fleet programme ‘requires Perth to spend more than the previously 
accepted six months on station. I would prefer [to] limit service to six months and 
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propose a gap be accepted from 18 March 1968 until Hobart arrives on station.’124 
The Chief of the Naval Staff was opposed to FOCAF’s ‘gap’ for a number of 
reasons, the principal one being the inability to maintain continuity in 
commitment.
125
 Peek saw great disadvantages in the situation whereby the only ships 
deemed able to serve in Vietnam were the American-built DDGs; ‘it is well nigh 
impossible to keep one of the two DDGs continually in the Seventh Fleet and 
maintain the stated policy of six months on station’.126 The material state of the 
vessels was of concern, and ‘the situation will persist at least until Brisbane is 
available for Vietnam operations.’ The operational strains of the Australian Fleet 
were such that it was recognised that: 
 
Ships should be given two clear six monthly periods in Australia after service in the 
Seventh Fleet. However, pending the availability of Brisbane for this service it is 
unlikely that this can be achieved unless the feasibility study, currently under 
development, of deploying a Daring to Vietnam shows that a Daring could make an 
effective contribution to Seventh Fleet operations.
127
     
 
 The Naval Board concluded that ‘the possibility of a Daring class destroyer 
undertaking a period of duty in Vietnamese waters’ should be examined. It was 
observed that ‘the USN authorities regarded logistic support for the Darings as 
merely a problem to be overcome’.128 By late 1968 a decision had been made to 
provisionally deploy Vendetta to Vietnam in September 1969. Arrangements were 
made to pre-position 4.5-inch ammunition and replacement barrels at the US naval 
base at Subic Bay, and to alter the manning of the ship so that its complement would 
be able to meet the needs of the operational environment.
129
 The ship would also be 
modified to be compatible with underway replenishment systems utilised by the 
USN. HMAS Vendetta carried out a successful deployment to Vietnam from 
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September 1969-March 1970 and was credited with 52 enemy dead by body count 
and another 20 probable from a total of 192 missions.
130
         
 
 The restriction of only DDGs being allowed to serve operationally in 
Vietnam not only had an impact on the abilities of the RAN to carry out its 
operational commitments. There was also an effect on the morale of the service as 
the RAN was increasingly being seen as ‘two navies’. In late 1967 FOCAF noted: 
 
Because DDG’s are the only ships currently allocated for service in Vietnam we cast 
doubts about the ability of other units to operate with the USN and because of type 
postings restrict markedly the number of sailors that can serve in a ship on active 
service …there is already a feeling in the fleet, that only the DDG’s are considered 
as first  eleven ships. This feeling, which is to be deprecated, will undoubtedly 
spread under the present policy.
131
   
 
This point was reiterated fifteen months later by the Secretary of the Department of 
the Navy; 
 
 If HMAS Brisbane returned [from Vietnam] without relief on station…the morale of 
 the Navy would also become involved because a belief that the Naval Board lacks 
 confidence in any ships but the DDGs would be inevitable [and] this tendency 
already  exists in the RAN…132  
 
HMAS Vendetta did prove to be an effective gunship in Vietnam but the fact that the 
ship was designed in Britain and made in Australia meant that the pre-deployment 
arrangements were anything but straightforward. The necessity of using a British-
designed ship in Vietnam was due to the small size of the RAN, and the operational 
requirements placed on the service.  
 
 The RAN found itself increasingly unable to carry out its operational 
commitments. The added strains of the Vietnam conflict on such a small navy did 
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nothing to alleviate the operational constraints of the RAN. Before the 
commissioning of HMAS Brisbane in 1967, the RAN had only two ships which 
could be deployed for combat operations off Vietnam. The recently purchased 
American-built DDGs, HMA Ships Perth and Hobart were suited for the task but the 
rest of the destroyer escorts possessed by the RAN were not, being British-designed 
and thus not standardised on the US logistic system. The strains on the RAN were 
such that Rear Admiral Peek, felt able to report: 
 
From observations and from reports it has become apparent that service in the 
Strategic Reserve no longer offers the excellent training that it did a few years ago. 
This is caused by the reduction in RN forces and by their pre-occupation in other 
areas in the Indian Ocean so that exercises with a number of ships are rarely 
possible…in the opinion of Commodore, Malaysian Navy, the withdrawal of our 
contribution would not be of concern to the Malaysian Government provided it was 
available to return in an emergency.
133
   
 
Peek went so far as to suggest that: 
 
 Consideration be given to withdrawing our escorts from the Strategic Reserve [and] 
 maintaining two ships in the Seventh Fleet. Use of ships other than those built in the 
 USA would produce logistic and operating problems…but these problems have to be 
 faced at some time.
134
  
 
The Secretary of the Department of the Navy replied that:  
 
Any abatement of the RAN contribution [to the Strategic Reserve] could only be by 
Government decision. It is known that the Government is currently considering the 
requirement to continue to position forces in South East Asia, but has intimated that 
it would wish to retain forces at about current levels. Accordingly, it would not be 
opportune to recommend that the RAN’s present commitment should be reduced.135 
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In regards to the suggestion that the commitment to Vietnam be increased it was 
stated that: 
 
 Similarly, the RAN’s commitment to Vietnam is based on Government policy and 
 could only be increased with Government approval…it is unlikely that a proposal to 
 increase the Vietnam commitment at the expense of forces in the Strategic Reserve 
 would be acceptable.
136
 
 
The DCNS suggested that ‘perhaps our feeling re the reduced training for ships in the 
S.R. (Strategic Reserve) could be raised with COMFEF in February’,137 however 
there is no record of this conversation taking place. The problems in maintaining 
three ships on overseas deployments were agreed on, but were considered inevitable 
because of international commitments.
138
 The Secretary, Department of the Navy’s 
comments in regards to RAN commitments Strategic Reserve and Vietnam were 
later reinforced in a Minute approved by the DCNS and the CNS.
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 The proposals by Peek are illustrative on a number of levels. The first is that 
a reduction in the Strategic Reserve could have been seen as a snub to Australia’s 
ANZAM partners, not the least Great Britain. Secondly, and perhaps more obviously, 
it was viewed that operational duty in Vietnam was much more beneficial to the 
effectiveness of a ship than non-combat operations elsewhere. Lastly, the fact that 
such discussions were taking place is a reflection of growing Australian naval 
confidence. British Admiral of the Fleet Lord Peter Hill-Norton remarked that: 
 
 Something we must recognise is that all too often the policies and interests of our old 
 Commonwealth friends are quite different to our own aspirations and that realities 
 and self-interest more and more tend to over-shadow sentiment.
140
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The level of pragmatism within Australian naval circles shows that this was indeed 
the case. 
 
  The period from 1945-75 was a time of great strategic change for Australia 
and the Royal Australian Navy. The diminution of British influence in the Southeast 
Asia and Pacific regions in the post-war period meant that Australia had to find a 
new strategic partner. In the immediate post-war period the national ties between 
Australia and Great Britain were strong, reinforced by the ideas of empire and 
Commonwealth, however strategic reality gave Australia little choice than to turn to 
the USA. The ANZUS treaty was but one manifestation of the altering strategic 
environment, Australian support of America in Vietnam another. In many ways 
Australia did exchange one ‘great and powerful friend’, the United Kingdom, for 
another, the United States. As examined in a previous chapter, Australian ties of kith 
and kin towards Great Britain were eroding due to a growing sense of Australian 
self-determination. The erosion of these national and historical ties was aided by the 
end of empire, decolonisation and the British withdrawal from east of Suez.      
 
 The national strategic replacement of the United Kingdom by the United 
States was somewhat mirrored by the RAN substitution of the United States Navy for 
the Admiralty. Even so, the former did not replace the latter in terms of the almost 
complete support given to the RAN by the Admiralty in the past. Although the RAN 
did purchase equipment and major units from the United States, itself a departure 
from the immediate post-war years where the dependence on the Admiralty for 
equipment was complete, it did not replace one monopoly for another. Although 
standardisation on American systems was an Australian strategic goal, the RAN 
resisted a complete move to the USN. This caused operational issues, as the USN 
naval supply system could not automatically cater for British-designed ships. This 
was a concern considering the small size of the RAN, and the Australian strategic 
shift away from the United Kingdom and to America. A Daring class destroyer was 
utilised in Vietnam, but there was great anxiety and much work to do prior to its 
deployment.   
 
 The RAN was a progressively independent service during the post-war 
period. Cooper referred to an instance in late 1959, where the First Sea Lord 
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appeared to apologise to the Australian CNS for having conducted an Admiralty 
study into the RAN’s future needs.141 It is difficult to believe this apology would 
have been forthcoming in 1945. Proposals for a ‘Commonwealth Eastern Fleet’ or a 
joint minesweeping force were meet with no enthusiasm on the part of the RAN, a 
sign that the RAN was determined to be a more self-sufficient force. On the purchase 
of the American-built DDGs Vice Admiral Burrell recalled that that ‘My conscience 
required me to give Admiralty an opportunity to continue our ship construction 
liaison’ however it was clear that ‘my alternative would be to turn to the United 
States.’142 This reveals a preference for Admiralty supply, but a willingness to look 
elsewhere if Australian needs could not be met. As Burrell expanded, ‘I am 
responsible for a success story not quite by accident but because the Royal Navy was 
unable, perhaps, for understandable reasons…to alter the design of their guided 
missile destroyers to meet, what I considered RAN requirements.’143 The drift from 
the Admiralty was not an easy one as considerations of naval history, culture and 
tradition were ever present. Nor did the alteration of naval policy herald a complete 
cessation of co-operation between the RAN and the Royal Navy. In many ways the 
alteration in naval relations was a microcosm of the changes in high-level Australian 
strategic thought, and indeed cultural changes within the nation itself. Even so, the 
modifications in national strategy and naval policy did not take place at the same 
times, or for the same reasons.         
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Photograph 4 HMA Ships Perth and Hobart, 15 November 1966 
 
 
 
Photograph courtesy of the Sea Power Centre of Australia. Note the British-style hull designations on 
the US-built vessels. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Royal Australian Navy owed much to the Admiralty and the Royal Navy. 
The RAN was created as an adjunct to the Royal Navy and the ties between the two 
services were great. This was especially true from the creation of the RAN in 1911, 
through the First World War, throughout the inter-war years, and during the Second 
World War. In the post-Second World War era the relations between the two services 
altered to an extent that in many ways mirrored the relations between Great Britain 
and Australia. This thesis has endeavoured to add to the available historiography 
surrounding the Royal Navy and the RAN in the post-Second World War period. 
Gaps exist in the historiography of both services especially in a co-operative context. 
An assessment of the existing literature also reveals a lack of consideration of inter-
service ties in the 1945-75 period. This thesis has also addressed a number of 
historiographical disagreements where they have been relevant to the context of 
inter-naval relations.        
 
 Recognition of the historical links and cultural ties between the Royal Navy 
and the RAN is crucial when an assessment of the altering relations between the 
services is made. In many ways, the strong bonds between the two services made a 
drift of the RAN from the embrace of the Admiralty painful. The officer class, and to 
a lesser extent the lower-deck of the RAN, owed much to the Admiralty. Traditions 
and naval culture was passed from the British service to the RAN. Operational 
experience in both world wars strengthened these bonds and made the notion of a 
singular-service, in many ways a natural one. There were advantages for the Royal 
Navy and the RAN in keeping the inter-naval bonds between the services strong. The 
Admiralty took the view that the close cultural ties strengthened other aspects of 
inter-service relations. This was especially true when Commonwealth navies acted in 
harmony in post-war conflicts such as Korea, the Malayan Emergency and 
confrontation with Indonesia. The RAN however, was increasingly being seen as an 
independent force, acting in operations without British support such as Vietnam, and 
taking a more self-determining posture in matters of personnel and equipment.   
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 This growing independence was illustrated on a number of cultural levels. 
The elevation of John Collins to ACNB illustrated an increasing level of Australian 
naval development. Collins’ predecessor, Royal Navy Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton, 
recognised that the RAN had come to maturity, an ‘Australia for Australians 
argument’. The time for an Australian ACNB had come, even though there would be 
a requirement for continuing Admiralty support in matters such as equipment 
procurement, personnel and training. Even so, cultural changes were introduced by 
the RAN to foster an increasing sense of Australian naval identity. These included 
the introduction of ‘Australia’ flashes to RAN uniforms, differing forms of ship 
identification such as hull numbering and the introduction of the Australian White 
Ensign.     
 
 The respective heads of service had an extremely good level of 
communication with each other, although this varied due to considerations of 
personality and character. While there are severe limitations in the ADM205 series, it 
is clear that communications at the highest levels continued throughout 1945-75 and 
beyond. Mid-level co-operation typified by naval liaison officers was variable, but on 
the whole inter-naval relations at this level were much more efficient than inter-army 
or air-force relations. Relations on a personal level varied greatly and this was only 
to be expected considering the great level of personnel interaction due to personnel 
exchanges and loans, training and inter-service operational co-operaration in both 
war and peace. Experiences of personnel interaction will always differ, and it would 
be misleading to suggest that the dealings between British and Australia members of 
the lower-deck were always of a less than comradely manner. It would also be 
fallacy to presume that members of the officer classes felt completely at home in 
their brethren’s service and nations. Cultural and historical ties meant that the drift of 
one navy from the other was a protracted process. The inherent ‘Britishness’ of the 
Australian officer class meant that decisions such as the purchase of American 
equipment was made with some trepidation. There was however, a strong sense of 
pragmatism associated with the gradual move away from the Admiralty. It was a 
process that in many ways followed the strategic drift of Australia and the United 
Kingdom from one another. 
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 The high level strategic choices of both nations altered in the post-war period. 
In essence, Australia placed much more emphasis on the importance of the United 
States as a strategic partner at the expense of the Anglo-Australian strategic 
relationship. Likewise the United Kingdom gravitated towards Europe and NATO. In 
the immediate post-war years much was made of Commonwealth strategic 
collaboration. The ANZAM agreement grew from post-war ideas on Commonwealth 
defence co-operation and ANZAM held particular significance for the RAN as the 
resultant development of independent Australian naval strategic planning was a 
differentiation from past practice where the Admiralty had been responsible for this 
task. ANZAM and the creation of the Far East Strategic Reserve, ANZUK, FPDA 
and SEATO, strengthened or maintained, in varying levels, the bonds between the 
two navies.  
 
Nonetheless there was a level of strategic confusion as to the future role of 
Britain. Was the United Kingdom to be an appendage of the United States, attached 
to it by a special relationship? Or would it be more beneficial to form a cohesive and 
powerful Commonwealth which would speak with one voice? At various points 
throughout the post-war period the British stated they had a moral obligation to give 
help, if needed, to Australia and New Zealand, but the ability of the United Kingdom 
to honour any such obligation practically, was frequently in doubt. Efforts were made 
to placate Australia, however the strategic realities facing the United Kingdom were 
clear. On the 31
st
 of December 1971 the Commander of the British Far-East Fleet 
hauled down his flag and the permanent presence of British ships east of Suez, apart 
from those assigned to ANZUK, was at an end.   
 
 Australia also redefined its strategic options in the post-war period. In the 
immediate post-war years Australia still placed great emphasis on co-operation in 
British Commonwealth defence. Even so there was recognition of the importance of 
America; the ANZUS treaty of 1952 best signified the alteration of Australian 
strategic interests towards the United States, although the Radford-Collins agreement 
that preceded it had more impact on the RAN. Although Australian strategic ties with 
Great Britain decreased in the post-war period, and Australian-American ties 
strengthened, it should not be assumed that Australia simply swapped one great and 
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powerful friend for another. Instead there should be recognition of an increase of 
Australian strategic independence.  
 
 In many ways this increased independence was a result of the diminution of 
British military power and influence in the Indian Ocean/Pacific regions and the far-
east. Concerns were held by the British about the stability of the region throughout 
the 1954-75 period. In 1970 the C-in-C Far-East stated, ‘The reasons for our 
preoccupation with Europe and NATO are plain and compelling. The war which 
would destroy Britain swiftly and completely is the war in Europe. But the most 
likely threats to peace are to be found not in Europe but in the Middle and Far East’1 
and ‘these relatively small Asian events are, in my judgement, far more likely to 
occur to the disadvantage of Britain and her allies than the much greater European 
events against which the western powers have prepared their major defences.’2 There 
may have been a level of self-interest in the pronouncements of the CICFE but there 
was continued British interest in the region, not the least concerns over the perceived 
increase of Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean. The process of decolonisation and 
the retreat from east of Suez did not mean a cessation in Anglo-Australian naval co-
operation, nor did it mean a termination in Anglo-Australian strategic relations.  
 
An examination of Anglo-Australian naval relations can do much to shed 
light on east of Suez and decolonisation concerns. Issue must be taken with the late 
Saki Dockrill’s assertion that ‘Britain wanted after the Confrontation, to abandon the 
Far East altogether, without even having to play a reduced role there (except possibly 
from a base in Australia)’.3 Royal Navy units continued to operate in the region 
throughout the 1945-75 period, albeit on a much reduced level. In addition planning 
for British use of naval facilities in Australia, if Singapore was no longer tenable, 
was advanced and the proposed level of British naval deployment was at times great. 
Greg Kennedy suggested that ‘By 1956, with the loss of India, the British withdrawal 
from the Middle East underway, and British imperial interests in the Far East in 
dispute, the RN had come to the end of its time as the protector of formal empire’.4 
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This, too, somewhat ignores the role played by the Royal Navy in the region 
following 1956. 
 
 Inter-service operations in war and peace were possibly the most tangible 
evidence of naval co-operation between the Royal Navy and the RAN. Vessels of 
both services operated with each other in the Korean conflict, the Malayan 
Emergency and confrontation with Indonesia. Shared doctrine, operating procedures, 
training, and equipment meant that forces of the Royal Navy and the RAN could, in 
the main, operate seamlessly together. This was especially true during the Korean 
war where there were occasional difficulties posed by the doctrinal differences of the 
United States Navy. The Malayan Emergency gave further opportunities for 
operational co-operation between the RAN and the Royal Navy, although the part 
played by the former was minor. Confrontation with Indonesia was a more 
operationally draining affair for both navies. The Royal Navy’s contribution was 
significant, and while the involvement of the RAN was more modest, it was at a time 
where conflict in Vietnam was escalating, and RAN operational responsibilities were 
expanding.      
 
 Peacetime exercises and training were an important aspect of inter-service co-
operation. Units of the Royal Navy and the RAN trained and operated with each 
other throughout the 1945-75 period and beyond. Joint exercises were valuable for 
the RAN as they gave opportunities for the service to work with larger and better 
resourced navies such as the Royal Navy. Following the withdrawal of British units 
from east of Suez, Royal Navy vessels continued, albeit in reduced numbers, to 
operate with units of the RAN in area such as the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Port 
visits were crucial in carrying out one of the more important peacetime tasks of 
maritime forces, that of ‘showing the flag’. Such visits to Australia by Royal Navy 
units continued to take place after the withdrawal of British forces from east of Suez. 
In a period where Australian strategic focus was increasingly shifting from the 
United Kingdom, Australian vessels continued to visit the UK and took part in 
maritime exercises and training. Such events continued after 1975, most notably in 
Exercise HIGHWOOD 77. A further example of co-operation between the services 
was during British atomic weapons testing off the coast of Western Australia in the 
1950s. Operations HURRICANE and MOSAIC resulted in the successful detonation 
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of atomic devices, and the RAN provided a large proportion of the naval support 
required for both operations. In a period where British naval assets were much 
reduced in the Asia-Pacific region there continued to be occasions where units of the 
Royal Navy and the RAN operated together.  
 
 There was much co-operation between the two services in matters of 
personnel. The post-war period saw inter-service loans of servicemen, exchange of 
human resources, and recruitment of ex-Royal Navy officers and sailors by the RAN. 
This movement of personnel was not on a one-to-one basis and the RAN benefited 
very much by the migration of British mariners to the service. The loan of British 
personnel was extremely important to the fledgling RAN Fleet Air Arm. Recruitment 
of ex-RN personnel by the RAN was in many cases to the detriment of the Royal 
Navy as this decreased the pool of resources available to the British. Even so the 
Admiralty welcomed Australian recruitment drives in the UK as this was seen as 
fostering the ties between the two services and propagating the notion of an ‘Empire 
Navy’. Officer exchanges also strengthened the bonds between the services, as did 
the extensive training carried out by RAN officers in the United Kingdom. Training 
of Australian officers was also beneficial to the Admiralty, as the result was a more 
operationally effective relationship between the services. The migration of personnel 
from one service to the other took place in a situation where the strategic positions 
taken by the United Kingdom and Australia were fluid. During the post-war period 
there was a decrease in personnel exchanges, inter-service loan and UK-based 
training of RAN personnel but this did not result in an increase of personnel 
migration with other navies such as the USN. As such, a decrease of Australian 
reliance on the Admiralty in affairs of personnel was a further indication of increased 
Australian naval independence. 
 
 Co-operation in matters of equipment was another important area of Anglo-
Australian naval relations in the post-war era. The addition of a naval aviation 
capability to the RAN was a manifestation of the willingness of the service to 
contribute to post-war imperial defence in an efficient manner. The fact that 
Admiralty assistance was absolutely vital to this end was a reflection of the reliance 
of the RAN on British assistance in the immediate post-war years. The economic 
terms offered by the Admiralty were generous, even though there was some 
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confusion about the expected capabilities of the vessels and aircraft. There was also a 
level of pragmatism on the part of the Admiralty, where the view was held that the 
creation of Australian naval aviation must in some measure be subsidised. It was 
stressed that following Australian commitment to the endeavour, any subsidies 
would not be in accordance with either Australian or British policy. The 
implementation of the Australian FAA was rewarded by the service of Australian 
carriers throughout the period of interest, including active service in the Korean 
conflict.  
 
In regards to the creation of an Australian naval aviation capability, issue 
must be taken with Wilson’s assertion that the primary British motive behind the sale 
of the carriers was the ‘considerable socio/economic importance to shipbuilding 
areas in which the carriers were constructed’.5 The evidence more readily supports 
the view that the primary aim of the addition of naval aviation capabilities to the 
RAN was the modernisation of the service, modernisation that was viewed as crucial 
to imperial defence in the post-war era. 
 
 The issue of Australian standardisation is important when assessing Anglo-
Australian naval co-operation. On the 4
th
 April 1957 the Australian Prime Minister 
announced that Australian weapons would be standardised as much as possible
 
with 
American patterns. This was due to the alteration in strategic circumstances whereby 
it was viewed that Australian forces would fight alongside those of the USA rather 
than the United Kingdom in any future global conflict. The RAN however, had long 
been standardised on British equipment and ammunition, and in drafting the 
proposed agreement with the United States the RAN took great pains to ensure there 
would be no impact in its ability to act with the Royal Navy in the future. 
Standardisation did not greatly affect the equipment procurement policies of the 
RAN, and did not herald an automatic switch from British ships to those of the USA. 
As such, issue must be taken with certain observations of Robert Hyslop. Hyslop 
wrote that ‘…[in 1957] the Australian Government decided that the Australian Navy 
should fashion itself on the United States Navy’.6 The reality is not so clear cut. The 
Minister of Defence later stated that the policy of standardisation with the US did not 
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mean that ‘where we have to buy from overseas we automatically buy from the 
United States’.7 Hyslop also suggested that the new Australian policy of 
standardisation of weapons and tactics with the United States ‘made it possible for 
the Minister for the Navy, J. G. Gorton, to secure the approval of the Government in 
1961 to purchase guided missile destroyers in the United States’.8 The 
standardisation policy may have made it possible, but it did not make it automatic, 
and the defining motive behind the purchase of the DDGs was the perceived 
advantages of the American Tartar missile system over the British equivalent.  
 
 The circumstances following the collision between the HMA Ships 
Melbourne and Voyager support the evidence of increased choice in Australian 
procurement options. The loss of HMAS Voyager in February 1964 resulted in offers 
from both the British and Americans for a replacement vessel. There was a level of 
political pressure on the RAN to accept the American solution, however the British 
Daring class ship was deemed as a more acceptable solution by the service. This 
decision was made in an environment where the decision to purchase American-built 
ships had already been made but the RAN saw difficulties in introducing too many 
US platforms at once due to issues with training and logistical support.   
 
 Following the standardisation agreements, the RAN continued to purchase 
British equipment where such equipment was deemed the best fit. One example was 
in the creation of a submarine capability for the RAN. The necessity for an 
Australian subsurface capability was in the main due to British inability to continue 
the deployment of the Australian-based Fourth Submarine Division. This force had 
provided valuable ASW training for Australian and New Zealand units since 1949 
but a diminution of British military power resulted in a level of pressure being placed 
on Australia to provide its own submarine force. American vessels were considered, 
but in late 1963 British Oberon class submarines were deemed as the best platform 
for the creation of the Australian submarine service. Again the Admiralty provided 
support for the submarine service, via the transfer of officers and sailors, as well as 
UK-based training for Australian submariners. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
6
 Hyslop, p. 196. 
7
 A1209, 1957/4180, Question For This Day, Notice Paper No. 49, 30 September 1959. 
8
 Hyslop, p. 217. 
246 
 
 
 The implementation of the largely Australian designed Ikara ASW weapon 
system on British vessels was an example where the Admiralty benefited from 
Australian naval expertise. The system was modified to suit British ships and 
installed on a number of vessels. Anglo-Australian co-operation in equipment design 
on Ikara and other systems, such as the proposed RAN DDL project, continued into 
the 1970s. Even though the power of the RN had declined by the mid-1960s the 
capacity and inclination of the Admiralty to assist the RAN in matters of equipment 
and personnel remained. As such, the following assertion of Tom Frame should be 
questioned: 
 
It was one thing for the RAN to hanker after the Royal Navy for support and 
guidance. Britain’s continuing ability and willingness to respond was quite another. 
The power of the Royal Navy had declined significantly by the mid-1960s.9 
 
Australia continued to utilise the resources of British naval personnel and facilities, 
albeit at a reduced rate, throughout the 1945-75 period. In addition the RAN 
continued to benefit from the greater equipment resources associated with the larger 
Royal Navy. Co-operation in matters of hardware procurement and design continued 
throughout the post-war period. Even so, the RAN increasingly found itself able to 
pick and choose in matters of procurement and by the 1960s the Admiralty was not 
deemed as the automatic choice. Nor was the United States viewed as the only 
solution to equipment. Even after US ships had been purchased by the RAN, a 
decision that was made with much misgiving by some within the service, the RAN 
continued to exploit the assets of the Admiralty where these resources were thought 
of as the best solution.           
 
 Australia faced many strategic choices in the post-war period. At the end of 
the Second World War Australia recognised that the United Kingdom could not be 
relied upon to provide protection for Australian strategic interests. Even so, the 
switch from one ‘great and powerful friend’, Great Britain, to another, the United 
States, was not a complete swap, and did not happen overnight. Nor was the strategic 
                                                          
 
9
 Frame, Pacific Partners, p. 99. 
247 
 
drift from the United Kingdom a sudden process. Even after the ratification of the 
ANZUS treaty in 1952 Anglo-Australian strategic and defence links remained. The 
degradation of British strategic and military power in the Asia/Pacific region had 
much to do with a reduction in Anglo-Australian co-operation and there were fears 
about the effect of this diminution on the Commonwealth. As Paul Hasluck, the 
Australian Minister for External Affairs stated ‘I regard the Commonwealth as a 
wheel with Britain as the hub. Weaken the hub or remove the hub and the wheel will 
soon become nothing more than a hoop which may be pleasant to play with but will 
be incapable of bearing any load.’10 In the immediate post-war period notions of 
imperial defence were strong, however divergent strategic interests rendered notions 
of imperial defence as unrealistic. As a result the strategic stance taken by Australia 
was a much more independent one.    
 
 The drift of the RAN from the Admiralty towards America somewhat 
mirrored the national strategic experience. Visits of high-ranking US naval officers 
to Australia took place in 1947 and reciprocal visits by the ACNB resulted in the 
1951 Radford-Collins agreement. Communications between the RAN and the USN 
continued throughout the post-war era, and increased due to amplified inter-service 
co-operation in areas of intelligence, operations and equipment procurement. 
Tensions did arise between the RAN and the USN, most notably the 1968 friendly-
fire incident involving HMAS Hobart off the coast of Vietnam, and the 1969 
collision between the RAN carrier HMAS Melbourne and the USS Frank E. Evans. 
But these tensions were not the norm and Australian-American naval relations 
flourished, even though the USN did not replace the Admiralty in levels of support 
given to the RAN. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the Australian naval 
shift towards the United States was the Australian purchase of the US-built Charles 
F. Adams class destroyers. The purchase of these vessels was a stark departure from 
previous procurement policies of the RAN, where previously all major ships had 
been designed and/or built in the United Kingdom. There was much heartache in the 
service about the drift from the Admiralty, but the DDGs were viewed as the best 
solution for the RAN. Even though cultural ties made the decision more painful than 
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it would otherwise have been the case, a level of pragmatism won out. The British 
were unable to fulfil Australian naval requirements so a solution had to be found 
elsewhere. The American ships were deemed as fit for purpose, and the previous 
governmental decisions on standardisation with the United States, made for an easier 
decision.  
 
 The British recognised the value of the sale of naval hardware to countries 
such as Australia and there were misgivings in British naval circles about the 
alteration in Australian naval procurement practice, but there was also a level of 
matter-of-factness associated with the purchase of the DDGs. The Admiralty were 
given the opportunity to modify their existing County class to suit Australian 
requirements, but declined. This is evidence of a certain level of pragmatism on the 
part of the Admiralty as there were doubts that the RAN would actually source 
American built ships. Although there were British misgivings about the quality of the 
DDGs, the ships provided sterling service in Vietnam and beyond.  
 
 The Vietnam war marked a turning point in that it was the first time that RAN 
units had served under the aegis of the US Seventh Fleet and fought unaccompanied 
by British vessels. The recently purchased DDGs served with distinction on 
operations including shore bombardment and carrier escort duties, and slotted into 
the existing US logistical chain almost seamlessly. Doctrinal differences between the 
USN and the RAN were apparent in the conflict and this was especially the case 
where ammunition expenditure was concerned. The RAN was a much smaller navy 
than the USN and placed more emphasis on ‘value for money’. Although the 
Australians were manning US-built ships, many of their naval values were still 
inherently British, a facet of the British orientation of the service. The British 
designed Daring class destroyer HMAS Vendetta performed honourably during its 
one deployment to Vietnam but there were logistical and operational difficulties 
associated with the employment of the vessel. For example modifications to the ships 
communications and UNREP equipment were necessary, as there was a lack of 
integration with US systems. In addition the ships ammunition was incompatible 
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with the US supply chain. The difficulties associated with the ships deployment have 
sometimes been understated but there was considerable work to be done before the 
British designed ship could be considered for use in Vietnam. 
 
 The use by the RAN of both American and British designed ships presented a 
number of problems for the service. The logistical difficulties were obvious, as 
neither the British or American systems were compatible with each other, but this 
was accepted prior to the purchase of the DDGs. A less obvious result following the 
introduction of the DDGs was that some in the RAN viewed the service as one of 
‘two navies’. One was composed of American built destroyers where valuable active 
service via the Vietnam conflict was available. The second of the ‘two navies’ was 
composed of ‘steel ships’, or escorts of British design; ships that were generally 
given tasks that were perceived as less valuable such as service with the Strategic 
Reserve. Operational constraints placed on the RAN, and the perceived operational 
benefits of service in Vietnam were such that it was suggested by some that an 
increase of units with the US Seventh Fleet be made at the expense of forces serving 
with the Strategic Reserve. This would have had obvious political ramifications for 
Australia, Great Britain and the USA and the proposal was quickly squashed, but the 
fact that discussions were taking place emphasises both the operational difficulties of 
a small navy such as the RAN and the occasional schism between naval and national 
policy. A gap between national and naval policy was also apparent in British 
discussions on the creation of a ‘Commonwealth Eastern Fleet’. Such a construct was 
viewed by some in the Royal Navy as potentially useful in making the most of the 
resources available to the Royal Navy, the RAN and the RNZN. There were great 
political difficulties associated with the proposal, and British political figures were 
adamant that no firm discussions regarding an integrated naval force should take 
place with the Australians. Dialogue did take place, during Vice Admiral Burrell’s 
1960 fact-finding visit to the UK, on the practicality of a joint RN-RAN 
minesweeping force. The suggestion was met with little enthusiasm on the part of the 
Australians, an indication of growing Australian naval independence.  
 
Throughout the post-war period a number of international and naval trends 
are apparent. One is the growing independence of Australia as a nation. This is 
especially relevant when one considers the strategic shift of Australia from the 
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United Kingdom to a more self-sufficient stance. An increase in defence co-
operation with the United States also took place in the same period, but the USA did 
not carry out the same role that Great Britain had previously. A second trend is that 
of increased self-reliance for the RAN. This inclination was arguably, a more subtle 
one, and differing levels of naval pragmatism, from both the RAN and the Admiralty 
were apparent. This was especially so in matters of personnel, training and 
procurement of equipment. There was also a level of pragmatism from the RAN 
towards its new dominant partner, the United States Navy. Just as an increased 
Australian naval self-reliance meant that the RAN had choices other than the 
Admiralty in regards to equipment procurement for example, the same increased 
independence meant that the Admiralty could be utilised when the RAN saw fit. 
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